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CHAPTER I 
BEFORE CONSIDERING RODRIGUFZ 
Historical Synopsis of the Relationship- Education, Finance and the Courts 1973-93 
In the early spring of 1973, educators looked hopefully towards the United States 
Supreme Court for guidance in resolving school finance issues.1 After all, nearly twenty 
years earlier, the Court had taken leadership roles, in both education and equal rights, 
when it declared in Brown v. Board of Education2 that "separate, but equal"3 education 
was unconstitutional.4 On March 23, 1973 the Supreme Court's leadership, for all 
effective purposes, came to a screeching halt with the Rodriguez decision. In Rodriguez, 
the Court held that education was not a fundamental right under the federal Constitution. 
Furthermore, the Court ruled that states could continue to determine their own methods for 
raising funds for schools, even if it meant using local property taxes as a major source of 
revenue. 
At first, the decision was interpreted as "a crushing blow to a movement that was 
trying to achieve education reform through judicial action. "5 Advocates of school finance 
reform feared this setback might stop the entire movement and they did so with good 
1 Linda Mathews, "Rodriguez and Friends," Race Relations Reporter (July 1973): 
15. 
2 Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 74 S.Ct. 686, 98 L.Ed. 873. 
3 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 16 S.Ct. 1138, 41 L.Ed. 256 (1896). 
4 Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 74 S.Ct. 686, 98 L.Ed. 873 (1954). 





opportunity," which have a particular meaning to those in the education community. 
Attorneys and judges may have some idea about these terms, but case law demonstrates 
that although they might define these terms similarly, they think about them differently. 
Early on in the education finance cases, it was almost as though educators spoke 
one "language" and courts spoke another. Educators would present their arguments in 
"eduspeak" and courts would hand down their decisions in "legalese." As time passed, 
and more and more cases were filed, each group became increasingly familiar with the 
other's "language," but it still was not their "native tongue." The communication problem 
was even more compounded because the issues to be resolved dealt with finance, which 
had its own "language," as well. Thus, in order to understand the history of the period, 
one may need not only a road map, but also a translator, for understanding the aspects of 
legal, educational, and financial language that were commonly used is essential to 
understanding this period in history. 
Thus, although this is a financial history work, much of this dissertation focuses on 
language and communication. This first chapter paves the way for later chapters by 
defining terms (from law, education and finance) that are used throughout the dissertation. 
It then discusses how school finance matters came to be addressed in court, in the first 
place. The second chapter discusses the facts and ruling in the Rodriguez case. The third 
chapter highlights some ouside aspects that may have influenced the decision, even though 
they were not directly mentioned in the case.outlines in brief the major state-court school 
finance cases that followed Rodriguez. The fourth chapter analyzes thepost-Rodriguez 
state court decisions, through description, comparison and contrast, emphasizing what the 
cases meant for the country as a whole. Finally, the fifth chapter draws conclusions about 
this period in history and offers suggestions to reformers who would like to see changes in 
school finance. 
Legal Preliminaries 
The Constitution of the United States 
Fundamental Rights and the Bill of Rights. 
5 
Education is not mentioned in the United States Constitution.13 It is not now, nor 
was it from 1973 to 1993, in legal terms, a "fundamental right" under the federal 
Constitution.1 4 Fundamental rights are those rights that are granted implicitly or explicitly 
in the United States Constitution and its amendments.IS This means that a fundamental 
right is either written about in the text of the Constitution, like the right to vote, or it is 
implied from other language, such as the right to privacy. As a practical matter, 
fundamental rights include most of the guarantees of the Bill of Rights, which are the first 
ten amendments to the Constitution. I 6 
The Fourteenth Amendment and Equal Protection. 
The United States Constitution was crafted to ensure the preservation of individual 
rights. Together with the Bill of Rights, the Constitution limits the powers of government 
and guarantees fundamental liberties for Americans.17 Initially, the Bill of Rights was 
applicable only to the federal government, not to individual state governments. Thus, in 
the early years of United States history, the powers of a state government were limited by 
respective bills of rights within the context of its own state constitution, rather than by the 
federal Bill of Rights. This process made states the final authority when interpreting their 
13 Although there is evidence that education was important to the framers of the 
Constitution, nonetheless they apparently chose not to include it. 
14 It is not a fundamental right under most state constitutions (even though states had 
the option of making it so, after Rodriguez.) 
15 San Antonio v. Rodriguez, 411 US. 1, 36 L.Ed 2d 16, 93 S.Ct 1278 (1973). 
16 John E. Nowak and Ronald D. Rotonda, Constitutional Law, Hornbook Series, 
5th ed. (St. Paul, Minnesota: West Publishing Co., 1995), 390. 
17 For example, among other rights, the Bill of Rights recognizes the rights to free 
speech, a speedy trial, and freedom of religion ,while it prohibits such governmental 
actions as unreasonable searches and seizures and excessive bail. 
6 
own constitutions, as long as no federal law was involved. With the adoption of the 
fourteenth amendment in 1868, however, federal constitutional controls were extended to 
state governments as weU.18 
For the purposes of this dissertation, the fourteenth amendment is important not 
only because it extends the Bill of Rights to actions against state governments, but also 
because it contains a phrase that has come to be known as the equal protection clause. 
The fourteenth amendment provides, in part, that "No state shall ... deny to any person 
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." 19 The equal protection clause has 
come to be an important guarantor of rights in many areas. In fact, "[i]n recent years the 
equal protection guarantee has become the single most important concept in the United 
States Constitution for the protection of individual rights. 1120 
The equal protection clause provides two guarantees. First, it promises that all 
individuals will be treated fairly when they are exercising their fundamental rights.21 
(Again, education is not a fundamental right.) Secondly, it assures that the government22 
will treat similarly situated individuals in a similar matter. 23 
Even with the equal protection clause, however, the government is not required to 
treat everyone equally. As shocking and un-American as it may sound, local, state, and 
18 John E. Nowak and Ronald D. Rotonda, Constitutional Law, Hornbook Series, 
5th ed. (St. Paul, Minnesota: West Publishing Co., 1995), 595. 
19 Constitution of the United States of America, Amendment XIV, Section 1. 
20 John E. Nowak and Ronald D. Rotonda, Constitutional Law, Hombook Series, 
5th ed. (St. Paul, Minnesota: West Publishing Co., 1995), 595. 
21 Ibid. 
22 The concept of "equal protection" under the fourteenth amendment applies to state 
and local governments only. Federal laws are tested under the same "equal protection" 
standards but through the implied guarantee of the fifth amendment. See John E. Nowak 
and Ronald D. Rotonda, Constitutional Law, Hornbook Series, 5th ed., (St. Paul, 
Minnesota: West Publishing Co., 1995), 596. 
23 John E. Nowak and Ronald D. Rotonda, Constitutional Law, Hombook Series, 
5th ed. (St. Paul, Minnesota: West Publishing Co., 1995), 597. 
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federal government bodies are entitled to discriminate among people; i.e., while it may 
seem odd to the non-lawyer, discrimination in and of itself is not illegal. For example, a 
state may decide that only people with certain qualifications can drive a truck, practice 
medicine, or teach elementary school.24 The equal protection clause ensures, however, 
that this ability to discriminate may not be used arbitrarily.25 
Tests for constitutionality under the equal protection clause. With the passage of 
time, as challenges to the equal protection clause were filed, the Supreme Court evolved a 
series oftests to determine whether the equal protection clause had been violated.26 From 
1973 to 1993, the Supreme Court used three tests to determine whether or not a law was in 
violation of the equal protection clause.27 Although the law changes constantly, currently 
all of these three tests are still in use. 
•The Rational Relationship Test 
The first test used during this period is known as the rational relationship test. The 
rational relationship test requires only that the government's reason for classifying or 
discriminating against an individual bears a rational relationship to a legitimate government 
interest.28 As long as it is arguable that there is a rational relationship to such an interest, a 
24 Allan R. Odden and Lawrence 0. Picus, School Finance: A Policy Perspective. 
(St. Louis, Missouri: McGraw-Hill, 1992), 22. 
25 John E Nowak and Ronald D. Rotonda, Constitutional Law, Hornbook Series, 5th 
ed., (St. Paul, Minnesota: West Publishing Co., 1995), 597. 
26 Allan R. Odden and Lawrence 0. Picus, School Finance: A Policy Perspective. 
(St. Louis, Missouri: McGraw-Hill, 1992), 22. 
27 Many sources, including several of the articles and notes cited here, list only two 
tests for equal protection, the rational relationship test and the strict scrutiny test. Although 
all school finance cases brought under equal protection clauses have bee resolved with one 
of these two tests, there are, in fact, three tests for determining whether a law violates 
equal protection. 
28 See Pennel v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 108 S. Ct. 849, 99 L.Ed.2d 1 (1988). 
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court should not interfere with the classification;29 i.e, the court should not declare the law 
unconstitutional. 
• The Strict Scrutiny Test 
The second test is known as the strict scrutiny test. This test is far more rigorous 
than the rational relationship test. With the strict scrutiny test, the government must show 
that it is discriminating (or classifying) because it has a compelling interest or that it is 
pursuing an overriding end. In addition, the relationship between the government's 
classification and its interest must be close. 
When a claim is brought under the auspices of the equal protection clause, the court 
will review the claim if it falls into one of two categories. The first category consists of 
people who are attempting to exercise their fundamental rights.30 The second category 
consists of people who are members of a "suspect class." A member of a suspect class is 
one who (1) is "saddled with such disabilities"; or 2) has been subject to "a history of 
purposeful unequal treatment"; or who 3) has been "relegated to a position of political 
powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the majoitarian political 
process. 113 l 
• The Intermediate Scrutiny Test 
Just as its name suggests, the constitutional standards for the intermediate scrutiny 
test, fall in between those of the rational relationship test and the strict scrutiny test. The 
intermediate scrutiny test was not used to determine the outcome of school finance 
challenges under the federal equal protection clause during the 1973-93 period. 
Consequently, it will not be emphasized in this dissertation. Nonetheless, it is important 
to note that the option of the intermediate scrutiny test became available to courts during this 
29 John E. Nowak and Ronald D. Rotonda, Constitutional Law, Hornbook Series, 
5th ed. (St. Paul, Minnesota: West Publishing Co., 1995), 597. 
30 Ibid. 
31 San Antonio v. Rodriguez, 411US1, 36 L Ed 2d 16, 40. 
9 
period.32 Furthermore, the courts' failure to use the intermediate scrutiny test during this 
period does not necessarily prohibit the use of this test in future education finance cases. 
32 Intermediate scrutiny developed after the 1973 Rodriguez decision. See Craig v. 
Boren 429 U.S. 190 (1976). 
10 
Purpose of U.S. Courts 
United States courts perform two functions. First, they settle disputes between 
parties. This is their most common function are the most common cases and involves 
selecting and applying the proper law to a particular set of facts. Such disputes may be 
criminal or civil. For example, a dispute may occur between two individuals, two 
companies, or, as in the case of a criminal violation, the people of a governmental body 
(such as a state) and the alleged offender. The second function of courts is to hear 
arguments for or against the very constitutionality of a law or its application. For example, 
the plaintiff (the person or entity bringing the charges) may argue either (1) that a particular 
law should never have been passed in the first place because it conflicts with the rights 
guaranteed under the Constitution or (2) that the law itself may be constitutional, but the 
way in which the law has been applied to a particular set of facts is not. In both types of 
cases, a court may decide whether a law is in violation of the state or federal constitution.33 
Judicial Considerations 
Judicial Review 
Judicial review is the supervisory power of United States Courts to declare national 
and state legislation unconstitutional. It is perhaps the United States' greatest contribution 
to the science and art of govemment.34 In his book The Constitution and American 
Education, Arvel A. Morris discusses at least three functions of judicial review, each of 
which he claims is vital to the success of the American government. First, he asserts that 
although the Supreme Court has only the power to say that a law is unconstitutional, and 
not to change the law directly, the mere declaration of unconstitutionality carries a great deal 
of weight with the public. Likewise, with a declaration of constitutionality, citizens often 
view the Court's opinion as a "stamp of legitimacy" upon a law or practice. Secondly, 
33 Arval A. Morris, The Constitution and American Education (St. Paul, Minnesota: 
West Publishing Co., 1980), 29. 
34 Ibid. 
11 
Morris notes that judicial review is an essential component in the triangular system of 
checks and balances. With the power of judicial review, courts limit the power of the 
executive and legislative branches by ensuring that these branches do not act with authority 
beyond that which is granted to them in the Constitution. Finally, Morris claims that "by 
fearlessly upholding a humane interpretation of our Constitution, the Supreme Court 
preserves, and requires the other branches of government to observe our great 
constitutional ideal of human dignity which otherwise might be forgotten. "35 
Judicial Activism 
Indeed, it is the duty of the judicial branch of the government to uphold the 
Constitution and the laws of the United States; however, it is not the duty of this branch to 
rewrite the law. At times, courts have been known to push their powers to the limit by 
engaging in judicial activism. Judicial activism is "marked by decisions calling for social 
engineering and occasionally these decisions represent intrusions into legislative and 
executive matters. 1136 
Judicial Restraint 
When a court believes that it may be on the verge of encroaching upon the duty of 
another branch of government, it should choose to exercise judicial restraint. Judicial 
restraint simply means that the court will not perform the duties of the legislative and 
executive branches of government. It will not create the law and it will not enforce the 
law; it will only interpret the law .37 Some would argue that just as with judicial activism, 
judicial restraint can be abused. This could happen when courts refuse to become involved 
in matters where its guidance could be helpful, such as in education finance matters. 
35 Ibid. at 80. 
36 Black's Law Dictionary, 5th ed., 1979, (St. Paul, Minnesota: West Publishing 
Co.,) 11th reprint 1987, 760. 
37 John E. Nowak and Ronald D. Rotonda, Constitutional Law, Horn book Series, 




Educators like the judiciary, also seek to preserve the idea of human dignity, but 
most frequently, they do so in the classroom rather than the courtroom. Not surprisingly, 
educators use different terminology as well. Many of the terms used by educators have 
crossed over into the language of legal briefs and judicial opinions. In fact, some of the 
educational terminology was created in anticipation of litigation. Nonetheless, in order to 
fully understand the background of the legal arguments that employ these terms, it is 
important to remember that these words and phrases have meaning to professionals outside 
the courtroom. 
Local Control 
Local control is one such phrase. The term is, in some sense, self-explanatory, 
meaning that issues are to be resolved within the borders of an immediate geographic area, 
rather than at any larger level. For example, a particular issue may be decided at a county 
level, rather than at a state level, or to go even further, the issue may then be further 
localized as to how it affects a particular city, a community, or even a neighborhood within 
that community. The concept of local control is not exclusive to education; however, 
historically, education and local control have had a very long relationship in the United 
States. Perhaps as a consequence, local control issues are especially sensitive in 
education.38 
Schools were first established in the United States on a local basis;39 thus, it was 
somewhat natural for them to be controlled at the local level. For schools, the idea of 
local control involves more than just financial matters; it involves the entire concept of 
38 Rochelle Sharpe, "Federal Education Law Becomes Hot Target of Wary 
Conservatives," Wall Street Journal, 30 August 1995, p. l(A). 
39 Percy E. Burrup, Vern Brimley Jr. and Rulon R. Garfield, Financing Education in 
a Oimate of Change (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1988), 162. 
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formal education. Curriculum, library book selection, teacher retention, and school 
policies (from student dress to student drinking) are all subject to the influence of local 
control. Historically, these elements of education, along with many others, have been 
controlled by local school boards,40 which are comprised of community members. 
In a note in the 1991 Vanderbilt Law Review, entitled "State Constitutional 
Analyses of Public School Finance Reform Cases: Myth or Methodology?" the author 
argues against the "rhetoric of local control,"41 but in doing so, points out some of the 
legitimate arguments for the preservation of local control. For example, parents who pour 
time, energy, and money into their local community school have a strong interest in that 
school. "[P]arents have an intimate and powerful interest in what and in how their 
children are taught, and even a possibility of reduced control raises concerns. "42 
Likewise, the community also has a strong interest in maintaining local control. 
"Preserving local fiscal autonomy against state domination is akin to protection of 
individual control over one's person and over the use of one's private property against 
government constraint. "43 Furthermore, different communities have different concerns, 
standards of living, and behavioral codes. Community-based concepts such as these 
naturally overlap into the microcosm of the local school. 
Equal Educational Opportunity 
Equal educational opportunity is "the basic principle that wealth should not 
determine the quality of public education."44 Much of the credit for developing the 
40 Rochelle Sharpe, "Federal Education Law Becomes Hot Target of Wary 
Conservatives," Wall StreetJoumal, 30 August 1995, p. l(A). 
41 Jonathan Banks, "State Constitutional Analyses of Public School Finance Reform 
Cases: Myth or Methodology?" 45 Vandertbilt Law Review 159 ( 1991) 
42 Ibid. at 160. 
43 Ibid. at 129. 
44 John Coons, Stephan D. Sugarman and William H. Clune III. Private Wealth and 
Public Education, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1970) 33. 
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concept of equal educational opportunity has been given to a former Northwestern 
University Law Professor, John Coons, and two former law students, William Clune and 
Stephen Sugarman. In their book, Private Wealth and Public Education, 45 the authors cite 
a 1966 government report, "Equality of Educational Opportunity," as the source of the 
concept,46 but the history of education finance indicates that reformers worked toward 
equalizing educational opportunity at least as far back as the early twentieth century. 4 7 
Education Finance 
History 
In effect, the United States does not have a history of school finance. Rather, it 
has at least fifty individual histories.48 "[l]t is fifty separate stories of controversy, 
fumbling, false starts, long periods of inaction, and application of various forms of 
informal local and state action. 1149 Although schools were organized in the United 
States in the early colonial period, free public education was "an idea created in the United 
States during the nineteenth century."50 There were early education laws in the colonies--
45 Allan R. Odden and Lawrence 0. Picus, School Finance: A Policy Perspective. 
(St. Louis, Missouri: McGraw-Hill, 1992), 25. 
46 J. Coleman, et. al. U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare, 1966. (This 
report is also known as the Coleman Report.) 
47 Andrew Reschovsky, "Fiscal Equalization and School Finance," National Tax 
Journal Vol. 47 No. 1: 185. 
48 This work does not examine school finance cases in the District of Columbia 
because the District of Columbia is not a state. Like the fifty states, however, the District 
of Columbia has problems with its own educational finance system. For a more detailed 
description of some of these problems, see Jonathan Kozol's Savage Inequalities. 
49 Burrup, Percy E., Vern Brimley Jr. and Rulon R. Garfield, Financing Education in 
a Oimate of Change, (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1988), 159. 
50 Percy E., Burrup Vern Brimley Jr. and Rulon R. Garfield, Financing Education in 
a Climate of Change, (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1988), 8. · 
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for example, the General Court of Massachusetts passed the Old Deluder Satan Act in 
1647 (which required every town with fifty or more families to appoint a teacher and towns 
with more than one hundred families to establish a secondary school), but education was 
overwhelmingly considered a private matter, best left to parents, private teachers, and the 
religious.SI 
Education in the United States was not always funded by a combination of local, 
state, and federal taxes, as it is now and was from 1973 to 1993. 
The typical citizen tends to think of the state school systems as having 
existed as they are now, from the beginning of the nation, but our patterns 
of education, including our financial formulas and schemes, are the 
products of more than two centuries of development under a grassroots 
process of building--a process that was often erratic.52 
Furthermore, local property taxes did not become the primary source of revenue for public 
schools until the late nineteenth century.53 
Today local, state and federal lawmaking bodies are responsible, albeit to varying 
degrees, for funding education.54 The level of financial commitment for each of these 
bodies has varied. For example, expenditures for elementary and secondary education 
comprise the single largest item in local government budgets.55 In contrast, while federal 
aid for education is older than the Constitution itself,56 within the past one hundred years, 
51 Ibid. at 159. 
52 Ibid. 
53 Andrew Reschovsky, "Fiscal Equalization and School Finance," National Tax 
Journal Vol. 47 No. 1: 185. 
54 Percy E. Burrup, Vern Brimley Jr. and Rulon R. Garfield, Financing Education in 
a Climate of Change (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1988), 13. 
55 Bernal L. Green and Mary Jo Schneider. "Threats to Funding for Rural Schools." 
Journal of Education Finance 15 (Winter 1990): 303. 
56 Percy E. Burrup, Vern Brimley Jr. and Rulon R. Garfield, Financing Education in 
a Climate of Change (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, Inc., 1988), 191. 
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the federal commitment to education has never exceeded 10 percent,57 i.e. state and local 
governments have combined for 90 percent of education's funding. 
Despite the importance of this weighty obligation, governmental bodies often use 
unscientific and ambiguous procedures to determine the amount of money to be budgeted 
for education.58 In part, they do so because in public sector institutions, such as 
education, there are no widely accepted methods for determining economic needs. In such 
a situation, when objectives may be vague or indeterminate governmental bodies are likely 
to look at several factors as substitute guidelines. Influential factors may include: (1) the 
organizations objectives and needs; (2) the potential contribution and influence of the 
institution; and (3) the political advantage of supporting the organization.59 Education 
suffers in such evaluations because it is often unable to demonstrate effectively that 
increased financial input produces effective results. 
Terminology 
Inputs and Outputs 
Economically speaking, a greater input should yield a greater output, but with 
education, inputs and outputs are somewhat difficult to define and extremely difficult to 
measure. Which inputs matter more, dollars or parental influence? What are the outputs 
that schools hope to produce? Better workers? Happier individuals? Model citizens? 
These questions are based, on the surf ace, on economic theories, but they cut to the quick 
. of ideas centered in educational philosophy. Part of the problem here lies with education 
57 Allan R. Odden and Lawrence 0. Picus, School Finance: A Policy Perspective. 
(St. Louis, Missouri: McGraw-Hill, 1992), 6. 
58 Percy E. Burrup, Vern Brimley Jr. and Rulon R. Garfield, Financing Education in 
a Climate of Change (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1988), 13. citing Robert J. Garvue, 
Modem Public School Finance (London: Macmillan, 1969), 67. 
59 Percy E. Burrup, Vern Brimley Jr. and Rulon R. Garfield, Financing Education in 
a Climate of Change (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, Inc., 1988), 13. 
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Equality and Equity 
Equality means treating everyone the same. In education this might translate as 
handing everyone the same $25.00 geography textbook. While such an action may seem 
just, it does not consider all of the students in the classroom. For example, a blind 
student's textbook may cost $50.00. A version translated into Spanish may cost $30.00. 
Some students may require supplemental materials to learn the same lessons that are 
presented in the geography textbook. "Public education systems are designed to produce 
equity (fairness) in the treatment of their students, but they do not, cannot, and should not 
aspire to produce complete equality. 1160 
Types of Equity. Equity itself has several considerations. First, there are at least 
two types of equity--horizontal equity and vertical equity. Horizontal equity "provides that 
students who are alike should be treated equally."61 Vertical equity "specifically recognizes 
differences among children and addresses the education imperative that some students 
deserve or need more services than others. "62 Equity and equality are sometimes used 
interchangeably,63 but they are, in fact, distinct terms and are not used interchangeably in 
this dissertation. 
Equity Considerations. Equity is also subject to the who? what? where? and 
when? questions. Who is to receive equitable treatment? Students? Parents? 
Taxpayers? Educators? What is the equity object? When should equitable treatment be 
employed? Always? Sometimes? Can criteria be established to set standards for use of 
60 Ibid. 
61 Allan R. Odden and Lawrence 0. Picus, School Finance: A Policy Perspective. 
(St. Louis, Missouri: McGraw-Hill, 1992), 60. 
62 Ibid. at 61. 
63 Percy E. Burrup, Vern Brimley, Jr., and Rulon R. Garfield, Financing Education 
in a Climate of Change, (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, Inc., 1988), 13. 
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the equity principle? All of these are important considerations when applying the concept 
of equity to any problem involving school finance. 
Fiscal Neutrality 
The concept of fiscal neutrality means that local school district wealth cannot be 
related to per student expenditures. It was developed by Coons, Clune, and Sugarman in 
an attempt to provide the court system with some judicially definable standard with which 
to compare school finance systems.64 Formally defined, it "is a negative standard, stating 
that current operating expenditures per pupil, or some resource, cannot be related to a 
school district's adjusted assessed valuation per pupil or some fiscal capacity measure. "65 
From 1973 to 1993 states adopted education policies that were "fiscally neutral," at least in 
terms of surface language. Today, every state acknowledges fiscal neutrality as the goal of 
its financing system.66 As the post-Rodriguez cases will demonstrate, however, few, if 
any, states have truly reached fiscal neutrality. 
How Rodriguez Came Before the Court 
Or Why Is School Finance Being Resolved in a Legal Setting Anyway? 
As the previous examination of terminology has already noted, education is not 
mentioned in the United States Constitution; it is not a fundamental right. Historically, 
local control has dominated community education. How, then, did the issues of school 
finance litigation come before any court, much less the United States Supreme Court? 
64 Allan R. Odden and Lawrence 0. Picus, School Finance: A Policy Perspective. 
(St. Louis, Missouri: McGraw-Hill, 1992), 25. 
65 Ibid. at 332. 
66 Andrew Reschovsky, "Fiscal Equalization and School Finance," National Tax 
Journal Vol. 47 No. 1: 187. 
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The Brown Case & Subsequent Years of Judicial Activism 
In Brown v. Board of Education, 67 the United States Supreme Court fully 
reviewed the validity of the "separate, but equal" doctrine that it had established in the 
1896 Plessy v. Ferguson68 decision. The Plessy decision had held that states could pass 
laws that would segregate people according to their race, as long as the laws were 
"reasonable, good faith attempts to promote the public good and [were] not designed to 
oppress a particular class."69 On May 6, 1954, in a unanimous decision, the Supreme 
Court held that "separate" was "inherently unequal" and thus the process of desegregation 
began. 
The road from Plessy to Brown was not an easy one. More than fifty years were 
spent inching toward the elimination of the "separate, but equal" doctrine. NAACP 
attorneys planned a course to wipe out segregation and they followed it step by step. They 
reasoned that a direct and immediate challenge to the entire doctrine would probably be 
swept aside. Thus, their moves were gradual. They began with challenges to the "equal" 
half of "separate, but equal." NAACP attorneys did not argue that "separate, but equal" 
was unconstitutional: rather, they urged that segregated facilities were not living up to the 
standards set in Plessy, e.g., the facilities were in fact separate, but they were certainly not 
equal.70 
Familiarity with the Brown case is especially important for understanding the 
Rodriguez decision, for several reasons. First, the Brown case demonstrates that the path 
toward changing the law is usually slow and arduous. Laws are not changed through 
67 Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 74 S.Ct. 686, 98 L.Ed. 873 (1954). 
68 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 16 S.Ct. 1138, 41 L.Ed. 256 (1896). 
69 John E. Nowak and Ronald D. Rotonda, Constitutional Law, Hornbook Series, 
5th ed. (St. Paul, Minnesota: West Publishing Co., 1995), 649. 
70 For an in-depth history of the challenge to the "separate, but equal" doctrine, see 
Equal Justice, by Richard Kluger. 
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spontaneous generation. Instead, lawyers generally develop well-thought-out and well-
planned strategies for meeting their goals. Secondly, Brown is important because it is part 
of a period of judicial activism and expansion of human rights under equal protection that 
school finance reformers hoped to capitalize upon in Rodriguez. School finance reformers 
believed that if the Supreme Court were willing to end segregation of the races, perhaps it 
would be willing to bridge the gap between the wealthy and the poor. Reformers reasoned 
that if race could qualify as a suspect class, subject to strict judicial scrutiny, perhaps 
wealth could qualify as well. Finally, Brown is important to Rodriguez because the facts 
of the Brown case developed in schools. 
The strategists who dismantled segregation chose education as the field in which to 
wage their battle. In the Plessy case, the plaintiff, who alleged that he was seven-eighths 
white, attempted to sit in a train section that had been reserved for whites. NAACP 
attorneys could have challenged segregation under other forms of transportation in the 
United States. Perhaps it would have been more logical to do so, but the path to 
desegregation was laid in the field of education. 
Thus, American schools, in all their non-constitutional glory were brought before 
the Supreme Court of the United States, and while some legal cynics might say that schools 
were merely the vehicle to bring the issues of segregation and equal protection before the 
Court, the Supreme Court itself recognized the importance of education in its decision. 
Most educators are familiar with Chief Justice Warren's words: 
Today education is perhaps the most important function of state and 
rocal governments. Compulsory school attendance laws and the great 
expenditures for education both demonstrate our recognition of the 
importance of education to our democratic society. It is required in the 
performance of our most basic public responsibilities, even service in the 
armed forces. It is the very foundation of good citizenship. Today it is a 
principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing 
him for later professional training, and in helping him adjust normally to his 
environment. In these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be 
expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education. 
Such an opportunity, where the state has undertaken to provide it, is a right 
which must be made available to all on equal terms. 71 
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With language such as this, expounded by the Chief Justice, school finance reformers had 
reason to think optimistically. When the man who had argued for the plaintiffs in the 
Brown case, Thurgood Marshall, became a member of the Supreme Court, the plaintiffs in 
the Rodriguez case had reason to think they could win. 
CHAPTER II 
THE RODRIGUEZ CASE 
Introduction 
In 1968, Demetrio Rodriguez, a thirty-two-year-old sheet metal worker, father of 
four, and veteran of two wars, joined seven other parents and fifteen students in a lawsuit 1 
that would eventually come before the United States Supreme Court as San Antonio v. 
Rodriguez. 2 At the time of the initial suit, Rodriguez's children were enrolled in school in 
the poor, mostly Hispanic Edgewood Independent School District in San Antonio, Texas.3 
His children attended classes at Edgewood Elementary, a building condemned by the city 
of San Antonio.4 Rodriguez, who "vowed that his seven-year old son Alex would never 
again go to a school that was unsafe, "5 was the first to sign the complaint; thus, his name 
appeared first on the lawsuit.6 
Rodriguez and the other plaintiffs filed their suit hoping to restructure the school 
finance system in Texas, not so that more money would be spent, but so that money would 
1 Renee Haines, "Now His Grandchildren Will Suffer Too." UPI, 26 September 
1990, Wednesday, BC cycle. 
2 San Antonio Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 US. 1, 36 L.Ed 2d 16, 93 S.Ct 1278 
3 Renee Haines, "Now His Grandchildren Will Suffer Too." UPI, 26 September 
1990, Wednesday, BC cycle. 
4 LEXIS transcript, "Texas Struggles to Find Equitable School Finance Plan," All 
Things Considered, 27 May 1993, on National Public Radio. 
5 Ibid. 
6 Renee Haines, "Now His Grandchildren Will Suffer Too." UPI, 26 September 
1990, Wednesday, BC cycle. 
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be spent more equitably.7 At the time of the suit, education in Texas, like almost every 
other state, was funded through a combination of federal, state, and local taxes.8 The 
resulting system of school financing was called "chaotic and unjust,"9 even by those who 
eventually upheld its constitutionality. 
The History of School Financing in Texas 
The Early History 
Historically, education in Texas was funded through local taxes that were 
supplemented through state assistance and, to a small degree, by federal moneys. The state 
of Texas provided for a system of free schools in its first constitution when it was admitted 
to the Union in 1845. In 1883, the Texas constitution was amended to create local school 
districts and to recognize the use of ad valorem 10 property taxes for the building and 
maintenance of a free school system. From that time, in the late nineteenth century, until 
the late 1940s, local funds were supplemented by two state sources: the State's Permanent 
School Fund and the State's Available School Fund. 
The State's Permanent School Fund 
The State's Permanent School Fund was established in 1854 with money generated 
from the sale of lands in Texas. It was established so that there might always be money 
for education in Texas. Although the Permanent School Fund still existed at the time the 
original Rodriguez suit was filed, it did not play as important a role in the analysis of the 
funding situation as did the State's Available School Fund. 
7 Ibid. 
8 411 US 1, 36 LEd 2d 16, 59. 
9 Ibid. 
10 An ad valorem tax is a tax on the property made according to its value. See 
Black's Law Dictionary. 
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The State's Available School Fund 
The State's Available School Fund received income from the State Permanent 
School Fund as well as ad valorum property taxes and other assessments.I I 
Consequently, the amount of money in the State's Available School Fund would vary from 
year to year. By the time the Rodriguez case was brought before the Supreme Court, the 
Available School Fund was a technical source of support for public schools, but it had been 
virtually replaced by the Minimum Foundation Program.12 
Increasing Disparities 
In spite of these state-supported funds, this system of funding education (through 
local taxes with supplementary money provided by the state) produced ever increasing 
spending disparities among school districts. In the twentieth century, as the state became 
more industrialized, wealth became more localized. The population of Texas was no 
longer spread evenly across the land and property wealth began to cluster in certain areas. 
The increased property value of some areas naturally meant that the residents of those areas 
were able to make greater provisions for their schools because the schools were funded 
locally. 
Reform Attempts in the 1940s 
By the 1940s, local funding disparities had grown to such proportions and had 
such a noticeable effect on the quality of district schools that the state legislature "undertook 
a thorough evaluation of public education with an eye toward major reform."13 In 1947, 
the state of Texas appointed an eighteen-member committee of legislators and educators to 
investigate school finance systems in other states and to devise a plan that would ease 
11 San Antonio v. Rodriguez, 411 US 1, 36 L.Ed. 2d 16, 27-28. 
12 See Marshall's dissent in San Antonio v. Rodriguez, 411 US 1, 36 L.Ed. 2d 16. 
13 San Antonio v. Rodriguez, 411 US 1, 36 L.Ed. 2d 16, 29. 
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disparities in local spending in Texas' school districts. By 1949, the eventual result of 
their work went into effect as the Texas Minimum Foundation School Program.14 
The Minimum Foundation School Program 
Money generated by the Minimum Foundation School Program was designated for 
three specific costs--namely, teachers' salaries, operating expenses and transportation 
costs. Any expenses falling outside of these three categories would have to be funded 
from other sources. Revenues for the Program were derived from both the state and local 
level. The state provided approximately 80 percent of the Program's funding, while the 
local districts, working as a single unit, provided the other 20 percent.15 The 20 percent 
provided by the local districts was known as the Local Fund Assignment.16 Each district 
contributed local property taxes to the Local Fund Assignment via a complicated formula 
that was designed so that a larger share of the costs would be assumed by districts with 
high property value. Although all the earlier funding devices remained in effect, by the 
time the Rodriguez case reached the Supreme Court in 1973, the Program accounted for 
close to half the total educational expenditures in the state.17 
School Financing at the Time of Rodriguez 
Over the course of the 1970-71 school year, the twelve school districts of Bextar 
County, Texas, including Edgewood and Alamo Heights, received funds from the federal, 
state, and local levels18 (see Table 1). The federal government contributed approximately 
10 percent of the overall public school expenditures, with the rest of the money coming 
from state and local sources. As previously noted, state funding came from two programs: 
14 Ibid. at 30. 
15 Ibid. at 29. 
16 Ibid. at 50. 
17 Ibid. at 29. 
18 Rodriguez v. San Antonio lndep. Sch. Dist., 377 F. Supp. 280. 
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(1) The Available School Fund and (2) The Minimum Foundation Program. For the 1970-
71 school year, the Available School Fund totaled $296 million. This money was 
distributed to districts on a per capita basis based upon the average daily attendance I 9 
during the previous school year. The Minimum Foundation Program, with 80 percent of 
its revenue drawn from general state revenues and 20 percent taken from the Local Fund 
Assignment, also remained in effect. 
19 The term "average daily attendance" appears frequently in school finance formulas 
and is not as simple as its name would suggest. Most often, students are "weighted" on 
criteria such as grade level or hours in school. 
28 











DESCRIPTION OF RESOURCES 
Funds were provided for, but not distributed on a 
per pupil basis 
Technically,* funds were distributed under two 
programs: 
Available School Fund 
Composed of many sources including the state ad 
valorem property tax, 114 total occupation tax, 
annual contributions by the legislature from general 
revenues, & revenues from the permanent school 
fund 
Minimum Foundation School Program 
80% paid by state 
20% paid by local school districts under the Local 
Fund Assignment 
The amount of money raised depends on the tax 
rate and the amount of taxable property 
*Although the Texas Constitution, Artide 7, § 5, established the Available school fund, by 
1973 the Available School Fund was characterized as "simply one facet" of the Minimum 
Foundation School Program because a school district's share of the Available School Fund 
is deducted from the amount to which the district is entitled under the Minimum Foundation 
Program. 
Information used in this table was obtained from the Supreme Court's Rodriguez decision. 
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Local fund-raising capabilities remained very important. Money raised locally, 
through ad valorem property taxes, went to several sources. It provided for a district's 
share of the Minimum Foundation Program; it reduced bonded indebtedness for capital 
expenditures; and it financed all expenditures above the state minimum.20 Although the 
ability to tax locally may have been initially seen as a means of "empowering"21 local 
school districts, two factors restricted a local school district's ability to raise funds. The 
first factor was the local tax rate, and the second factor was the amount of taxable property 
within the district.22 
The District Court Case 
Synopsis 
When the Rodriguez plaintiffs brought their suit to federal court in the Western 
District of Texas, they alleged that the ad valorum property tax played a significant role in 
determining how much money would be spent on each child's education. The plaintiffs 
claimed that under the Texas financing system, students who resided in property poor 
districts had far fewer dollars spent on their education than students in wealthier districts, 
even though the property-poor districts were taxed at a higher rate. The plaintiffs urged the 
court to find that the method of financing education in the state of Texas violated the equal 
protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution on the 
grounds that the state unfairly distinguished the type of education its citizens would receive, 
based on the wealth of the district in which they resided. 
The defendants did not dispute the distinction between the treatment of various 
groups. Instead, they responded that there was a rational relationship between the 
financing system and the legitimate state purpose of maintaining local control over schools. 
20 Rodriguez v. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist., 337 F. Supp. 280, 281. 
21 Ibid at 281. 
22 San Antonio v. Rodriguez, 411 US 1, 36 L.Ed. 2d 16, 66. 
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According to the defendants, this rational relationship was enough to validate the difference 
in treatment. 
The court first determined the issue in the case: Did the system of financing 
education in Texas violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment? 
After considering the facts, the court held that the system of financing education in Texas 
violated the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The court mandated the 
defendants to "reallocate funds ... so as not to violate the equal protection provisions of both 
the United States and Texas constitutions"23 within two years.24 
The District Court's Analysis 
In its analysis of the facts, the court first acknowledged the three sources of 
education funding: federal, state and local. The court noted that federal funds accounted 
for "only about ten percent of the overall public school expenditures. "25 Two programs, 
the Available School Fund and the Minimum Foundation Program comprised the state 
sources. Part of the resources (20 percent) comprising the Minimum Foundation Program 
came from the "Local Fund Assignment." In order "to pay their share of the Minimum 
Foundation Program, to satisfy bonded indebtedness for capital expenditures, and to 
finance all expenditures above the state minimum, "26 local school districts collected ad 
valorem taxes. Districts with lower property value were unable to produce funds at the 
same level as districts with a higher property value, even though the poorer districts would 
. typically tax at a much higher rate. (For example, Edgewood's production from ad 
23 Rodriguez v. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist., 337 F. Supp. 280, 285. 
24 Before two years had passed, however, the Supreme Court reversed the lower 
court's decision. 
25 Rodriguez v. San Antonio, 337 F. Supp. 280, 281. 
26 Ibid. 
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valorem taxes was $21 while Alamo Heights' was $307, even though Alamo Heights taxed 
at a lower rate than Edgewood.)27 
The court disagreed with defendants' contentions that the rational relationship stan-
dard to equal protection should be applied and that a rational relationship existed between 
funding distinctions and the legitimate state purpose of maintaining local control. Instead, 
the court found that a classification was made on wealth and that education was a funda-
mental interest. Consequently, "more than mere rationality was required."28 The court 
held that, "Because of the grave significance of education to both the individual and to our 
society, the defendants must demonstrate a compelling state interest that is promoted by the 
current classifications created under the financing scheme. "29 Furthermore, even if 
rationality had been an acceptable test, the state was unable to meet the requirements of that 
test anyway ,30 
The court then distinguished this case from an earlier case, Mcinnis v. Shapiro, 31 
"in which the plaintiffs had sought to require educational expenses [based] on 'pupils 
educational needs"' ,32 and from other similar cases which had called for excessive federal 
involvement in the intricacies of school financing. Whereas the Mcinnis plaintiffs had 
failed to establish adequate definitions for "educational needs," the Rodriguez plaintiffs 
called for the implementation of a previously defined term--fiscal neutrality. Furthermore, 
while the role of the judiciary was unclear in the establishment of "educational needs," 
27 Ibid. at 282. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Ibid. at 283. 
30 Ibid. at 284. 
31 293. F. Supp. 327 (N.D. Ill. 1968). 
32 Rodriguez v. San Antonio lndep. Sch. Dist., 337 F. Supp. 280, 283. 
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fiscal neutrality simply mandated that the quality of public education may not be a function 
of wealth, other than the wealth of the state as a whole.33 
The court then brushed aside the defendants' last few arguments. First, to the 
state's contention that the current system was necessary because it granted local decision 
making power to individual districts (for the preservation of local control), the court 
responded that "the state has in truth and in fact, limited the choice of financing by 
guaranteeing that some districts will spend low (with high taxes) while others will spend 
high (with low taxes.) Hence, the ... system [did] not serve to promote one of the very 
interests which the defendants assert[ed.]"34 The court also challenged the defendants 
claim that the plaintiffs wanted to create socialized education. The court noted that 
education "has been socialized [in the United States] ... almost from its origin. 1135 Finally, 
the court stated that "[ w ]bile defendants are correct in their suggestion that this Court 
cannot act as a 'super-legislature,' the judiciary can always determine that an act of the 
legislature is violative of the Constitution. "36 In this instance, the court found that the act 
of the legislature that established the school financing system in Texas violated the equal 
protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. 
33 Ibid. at 284. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Ibid. at 285. 
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The Supreme Court Decision 
Synopsis 
The case was overturned on appeal to the United States Supreme Court. In a 
5-4 decision, the Supreme Court found that the Rodriguez case was not appropriate for 
strict judicial scrutiny and that the Texas school system did not violate the equal protection 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Education was 
not a fundamental right under the federal Constitution and states could continue to fund 
their school systems through the use of ad valorem property taxes. 
The Structure of Opinion 
The Rodriguez opinion was written by Justice Lewis F. Powell Jr. Justices 
Warren E. Burger, Potter Stewart, Harry A. Blackmun, and William H. Rehnquist joined 
in the opinion, i.e. they agreed with both the verdict and the reasoning behind the verdict. 
Justice Stewart also wrote a concurring opinion, not to diverge from Justice Powell's 
writing, but to emphasize his belief that any other result would have marked "an 
extraordinary departure from the principled adjudication under the Equal Protection Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment. 113 7 Justice Byron R. White wrote a dissenting opinion in 
which he was joined by Justices William 0. Douglas and William H. Brennan. Justice 
Brennan also voiced his disagreement with the court in an additional dissent on the subject 
offundamentality. Finally, Justice Thurgood Marshall wrote a detailed dissent with which 
Justice Brennan also concurred. 
37 San Antonio v. Rodriguez, 411 US 1, 36 L.Ed. 2d 16, 58. 
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Table 2 - ComEosition of the Court at the Time ofthe Rodri~uez Decision 
Justice Born Appointed by Term Served Vote 
Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 1907 Nixon 1972-'ir? Majority 
Warren E. Burger 1907 Nixon 1969-86 Joined 




Harry A. Blackmun 1908 Nixon 1970-94 Joined 
William H. Rehnquist* 1924 Nixon 1972-Present Joined 
Byron R. White 1917 Kennedy 1962-93 Dissented 
William 0. Douglas 1898 F. D. Roosevelt 1939-79 Joined in 
White's dissent 
Thurgood Marshall 1908 Johnson 1967-91 Dissented 




dissent & wrote 
own dissent 
*Rehnquist became the Chief Justice in 1986. 
Sources: The New York Public Library Desk Reference, the Worldbook Encyclopedia and 
the Rodriguez decision. 
The Majority Opinion 
Justice Powell began the majority opinion with an introductory history of the 
record. He then divided his opinion into four sections. In the first section, Justice Powell 
established the framework for the majority's analysis.38 In the second section, itself 
divided into three parts, the majority concluded that "Texas' system of public school 
finance [was] an inappropriate candidate for strict judicial scrutiny. "39 In the third section, 
38 Ibid. at 33. 
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the majority examined the facts of the case as they were related to the equal protection 
clause and found that any disparities were not the "product of a system so irrational as to be 
invidiously discriminatory. "40 Finally, in the fourth section, on behalf of the majority, 
Powell acknowledged that the system of school finance in Texas needed revision, but that it 
was not within the Court's legitimate powers to undertake that task. 
In the introductory section of the majority opinion, Justice Powell recognized the 
parties and the conditions under which they brought suit. He identified the case as a class 
action suit initiated by "Mexican-American parents whose children attended the elementary 
and secondary schools in the Edgewood Independent School District"41 brought on behalf 
of "children throughout the State who were members of minority groups or who were poor 
and lived in school districts with a low property tax base. "42 He then noted that not all of 
the children in the complaint attended public school; some attended private school,43 even 
though this fact did not affect the certification of the class. Next, Powell named the 
defendants: the State Board of Education, the Commissioner of Education, the State 
Attorney General, and the Bextar County (San Antonio) Board of Trustees. Then, the 
Justice traced the filing of the complaint, the impaneling of the three-judge district court, the 
district court's ruling, and the state's proper appeal. Finally, Justice Powell indicated the 
majority's reversal of the lower court's decision. 
J. The first section of the majority opinion began with a brief history of school 
financing in Texas. It then moved into a discussion of the "complex" and "complicated" 
system under examination,44 highlighting the Minimum Foundation Program. The Court 
39 Ibid. at 49. 
40 Ibid. at 55. 
41 Ibid. at 27. 
42 Ibid. 
43 Ibid. at 26-27. 
44 Ibid. at 29. 
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reasoned that the Minimum Foundation Program was designed to serve two purposes. 
First, it "would have an equalizing influence on expenditure levels between districts by 
placing the heaviest burden on the school districts most capable of paying. "45 At the same 
time, through the Local Fund Assignment, every school district would be "force[d] ... to 
contribute to the education of its children but that would not itself exhaust any district's 
resources. "46 
Powell then went on to compare the Edgewood and Alamo Heights communities, 
including their racial compositions, student enrollments, tax rates and assessed property 
values47 (see Table 3). He also noted that from 1949 to 1967 state and local expenditures 
toward education rose 500 percent and that during the previous ten years, the total school 
budget rose from $750 million to $2. l billion.48 Powell acknowledged that local taxes 
contributed greatly to the amount of money spent by a school district and that reliance on 
such taxes produced "substantial interdistrict disparities. n 49 
45 Ibid. 
46 Ibid. 
47 Ibid. at 30-32. 
48 Ibid. at 30. 
49 Ibid. at 32. 
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Table 3 - Comparison Edgewood and Alamo Heights at the Time of the Rodriguez Decision 
Edgewood Alamo Heights 
Total enrollment for 22,862 students 5,432 
elementary & secondary 
Number of schools 25 6 
Amount of commercial Residential community Residential Community 
or industrial property Little commerce or industry 
Racial background of 90% Mexican-American 82% "Anglo" 
residents 6% African-American 18% Mexican-American 
4% unidentified/other Less than 1 % African-
American 
Median family income $4,686 $8,001 
Lowest in metropolitan area 
Averaged assessed $5,960 per pupil $49,078 per pupil 
property value Lowest in metropolitan area 
Equalized tax rate per $1.05 $.85 
$100 of assessed Highest in metropolitan area 
property 
Local contribution 
above and beyond the 
$26 per pupil $333 per pupil 
local fund assignment 
requirement 
State contribution 
through the minimum 
$222 per pupil $225 per pupil 
foundation program 
Total local & state $248 per pupil $558 per pupil 
funds 
Federal funds $108 per pupil $36 per pupil 
Total funds $356 per pupil $594 per pupil 
Source: The Supreme Court's decision in Rodriguez. 
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Justice Powell then summarized the District Court's findings that: ( 1) "wealth" 
was a suspect class; (2) education was a fundamental interest; and (3) that because the 
state of Texas could not demonstrate a compelling state interest for maintaining its school 
financing system, the system had to be abolished. Finally, he added: "Texas virtually 
conceded that its historically rooted dual system of financing education could not withstand 
strict judicial scrutiny. "50 With this factual framework in place, Powell began the 
majority's analysis. 
!L. According to the majority, the District Court's opinion did not "reflect the 
novelty and complexity of the constitutional questions posed by the appellees' challenge to 
Texas' system of school financing. "51 The Supreme Court alleged that District Court in 
Rodriguez, as well as courts in other school finance cases,52 had "virtually assumed their 
findings of a suspect class through a simplistic process of analysis."53 In the majority's 
view, the Supreme Court itself had never examined a case of wealth discrimination similar 
to the one presented by the facts of the Rodriguez case. Preliminary questions as to the 
nature of the class needed to be addressed before resolving the complex constitutional 
questions. 
A. The first preliminary question that the Court sought to address was whether the 
class of plaintiffs in Rodriguez indeed constituted a suspect class. If it did constitute a 
suspect class, then the court would be compelled to examine the Texas education financing 
plan with strict judicial scrutiny. (See Chapter 1 for more on suspect classes and strict 
judicial scrutiny.) For several reasons, however, the Court found that the Rodriguez class 
was not suspect. 
50 Ibid. at 33. 
51 Ibid. at 34. 
52 Such as the California Supreme Court case Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal 3d 584, 487 
P.2d 1241 (1971). 
53 San Antonio v. Rodriguez, 411 US 1, 36 L.Ed. 2d 16, 34. 
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First, the Court failed to find a definable class of poor people. The Court 
suggested that the class alleging discrimination might be comprised of: (1) people whose 
income was below a certain determined level; or (2) people who were relatively poorer 
than certain others; or (3) people in a certain district who were poorer than others in that 
district.54 The plaintiffs in this case were "a large, diverse and amorphous class, unified 
only by the common factor of residence in districts that happen to have less taxable wealth 
than other districts. "55 
The Court then compared the alleged deprivation suffered by the Rodriguez 
plaintiffs to that which was endured by plaintiffs in other cases where the Court had found 
discrimination against a class based on wealth.56 In Rodriguez, the court reasoned that 
the plaintiffs were not completely deprived of a state service as they were in other cases. 
The court found that the plaintiffs did have the opportunity to an education. The majority 
wrote that the State of Texas provided 12 years of free public school, in addition to 
teachers, books, transportation funds, and operating expenses. In addition, the majority 
pointed out that the plaintiffs never claimed that they were deprived of an education in their 
argument . The plaintiffs asserted only that they received "a poorer quality education than 
that available to children in districts having more assessable wealth. 1157 
Finally, the Court asserted that even if the class in this case could have been 
defined, it possessed none of the usual traits of suspectness that had been defined in earlier 
cases. In the past, only certain characteristics would render a class 
"suspect." For example, in previous cases, classes were considered suspect if it was 
54 Ibid. at 35. 
55 Ibid. at 40. 
56 See Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12,100 L.Ed. 891, 76 S.Ct. 585, 55 ALR 2d 
1055 (1956) where the Court invalidate laws that prevented an indigent defendant from 
obtaining a trial transcript necessary to the appeal process. 
57 San Antonio v. Rodriguez, 411 US 1, 36 L.Ed. 2d 16, 37. 
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subject to a history of purposeful discrimination, such as racial discrimination. Classes 
could also be considered suspect if they were either burdened with extreme disabilities or 
so politically powerless that they required the protection of the government's strict scrutiny 
analysis under the equal protection clause.58 According to Powell, the Rodriguez plaintiffs 
did not demonstrate any of these characteristics. Thus, in the majority's view, there was 
no suspect class. 
B. The majority was careful not to downplay the importance of education, 
however. It cited the Brown case for the proposition that "education is perhaps the most 
important function of state and local governments." Furthermore, the majority claimed that 
the Court had been dedicated to public education throughout the course of United States 
history.59 "But, [the Court argued] the importance of a service performed by the State 
does not determine whether it must be regarded as fundamental for the purposes of 
examination under the Equal Protection Clause. "60 This was the next subject addressed by 
the majority. 
In Rodriguez, the plaintiffs had asserted that even if the Court would not recognize 
a discernible class of poor people whose rights were to be evaluated with strict scrutiny the 
right to education was, nonetheless, fundamental. In the Court's view, the key to 
determining whether the plaintiffs were correct and whether education was fundamental 
could not be found by comparing education with other rights. Rather, the Court looked to 
the United States Constitution. The Court examined the Constitution to see whether a right 
to education was either explicitly or implicitly guaranteed.61 In this case, the majority held 
that there was no such constitutional guarantee to education. 
58 Ibid. at 40. 
59 Ibid. at 41. 
60 Ibid. at 41. 
61 Ibid. at 43. 
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The Court pointed out that education, because it is not mentioned in the federal 
Constitution, could not be considered among the rights explicitly afforded by the 
document. The plaintiffs had argued, however, that the right to education was implicitly 
guaranteed by the Constitution. 
Specifically, they insist[ed] that education is a fundamental personal right 
because it is essential to the effective exercise of First Amendment freedoms 
and to intelligent utilization of the right to vote. In asserting a nexus 
between speech and education, appellees urge that the right to speak is 
meaningless unless the speaker is capable of articulating his thoughts 
intelligently and persuasively. The 'marketplace of ideas' is an empty 
forum for those lacking basic communicative tools. Likewise they argue[ d] 
that the corollary right to receive information becomes little more than a 
hollow privilege when the recipient had not been taught to read, assimilate 
and utilize available knowledge.62 
The Court did "not dispute any of these propositions, "63 but it did not find education to be 
a fundamental right either. 
Powell wrote that the Supreme Court had "never presumed either the ability or 
authority to guarantee to the citizenry the most effective speech or the most informed 
electoral choice,"64 (emphasis in the original text). Consequently, even if education was a 
fundamental right (because of its necessity relative to other rights), Powell questioned how 
much and what type of education was necessary. The court also pointed out that adequate 
food and shelter might also be necessary to the successful exercise of other rights, but these 
rights were not constitutionally fundamental. The Court reasoned that if education was a 
fundamental right under the type of argument offered by the plaintiffs that fundamental 
right status might have to be extended to other important personal interests.65 
62 Ibid. at 44. 
63 Ibid. at 44. 
64 Ibid. 
65 Ibid. at 45. 
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C. In the final part of the second section of the majority opinion, Justice Powell 
suggested that the Supreme Court would not become a so-called "super-legislature. "66 
Powell wrote, "We have here nothing less than a direct attack on the way in which Texas 
bas chosen to raise and disburse state and local tax revenues." The majority had several 
reasons for failing to enter into the resolution of Texas's school financing problems. 
First, the majority reported that to do so "would have the Court intrude in an area in 
which it has traditionally deferred to state legislatures. "67 Furthermore, the Court believed 
that is was impossible to implement a tax system that was completely free of 
discrimination.68 In addition, the Court suggested that there were still too many 
unanswered questions as to the relationship between funding and educational quality for it 
to make an informed decision about such matters. According to the majority, even 
education policy experts disagreed on whether there was a correlation between educational 
expenditures and educational quality.69 Somewhat fatalisticlaly, the majority opined, "The 
ultimate wisdom as to these and related problems of education is not likely to be divined for 
all time even by the scholars who now so earnestly debate the issues. "70 Lastly, the Court 
suggested that an active role in this case had the potential to interfere with the traditional 
state/federal government relationship. "[l]t would be difficult to imagine a case having 
greater potential impact on our federal system than the one now before us. 1171 
66 The Court actually discussed the 'super legislature phenomenon earlier in the case 
in Section II, Part B. The Court borrowed the phrase form an earlier Supreme Court 
decision, Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 Us at 665, 661, 22 L Ed 2d 600. 
67 San Antonio v. Rodriguez, 411 US 1, 36 L.Ed. 2d 16 at 47. 
68 Ibid. at 48. 
69 Ibid. at 48-49. 
70 Ibid. at 49. 
71 Ibid. 
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In sum then, the Court asserted in Section II that in the Rodriguez case, there was 
no suspect class, education was not shown to be a fundamental right, and the Supreme 
Court would not act as a "super-legislature." Thus, for all these reasons (cited in Parts A, 
B, and C) the Supreme Court concluded that "Texas' system of public school finance [was] 
an inappropriate candidate for strict judicial scrutiny. "72 The system could still be declared 
unconstitutional, however, if the state failed to meet the rational relationship test. The 
Court went on to address that possibility in the next section. 
III. In the third section of the majority opinion, Powell addressed whether the 
Texas school financing system, "with its conceded imperfections, nevertheless bore some 
rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose. "73 Powell again reviewed the structure 
of the financing system and admitted: 
In part, local differences are attributable to differences in the rates of 
taxation or in the degree to which the market value for any category of 
property varies from its assessed value. The greatest interdistrict 
disparities, however, are attributable to the differences in the amount of 
assessable property available within any district. Those districts that have 
more valuable property, have a greater capacity for supplementing state 
funds.74 
Powell went on to acknowledge that wealthy districts could pay for better teachers and 
lower the student -teacher ratio, which would suggest that wealthier districts could provide 
a better education. 
In spite of these admissions and their implications, the majority nonetheless found 
that the state's school financing system bore a rational relationship to a legitimate state 
purpose. Powell listed at least eight reasons for the majority's position: 
72 Ibid. 
73 San Antonio v. Rodriguez, 411 US 1, 36 L.Ed. 2d 16, 49. 
74 Ibid. at 50, 51. 
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1 . The use of this type of funding system was widespread throughout the 
United States. Almost every other state used a similar formula for funding 
state schools. 
2. Texas had a long history of using the local property tax to finance 
education. 
3. The Texas system of school financing was responsive to both state and local 
interests, in accordance with the renowned educational finance theories of 
George D. Strayer and Robert M. Haig. 
4. Parents and taxpayers could exercise local control in that they could devote 
more of their own money to their own children and that they could also 
determine how their own tax dollars would be spent. 
5. The existence of "some inequality" was not enough to strike down the 
whole system. Neither was the fact that, hypothetically, a better system of 
school financing might be possible. 
6. Even poor districts were not completely devoid of educational choices. For 
example, they could determine how available funds would be allocated and 
could also make "numerous decisions" as to the operation of their school. 
7. Giving the state a greater financial responsibility would be likely to 
diminish local power. 
8. Any system of local taxation was likely to establish boundaries and 
property value fluctuation and/or disparities may result, but that did not 
make such methods oflocal taxation unconstitutional. 
Thus, the majority concluded that the District Court had erred when it found that "the State 
had failed even 'to establish a reasonable basis' for a system that results in different 
spending levels of pupil expenditures. 117 5 
75 San Antonio v. Rodriguez, 411 US 1, 36 L.Ed. 2d 16, 51 quoting 337 F.Supp at 
284. 
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Section IV. In the final section of the majority opinion, Powell reiterated the 
importance of education, but again pointed out the complexity of educational finance issues 
and the disagreement among educational researchers as to the best way to improve 
conditions in the poorest districts. The majority called for "innovative thinking as to public 
education, its methods, and its funding," but saw fit to exercise judicial restraint. It did not 
want to violate "the values of federalism and separation of powers"76 by becoming 
involved in matters it considered better left to the legislature. Educational finance issues did 
indeed require the continued attention of scholars, but, according to the Court, the 
"ultimate solutions" to these problems had to come from the legislature. 
76 San Antonio v. Rodriguez, 411 US 1, 36 L.Ed. 2d 16, 57. 
46 
Justice Stewart's Concurring Opinion 
In his concurring opinion, Justice Stewart wrote that just because a system (such as 
the education financing system in Texas or any other state) is "chaotic and unjust," it does 
not mean that system is unconstitutional. Furthermore, according to Stewart, the equal 
protection clause does not exist in order to grant "substantive rights" or "substantive 
liberties"77; it exists simply to measure government classifications. Stewart wrote that "it 
has long been settled that the Equal Protection Clause is offended only by laws that are 
invidiously discriminatory--only by classifications that are wholly arbitrary or capricious.78 
Despite the inequities in the system, Stewart did not believe that the school finance laws 
were invidiously discriminatory or that they formed arbitrary or capricious classifications. 
Stewart then voiced his further agreement with the majority's conclusion. He 
found that there was no violation of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth 
amendment because (1) there was no identifiable class that had been discriminated against 
under equal protection; (2) even if such a class had existed, they would have had none of 
the traditionally accepted criteria to make that class suspect; (3) the Texas school financing 
system did not "rest on grounds wholly irrelevant to the state's objectives";79 and the Texas 
system did not impinge upon any substantive constitutional rights or liberties. Thus, 
Stewart agreed with the majority's holding. 
Brennan's Dissent 
Justice Brennan made a special point of disagreeing with the majority's analysis as 
to just what constitutes a fundamental right.80 Unlike the majority, which wrote that a 
77 Black's Law Dictionary defines a substantive right as "{a] right to the equal 
enjoyment of fundamental rights, privileges and immunities; distinguished from procedural 
rights." (p.1281). 
78 San Antonio v. Rodriguez, 411US1, 36 L.Ed. 2d 16, 58. 
79 Ibid. at 59, 60. 
80 Brennan also joined in White's dissent, the analysis of which follows. 
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right was fundamental for purposes of equal protection analysis only if it was "explicitly or 
implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution, "81 Brennan asserted that fundamentality was "in 
large measure, a function of the right's importance in terms of the effectuation of those 
rights which are in fact constitutionally guaranteed. 11 82 In Brennan's view, the closer the 
relationship between the government activity (here the provision of schools) and the 
constitutional interest, the stricter the scrutiny. In this case, according to Brennan, there 
was "no doubt that education is inextricably linked to the right to participate in the electoral 
process and to the rights of free speech and association guaranteed by the First 
Amendment."83 By following this reasoning, the only correct conclusion according to 




San Antonio v. Rodriguez, 411 US 1, 36 L.Ed. 2d 16, 43. 
Ibid. at 60. 
Ibid. 
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Justice White's Dissent (Joined by Justices Douglas and Brennan) 
In his dissent, Justice White disagreed with the majority's conclusion that the 
Texas school financing system provided "a rational and sensible method of achieving the 
state aim of preserving an area for local initiative and decision [through the use of local 
property taxes.]"84 In White's view, there was no meaningful local option for poor 
districts. 
The difficulty with the Texas system is that it provides a meaningful option 
to Alamo Heights and like school districts but that almost none to 
Edgewood and those other districts with a low per-pupil real estate tax base. 
In these latter districts no matter how desirous parents are of supporting 
their schools with greater revenues, it is impossible to do so through the use 
of the real estate property tax. In these districts, the Texas system utterly 
fails to extend a realistic choice to parents because the property tax, which is 
the only revenue raising mechanism extended to school districts, is 
practically and legally unavailable. 85 
Poorer districts were trapped by their low property values and high tax rates. 
Like the majority, White also looked to the factual statistics surrounding the 
Rodriguez case.86 He used a few additional statistics, however, to emphasize his view 
that the financial disparities among Texas school districts were "undeniably serious. "87 
He pointed out that in order for both Alamo Heights and Edgewood to reach the highest 
local property tax yield in Bextar County, Alamo Heights could tax at 68¢ per $100 of 
assessed valuation, but Edgewood would have to tax at $5.76 per $100 of assessed value, 
just to reach the same goal. "But state law place[d] a $1.50 per $100 ceiling on the 
. maintenance tax rate, a limit that would surely [have been] reached long before Edgewood 
84 San Antonio v. Rodriguez, 411 US 1, 36 L.Ed. 2d 16, 61. 
85 Ibid. 
86 The majority opinion, and White's dissent use slightly different numbers. As 
White noted in his own Note 2 however, some differences existed because various exhibits 
were relied upon, but "[t]he disparity between districts, rather than the actual figures, is the 
important factor." 
87 San Antonio v. Rodriguez, 411 US 1, 36 L.Ed. 2d 16, 62. 
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attained an equal yield. "88 Edgewood was, therefore, "precluded in law as well as in fact, 
from achieving a yield even close to that of some other districts. 1189 
White then examined the facts in light of the rational relationship test under the 
equal protection clause. He agreed with the majority's contention that the State of Texas 
had a legitimate interest in preserving the concept of local control, but he found that the 
present system classified individuals in such a way as to make local control impossible for 
people living in certain districts.90 
If the State aim[ed] at maximizing local initiative and local choice by 
permitting school districts to resort to the real property tax if they choose to 
do so, it utterly fail[ed] in achieving its purpose in districts with property tax 
bases so low that there is little if any opportunity for interested parents, rich 
or poor, to augment school district revenues.91 
In White's view, the parents and children in property-poor districts such as 
Edgewood suffered from invidious discrimination.92 
White was careful to mention that the elimination of Texas's discriminatory system 
did not have to bring the type of dramatic changes that some might fear. It would not have 
to mean the end of local control. Furthermore, it would not have to mean that the State of 
Texas would have to dole out the exact same dollar sum to every individual student in the 
state. Nor would it have to mean that states would be hampered by inflexible 
constitutional restraints because of their obligation to educate. "On the contrary it would 
merely mean that the State must fashion a financing scheme which provides a rational basis 
for the maximization of local control, if local control is to remain a goal of the system. "93 
88 Ibid. 
89 Ibid. 
90 Ibid. at 63. 
91 Ibid. 
92 Ibid. 
93 Ibid. at 64. 
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Before concluding his dissent, White made a few additional points. First, he re-
emphasized his belief that the differences between wealthy and poor districts were not 
inconsequential. According to White, even the State of Texas recognized the importance 
of providing educational opportunities above and beyond a bare minimum. Finally, 
unlike the majority, Justice White had no difficulty identifying a class that was treated 
differently under a state-sponsored system. He indicated that he needed to look "no farther 
than the parents and children in the Edgewood district. "94 
94 Ibid. 
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Marshall's Dissent (with Which Douglas Concurred) 
Marshall constructed his dissent carefully, just as Powell had constructed the 
majority. Obviously, however, Marshall reached the opposite conclusion. In his lengthy 
dissent, Marshall attempted to take apart the majority's reasoning, but Marshall's dissent 
was by no means purely academic. His logical arguments apparently reflected his own 
beliefs. 
Marshall introduced the first section of his dissent by redefining the issue in the 
case. According to Marshall, the issue was not whether Texas was "doing its best to 
ameliorate the worst features of a discriminatory schemej but, rather, whether the scheme 
itself [was] in fact constitutionally discriminatory in the face of the Fourteenth 
Amendment's guarantee of equal protection of the laws. 1195 
I. A. Marshall then restated the basic structure of the Texas school financing 
system, with its federal, state and local contributions. He emphasized the fact that the 
poorest districts had the highest tax rates, but the lowest property values.96 Therefore, he 
concluded, even with proportionately higher taxes, it would be virtually impossible for 
poorer districts ever to achieve the funding potential of wealthier districts. 
According to Marshall, the state programs, supposedly designed to ease the 
financial disparities, had no such effect. Marshall pointed to flaws in the Local Fund 
Assignment portion of the Minimum Foundation School Program. In Texas, an 
"Economic Index" had established the contribution of individual districts to the Local Fund 
Assignment. Poorer districts were supposed to pay according to ability, but Marshall 
claimed that in reality, that was not always the case. He quoted one of the original 
consultants working on the Minimum Foundation School Program, Dr. Edgar Morphet, as 
95 Ibid. at 66. 
96 Marshall indicated that "this correlation between the amount of taxable property per 
pupil and the amount of local revenues per pupil [also] holds true for the 96 districts in 
between the richest and poorest districts." See 411 U.S. 1, 36 L.Ed. 2d 16, 67. 
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stating that "The Economic Index approach to evaluating local ability offers a little better 
measure than sheer chance, but not much. "97 
Furthermore, Marshall declared that even the majority's much touted increased state 
spending did not alleviate the disparities. 
The majority continually emphasizes how much state aid has, in recent years 
been given to property poor Texas school districts. What the Court fails to 
emphasize is the cruel irony of how much more state aid is being given to 
property-rich districts on top of their already substantial local property tax 
revenues.98 
In fact, the gap between the rich districts and the poor districts was not shrinking, but 
growing. For example, from the 1967-68 school year to the 1970-71 school year the gap 
between rich and poor districts had grown by 38 percent. In terms of dollars, whereas in 
1967-68 the Minimum Foundation Program supplied $222 for each Edgewood student, 
and $225 for each Alamo Heights student, by the 1970-71 school year, Edgewood 
received $356 per student and Alamo Heights $491 per student. The difference had 
escalated from a mere $3 to $135. Thus, Marshall agreed with the District Court's 
observation that "the system tend[ed] to subsidize the rich at the expense of the poor, rather 
than the other way around. 1199 
B. In the second part of his first section of analysis, Marshall began by voicing his 
disbelief with the state's contention that the quality of education in any particular district 
was not determined by money. "In my view ... even an unadorned restatement of this 
contention is sufficient to reveal its absurdity."100 Marshall stressed that significant 
educational inputs were provided by money.101 (See Chapter 1 for a discussion of 
97 San Antonio v. Rodriguez, 411 US 1, 36 L.Ed. 2d 16, 69. See also Marshall's 
Note No. 29. 
98 San Antonio v. Rodriguez, 411 US 1, 36 L.Ed. 2d 16, 71. 
99 San Antonio v. Rodriguez, 411 US 1, 36 L.Ed. 2d 16,71 citing 337 F.Supp 280, 
282. 
100 San Antonio v. Rodriguez, 411 US 1, 36 L.Ed. 2d 16,72. 
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educational inputs.) Marshall believed that, in the Rodriguez case, the facts demonstrated 
that the lack of funds reduced the educational inputs for children in poorer districts.102 
Reduced inputs meant less qualified teachers, more crowded classrooms, and poorer 
facilities, 103 not to mention outdated materials, unsanitary conditions, and less hope for the 
future. 
Furthermore, Marshall pointed out that if money was not important to the quality of 
a child's education, surely wealthy districts from outside Texas would not spend their time 
and money hiring attorneys to write amicus curirel04 briefs in support of the state's 
position, as they had done in the Rodriguez case. I 05 Marshall thus implied that wealthy 
parents, as well as poor parents, knew the importance of money to a school district. 
Within the course of this discussion on the relationship between money and 
educational quality, Marshall took the opportunity to address the Court's role in the case. 
Like the majority, Marshall acknowledged that it was not the role of the court to resolve 
educational finance disparities. The role of the court was simply to enforce the United 
States Constitution.106 Unlike the majority, however, Marshall believed that the facts of 
the case did raise the "grave" constitutional question as to whether the state's school 
101 Educational inputs need not be related only to money and what it can buy. Non-
monetary factors such as individual student motivation or parental interest may also be 
considered educational inputs. These non-monetary educational inputs have caused 
problems for courts and education finance specialists alike because they do not know how 
to evaluate such inputs in relation to dollars provided. 
102 San Antonio v. Rodriguez, 411 US 1, 36 L.Ed. 2d 16, 72. 
103 Ibid. 
104 Amicus curire "means literally, friend of the court." (Black's Law Dictionary, 
p. 75) An amicus curire brief is written by a party other than the parties directly involved in 
the suit. A person or entity "may petition the court for permission to file a brief, ostensibly 
on behalf of a party but actually to suggest a rational consistent with its own views. 
105 San Antonio v. Rodriguez, 411 US 1, 36 L.Ed. 2d 16, 73. 
106 Ibid. 
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financing scheme constituted a form of state-created discrimination in the public provision 
of education.107 
Marshall admitted that the Constitution did not require precisely equal treatment of 
all people at all times, but neither did the Constitution allow discrimination under the guise 
of adequacy. The state could not establish a system where everyone received a bare 
minimum described as "adequate," but where some were virtually guaranteed to receive far 
more than "adequate." Marshall wrote, "this Court has never suggested that because some 
'adequate' level of benefits is provided to all, discrimination in the provision of services is 
therefore constitutionally excusable." l 08 
Marshall also questioned how, after the majority had so strongly expressed its 
reluctance to become involved in the determination of educational standards, the Court 
could accept the appellants' judgment as to the "adequacy" of education in Texas. 
One would think that the majority would heed its own feverent affirmation 
of judicial self-restraint before undertaking the complex task of determining 
at large what level of education is constitutionally sufficient. Indeed, the 
majority's apparent reliance upon the adequacy of the educational 
opportunity assured by the Texas Minimum Foundation School Program 
seems fundamentally inconsistent with its own recognition that educational 
authorities are unable to agree upon what makes for educational quality.109 
Thus, Marshall implied that the majority was certain that even though educators did not 
know the elements of a good education, they did, nonetheless know the components of an 
adequate education. 
Even if adequacy had been an acceptable standard, the Minimum Foundation 
Program failed to provide for adequate education anyway. In fact, the school finance 
system in Texas was far beyond inadequate. The Texas system provided unequal 
educational opportunity and it was this unequal educational opportunity that raised the 
107 Ibid. 
108 Ibid. at 75. 
109 Ibid. 
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question of the denial of equal protection of the laws.11 o Consequently, Marshall had no 
trouble finding "a sufficient showing to raise a substantial question of discriminatory action 
in violation of the equal protection clause." 111 
C. Marshall then examined whether there was a legitimate class experiencing 
discrimination. Not surprisingly, Marshall found such a class. In Marshall's view, the 
facts alone, as they were determined by the District Court, were enough to prove the 
existence of a class. The facts of the Rodriguez case provided a legitimate class of 
individual interests experiencing discrimination, not just a scheme where some districts 
received more than others. 
Texas has chosen to provide free public education for all its citizens, and it 
has embodied that decision in its constitution. Yet, having established 
public education for its citizens, the State, as a direct consequence of the 
variations in local property wealth endemic to Texas' financing scheme, has 
provided some Texas schoolchildren with substantially less resources for 
their education than others. Thus, while on its face the Texas scheme may 
merely discriminate between local districts, the impact of that discrimination 
falls directly upon the children whose educational opportunity is dependent 
upon where they happen to live.112 
The class was comprised of children whose educational opportunity was dependent upon 
where they happened to live.113 
Justice Marshall also disagreed with Justice Stewart's contention that an objectively 
identifiable class was necessary before the court could evaluate a claim under the equal 
protection clause. In Marshall's view, it was not the class that determined whether to 
. invoke equal protection analysis; it was the nature of the discrimination. In the Rodriguez 
case, there was an "overarching form of discrimination"l 14 because the state of Texas 
110 Ibid. at 76. 
111 Ibid. 
112 Ibid. at 77. 
113 Ibid. 
114 Ibid. at 79. 
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discriminated between schoolchildren on "the basis of taxable property within their 
district." l l 5 
II. A. In his second section, Marshall moved into his equal protection analysis. 
He prefaced his analysis by summarizing the ways in which the District Court and the 
majority had used the clause in their respective opinions. According to Marshall, the 
District Court had held that under the facts of the Rodriguez case, the state had to show, not 
merely a rational relationship, but a compelling state interest for their school financing 
scheme. The District Court had found that the state's system was subject to the stricter 
scrutiny because the District Court had viewed the classification of citizens, based on 
wealth, as highly suspect and because the classification itself affected a fundamental 
interest--education. On the other hand, Marshall noted, the majority had concluded that 
under the Rodriguez facts, it was necessary only to employ a standard of rationality. 
Marshall disagreed with the majority's contention. Justice Marshall believed that the 
majority had reached its decision to implement the rational relationship test through a 
"rigidified" and "labored" equal protection analysis. 
Marshall did not believe, as did the majority, that "the 'answer' to whether an 
interest [was] fundamental for purposes of equal protection [was] always determined by 
whether that interest 'is a right. .. explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the 
Constitution."'116 Marshall wrote: 
I would like to know where the Constitution guarantees the right to 
procreatel 11 ... or the right to vote in state electionslls ... or the right to an 
appeal to a criminal conviction 119 ... These are instances in which, due to the 
115 Ibid. at 77. 
116 Ibid. at 81-82. 
117 See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 US 535,541, 86 L.Ed. 1655, 62 S. Ct. 1110 
(1942). 
118 See Reynolds v Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 12 L.Ed. 2d 506, 84 S.Ct. 1362 (1964). 
importance of the interests at stake, the Court has displayed a strong 
concern with the existence of discriminatory state treatment. But the Court 
never said or indicated that these are interests which independently enjoy 
full blown constitutional protection.120 
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The interests of procreation, voting and appealing criminal convictions were not explicitly 
or implicitly part of the Constitution, but the Court had nonetheless evaluated them with 
strict scrutiny when they were closely related to a constitutionally guaranteed right. 121 
In order to ensure the integrity of the constitutional guarantee, Marshall argued that 
related interests also had to be protected. 
The task in every case should be to determine the extent to which 
constitutionally guaranteed rights are dependent on the interests not 
mentioned in the Constitution. As the nexus between the specific 
constitutional guarantee and the nonconstitutional interest draws closer, the 
non constitutional interest becomes more fundamental and the degree of 
judicial scrutiny applied when the interest is inf ringed on a discriminatory 
basis must be adjusted accordingly.122 
While the interests themselves might not be fundamental, they might require strict judicial 
scrutiny. 
Marshall then highlighted other Supreme Court cases where unprotected interests so 
seriously affected constitutional rights that any state laws, established to restrict the 
unprotected interests, had been struck down. Lastly, Marshall differentiated between the 
facts of the Rodriguez case and other cases where a state's economically based interests 
were challenged. Marshall admitted that "in the context of economic 
interests ... discriminatory state action is almost always sustained."123 When the 
discrimination affects the important individual interests of a disadvantaged class and the 
119 See Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 100 L.Ed. 891, 76 S.Ct. 585, 55 ALR 2d 
1055 (1956). 
120 San Antonio v. Rodriguez, 411 US 1, 36 L.Ed. 2d 16, 82. 




interests are simultaneously related to constitutional guarantees, however, the Court should 
employ a strict scrutiny standard. 
B. In Part B of Section II, Marshall recognized the fundamentality of 
education.124 He gave three reasons for this recognition: (1) the United States Supreme 
Court had an historic commitment to education; (2) public education was accorded a 
"unique status"l25 in American society; and (3) education was very closely related to 
"some of our most basic constitutional values.126 
As for the Court's strong interest in education, Marshall called it "a matter of 
commonknowledge."127 He cited the Court's opinion in the Brown case to emphasize 
the Court's historic commitment. In fact, he used the some of the exact same quotations 
that the majority had used to emphasize how important education was in the eyes of the 
Supreme Court.128 
Then Marshall proceeded to examine the importance of education in American 
society. He pointed out that almost every state acknowledged education in its state 
constitution and likewise almost every state had compulsory attendance laws.129 In 
Marshall's view, "No other state function is so uniformly recognized as an essential 
element of our society's well-being." 130 
124 Ibid. at 91. 
125 Ibid. at 88. 
126 Ibid. 
127 Ibid. 
128 Interestingly, but not surprisingly, in the Rodriguez opinion, Marshall never 
discussed his own role as plaintiffs' attorney in the Brown case. 
129 Marshall noted that at the time of the Rodriguez decision, 48 of 50 states had both 
education clauses and compulsory attendance laws. 
130 San Antonio v. Rodriguez, 411 US 1, 36 L.Ed. 2d 16 at 89. 
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Finally, Marshall addressed the importance of education to the rights of free speech 
and political participation. "Education directly affects the ability of a child to exercise his 
First Amendment interests, both as a source and a receiver of information and ideas, 
whatever interests he may pursue in life ... [the United States Supreme Court has] not 
casually described the classroom as the 'marketplace of ideas."' 131 Furthermore, Marshall 
added, without adequate education, participation in the political process would be severely 
hampered. To emphasize this point, Marshall cited statistics drawn from the 1968 
presidential election that demonstrated the correlation between individual education and the 
likelihood of voting. 
Then Marshall again challenged the majority's interpretation of the key issue in the 
case. Marshall believed that "the issue was one of discrimination that affect[ ed] the quality 
of education which Texas had chosen to provide its children."132 The Rodriguez plaintiffs 
had not asked for the best education, as the majority appeared to imply. They sought only 
to end the state discrimination that was based upon the unequal distribution of taxable 
district property wealth and that resulted in unequal educational opportunity.133 
Marshall summarized his views on the fundamentality of education in the following 
manner: 
The factors just considered, including the relationship between education 
and the social and political interests enshrined within the Constitution, 
compel us to recognize the fundamentality of education and to scrutinize 
with appropriate care the bases for state discrimination affecting equality of 
educational opportunity in Texas ' school districts--a conclusion which is 
only strengthened when we consider the character of the classification in 
this case.134 
Marshall then went on to consider the plaintiffs' classification. 
131 The notion that the classroom was the 'marketplace of ideas' appeared in 
Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603, 17 L.Ed. 2d. 629, 87 S.Ct. 675 
132 San Antonio v. Rodriguez, 411 US 1, 36 L.Ed. 2d 16 at 91. 
133 Ibid. 
134 Ibid. at 91-92. 
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C. In Part C of Section II of Justice Marshall's dissent, Marshall disagreed with 
the majority's portrayal of a disadvantaged class. The majority had asserted that, in 
previous cases, the disadvantaged class has "shared two distinguishing characteristics: (1) 
"because of their impecunity they were completely unable to pay for some desired benefit." 
and 2) "as a consequence, they sustained an absolute deprivation of a meaningful 
opportunity to enjoy that benefit."135 Marshall found otherwise. 
He cited three cases to illustrate his point, Harper v. Virginia Board of Education 136 
and Griffin v. Illinoisl37 and Douglas v. Califomia.138 In Harper, the Court struck down 
an entire poll tax, rather than simply exempting those to poor to pay. In the Court's view 
the tax had been unfair both to those who could not pay and to those who would choose 
not to pay. In Marshall's view, this ruling demonstrated that a total inability to pay was 
not a necessary characteristic of a disadvantaged class. Likewise, according to Marshall, 
Griffin and Douglas confirmed that the class need not be comprised of those who are 
absolutely deprived of an opportunity to enjoy a benefit. In the Griffin and Douglas cases, 
the plaintiffs were, respectively to poor to pay for a transcript and counsel to use in the 
appeal process. Marshall wrote: "The right of appeal was not absolutely denied to those 
too poor to pay; but because of the cost of a transcript and of counsel, the appeal was 
substantially less meaningful for the poor than for the rich."139 
Marshall recognized that the Rodriguez case was not identical to the earlier cases of 
Harper, Griffin, and Douglas. Those cases dealt with individual wealth rather than the 
wealth of a group, such as a school district. Marshall indicated that the Court had not 
135 Ibid. at 35. 
136 383 U.S. 663, 16 L.Ed 2d 169, 86b S.Ct. 1079 (1966). 
137 351 U.S. 12,100 L.Ed. 891, 76 S.Ct. 585, 55 ALR 2d 1055 (1956). 
138 372 US 353, 9 L.Ed. 2d 739, 89 S.Ct. 1404 (1969). 
139 San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 36 L.Ed. 2d 16 at 93. 
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traditionally viewed the poor, as a group, in the same way it viewed individual poverty. 
Whereas cases of individual impecunity might cause government classifications to be 
examined with strict scrutiny, group poverty classifications were traditionally examined 
under a rational relationship standard. 
Furthermore, in Marshall's view, the poor were not "as politically powerless"l40 as 
certain racial and ethnic groups. In the past, discrimination against racial and ethnic 
groups had rendered them virtually politically powerless; thus, restrictions against these 
groups were subject to strict judicial scrutiny. The situation with the poor was somewhat 
different , in Marshall's view. Marshall wrote: "While the 'poor' have been frequently 
been a legally disadvantaged group, it cannot be ignored that social legislation must 
frequently take cognizance of the economic status of our citizens."141 Thus, while the poor 
might have been historically subject to a stigma similar to those attached to racial and ethnic 
groups, the poor were not rendered politically powerless by that stigma because social 
legislation had long recognized the special needs of the poor.142 
Marshall believed that the level of scrutiny at which to evaluate wealth 
classifications should be determined by the importance of the interests being affected and 
the relevance of personal wealth to those interests.143 In the Rodriguez case, he found that 
the discrimination, even though it was technically group discrimination should be subject to 
strict scrutiny. In this case, individual children had no control over the formation of 
districts or their possible inclusion in a property-poor district. In the Rodriguez case, the 
"discrimination is no reflection of the individual's characteristics or his abilities. And thus 
140 Ibid. at 94. 




--particularly in the context of a disadvantaged class composed of children--we have 
previously treated discrimination on a basis which the individual cannot control as 
disfavored." 144 
Justice Marshall then added two more points in favor of his disadvantaged class 
theory. He found that the Rodriguez plaintiffs were politically disadvantaged because in 
order to change the school financing system, they would have to challenge wealthy districts 
that had "a strong vested interest in the preservation of the status quo."145 Marshall also 
indicated that the state of Texas has created this class of plaintiffs when it formed the 
financing system and drew the district boundaries. In Marshall's opinion, the Rodriguez 
case was unusual because not only did the state permit the discrimination; it also created it. 
Marshall wrote: 
In the final analysis, then, the invidious characteristics of the group wealth 
classification present in this case merely serve to emphasize the need for 
careful judicial scrutiny of the State's justifications for the resulting inter-
district discrimination in the educational opportunity afforded the 
schoolchildren of Texas.146 
Then Marshall moved into the last part of his analysis in Section II. 
D. In Part D, Marshall completed his equal protection analysis. He had 
already found education to be a fundamental interest, the class to be suspect, and the use of 
the strict scrutiny test to be appropriate. All that remained for him to do was to examine 
the rationale behind the state's discrimination. According to Marshall, the only 
. justification for the preservation of the school financing system offered by the appellants 
was that of local control. Although Marshall supported local control, he found that "the 
State's purported concern with local control [was] offered primarily as an excuse rather 
144 Ibid. 
145 Ibid. 
146 Ibid. at 96. 
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than as a justification for interdistrict inequality," 147 (emphasis added). In Marshall's 
view, local control was "a myth for many of the local school districts in Texas."148 
Not surprisingly, the State of Texas failed to meet the strict scrutiny standard.1 49 
In fact, Marshall believed, as did the District Court, that the Texas school financing system 
was not even rationally related to the legitimate state interest of local control.150 
Furthermore, Justice Marshall refused to evaluate any of the alternative financing plans that 
were offered by the appellants. Finally, Marshall scolded that if the State of Texas were 
ever to appear before the Court with an alternative school financing plan, the State had 
better "present something more than the mere sham 11 151 that was before the Court in the 
Rodriguez case. 
Ill. Marshall's third and final section was brief. In this section, Marshall 
attempted to quash some of the fears that would have been associated with an affirmation of 
the District Court's decision. An affirmation of the District Court's decision would not 
have been a "death kne11"152 for local control. According to Marshall, "Clearly this suit 
ha[ d] nothing to do with local decision making with respect to educational policy or even 
educational spending." 153 Districts would "not necessarily" 154 have to eliminate local 
control of educational funding or the local property tax.155 An affirmation of the District 
147 Ibid. at 97. 
148 Ibid. at 99. 
149 Ibid. 
150 Ibid. at 97. 
151 Ibid. at 99. 
152 Ibid. 
153 Ibid. 
154 Ibid. at 100. 
155 Ibid. at 101. 
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Court's decision would only "restrict the power of the State to make educational funding 
dependent exclusively upon local property taxation as long as there exist[ed] interdistrict 
disparities in taxable property wealth." 156 
In his final few sentences, Justice Marshall took the opportunity to admonish the 
Court for shirking its responsibility in the Rodriguez case. The possibility that the 
legislature might be able to resolve these school finance problems did not constitute an 
adequate reason for the judicial restraint. 
The possibility of legislative action is, in all events, no answer to the 
Court's duty under the Constitution to eliminate unjustified state 
discrimination. In this case, we have been presented with an instance of 
such discrimination, in a particularly invidious form, against an individual 
interest of large constitutional and practical importance.157 
Thus, in Marshall's view, the District Court's opinion should have been affirmed.158 
Conclusion 
Rodriguez was a lengthy decision. The majority, concurring, and dissenting 
opinions totaled 136 pages. In spite of the length of the opinion, there was much the 
opinion did not say and much that was implied. In addition, many unanswered questions 
remained. Education finance reformers were unsure what their next steps would be. 
Some feared that the movement to bring equal educational opportunity to all students had 
ended, at least as far as the courts were concerned. Others hoped reform might be 
available in state courts. If reform was to take place in the state courts, however, the 
unresolved issues and problems of Rodriguez would have to be examined. Why did the 





expansion of fundamental rights forever prohibit equal educational opportunity? The next 




Their Duty and Their Life Experiences 
At the Supreme Court level, the Justices are rarely called upon to be finders of 
fact.I The Supreme Court's duty, in most cases, is simply to review the decision of the 
lower court.2 A trial court determines what constitutes "the facts" of the case and then 
applies the appropriate law to those facts. If the case is appealed, the appellate court 
simply reviews the application of the law to the facts of the case; it does not create or find 
"new" facts. In the Rodriguez case, the District Court took the role as the finder of fact. 
The case was then appealed directly to the Supreme Court.3 There the Court reviewed the 
application of the law to the facts. 
Just as the Supreme Court should not bring new facts to the evaluation of the case, 
neither should it let other forces influence its decision. For example, the Court should not 
1 They are called upon to be fact finders in a few types of cases (which are not 
relevant to the discussion of this case) specifically named in the United States Constitution. 
2 The Supreme Court does not have to hear all of the cases. Most cases come before 
the Court on a Petition of Certiorari, which the Supreme Court uses as a discretionary 
device to choose the cases it wishes to hear. Black's Law Dictionary, p. 207. 
3 In some sense, the case was not typical procedurally because the case was first 
heard by a three-judge panel of district court judges, which made direct appeal to the United 
States Supreme Court possible. Most often, the appeal process involves more steps. The 
point here is not to explain in detail the procedural steps to the Supreme Court, but merely 




bow to political pressures, nor should it be influenced by the President's thinking.4 The 
Court's integrity is essential to its important role in the system of checks and balances. 
Yet, the Justices cannot make their decision in a vacuum. Like any person, even a 
person of great rectitude is subject to outside influence. Furthermore, unlike other cases, 
the Rodriguez case dealt with an issue that all of the Justices had experienced personally---
American education. Although all of the Justices on the Court during the Rodriguez case 
were well educated, their educational experiences varied, and while their personal 
experiences should not have affected the outcome of the case, the "evidence" suggests that 
it might have. 
Justice Powell, the author of the majority, came "from an aristocratic family 
prominent in Virginia affairs for two centuries. "5 At the time of the decision, he was a 
millionaire, living in a mansion on the banks of the James River.6 When he retired from 
the Supreme Court, some fourteen years later, in 1987, he retired as the Court's richest 
member.7 Justice Potter Stewart was the son of a "powerful"8 Ohio politician and state 
courtjudge. Stewart attended prep school and Yale University. William H. Rehnquist 
has been described as "solidly middle-class, 119 and while Warren E. Burger and Harry A. 
Blackmun worked their way through college and law school, neither, was ever 
4 This might not be as easy as it seems, especially if the current president had a 
strong opinion on a case and had also nominated some of the current Justices. 
5 Linda Mathews, "Rodriguez and Friends," Race Relations Reporter ( July 1973 ): 
19. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Glen Elsasser and Janet Cawley, "Powell Quits Supreme Court: Jurist, 79, Cast 
Pivotal Vote in Key Decisions," Chicago Tribune 1987, p.1, Zone C, LEXIS. 




penniless. Io Thus, the backgrounds of members of the majority suggest that they had 
limited personal experience with poverty or with the kind of educational experience poverty 
might bring. 
The dissenting members of the court came from somewhat different backgrounds. 
Thurgood Marshall was "the grandson of a slave and the son of a Baltimore country club 
steward."l l He attended segregated schools during the time when schools for blacks and 
whites were certainly "separate," but not always "equal." William 0. Douglas, "orphaned 
as a boy, was so poor that he spent the summer before he entered Columbia Law School 
working his way across the country from Washington state to New York, doing odd jobs 
[because] there was no money at home for train fare." 12 Byron R. White grew up as the 
son of a small-town lumber dealer, near a rural Colorado area that was no stranger to 
poverty. Finally, although William J. Brennan's father eventually became a city 
commissioner, "he started out as a labor organizer and was at least once beaten by 
police." 13 
Certainly, Justices are not supposed to permit their own personal experiences to 
sway their case analysis. For example, a Justice should not think, "I walked ten miles in 
the snow without shoes to get to school and if it was good enough for me, it's good 
enough for anyone." To permit such a bias to influence the facts of a case would be 
unacceptable. The Supreme Court's duty is simply to review the decision of the lower 
court, without bringing in outside considerations. 
In the Rodriguez case, whether the Justices' life experiences affected their 
perception of the severity of the educational issues is impossible to say. Possible 
correlations between life experience and the Justices' vote may be coincidental; according 
10 Ibid. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Ibid. at 19-20. 
13 Ibid. at 19. 
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to the highest judicial standards, they should be. Regardless of the nature of such possible 
correlations in the Rodriguez case, these differences in judicial backgrounds are interesting 
to note. 
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Their Thoughts on the Opposing Views in Rodriguez 
Also interesting to note are the Justices' individual perceptions of their colleagues' 
opinions in the Rodriguez case. Clearly, strong beliefs were held on both sides. On the 
one hand, in his opinion concurring with the majority, Justice Stewart labeled Marshall's 
dissent as "imaginative."14 While this adjective might have positive connotations in some 
fields (possibly including the education profession), in the Rodriguez case, Stewart's use 
of the term was certainly dismissive. Likewise, in his dissent, Marshall expressed his 
strong opposition to the majority's ruling. For example, in his closing remarks, Marshall 
wrote: "The Court's suggestions of legislative redress and experimentation will 
doubtlessly be of great comfort to the schoolchildren of Texas' disadvantaged 
districts ... "15 Even a cursory reading of Marshall's opinion suggests a sarcastic tone in 
the Justice's voice. 
The Difficult Nature of the Case 
The Close Vote 
In the end, the vote in the Rodriguez case was very close, 5 to 4. Yet, even the 
numerical translation of the Justices' positions on the case does not demonstrate how close 
the case came to being decided in the plaintiffs' favor. John Coons, "widely considered to 
have been the principal intellectual force behind the legal theories that the Court tested in 
Rodriguez," learned from a law clerk,16 who worked at the Supreme Court during the 
Rodriguez case, that "the plaintiffs had a majority on their side right until the end." 17 The 
school finance reformers involved in the case eventually learned which Justice changed his 
14 San Antonio v. Rodriguez, 411 US. 1, 36 L.Ed. 2d 16 at 58. 
15 Ibid. at 101. 
16 Coons did not identify the law clerk by name. 
17 "A Decade After Rodriguez: An Interview with John Coons," Phi Delta Kappan, 
(March 1983): 479. 
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mind, although they were quiet about the identity of the Justice. Coons stated, "There is 
no point in my identifying the swing man, but the decision was a close shave."18 
The Potential Concerns of the Majority 
The fact that one of the Justices may have changed his mind suggests the difficult 
nature of the case. The disparities in funding and educational opportunities were obvious 
both to the dissenters and to the majority. The difficulty with the Rodriguez case, 
however, lay not so much with the facts but with the application of the facts to the United 
States Constitution. Coons expressed his belief that "in general, it must have been hard 
for the Justices to be certain that they were not lighting the fuse to a powder keg instead of 
straightening out an incoherent system."19 These powder keg issues included the 
expansion of fundamental rights, the role of excessive judicial activism, and an unknown 
future of constitutional dilemmas. 
For example, the expansion of fundamental rights was probably a legitimate 
concern for the majority. As Powell noted, if education was pronounced a fundamental 
right, what about the "rights" to food and shelter? Are not the needs for food and shelter 
more elementary than that of formal education? The addition of one fundamental right 
could have led to others. For example, what about the potential "right" to be free from 
violence? Would it also be the state's responsibility to keep children in state supported 
housing projects reasonably safe and protected from violence? If so, are the children's 
rights being denied if there is a higher crime rate in their housing project than in a wealthy 
subdivision with a gatehouse and a twenty-four-hour guard? While this example may 
seem extreme, the point is that the elevation of education to fundamental-right status could 




Even if the Court were somehow able to draft an opinion that made education a 
fundamental right, while limiting the expansion of other alleged fundamental rights, how 
would the role of the federal government change, with respect to education? Would the 
federal government be required to contribute more than 10 percent to any state's education 
budget? Would a whole new federal educational bureaucracy have to be created? What 
would be the federal government's role? The majority may have felt questions such as 
these were unanswerable. 
Secondly, the majority may have been genuinely apprehensive about intruding into 
legislative territory in the Rodriguez case. The Supreme Court is not a legislature. 
Consequently, it certainly should not act as a super-legislature. To do so would be to act 
beyond the scope of the Court's legitimate powers as they were outlined in the 
Constitution. Not surprisingly, John Coons questioned the Court's alleged fear of acting 
as a super legislature. In Coons's view, the Court did not hesitate to act in a legislative 
capacity when it deemed such action necessary. 
'It's true that in Rodriguez they acted like restrained and very proper 
judges,' he said. 'But that certainly wasn't the situation in the abortion 
cases, where you had these same justices reaching out and grabbing for 
power, sweeping aside the judgment of .SO state legislatures, striking down 
every abortion law in the country. They acted like legislators by going so 
far as to set down what was constitutionally permissible in each month of 
pregnancy. It was truly amazing, for they made it impossible for the state 
legislatures to deal with the abortion issue again.'20 
Regardless of whether Coons was correct in his evaluation of the Court's activities in the 
abortion cases, the Supreme Court does not have the authority to create laws; it has only 
the power to interpret them. Thus, if the majority believed it would be acting as a super-
legislature by ruling for the plaintiffs, their hesitation was within the bounds of the 
Constitution. 
20 Linda Mathews, "Rodriguez and Friends,'' Race Relations Reporter ( July 1973): 
20. 
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Finally, the majority may have felt restricted by the text of the Constitution itself. 
A provision for any type of education, let alone an education financing scheme, is 
noticeably absent from the United States Constitution. Surely the founding fathers were 
articulate enough to have included some provision for education, if they had been so 
inclined. The strong inference to be drawn from the absence of education in the federal 
constitution, might very well have been that it was not a fundamental right and the federal 
government should leave public education matters to the states. After all, education 
clauses were present in almost every state constitution at the time of Rodriguez. 21 Perhaps 
it was only logical for the Supreme Court to believe that remedies for these educational 
finance problems would be found within the individual state constitutions, rather than in the 
federal Constitution. 
21 According to Marshall's dissent in Rodriguez, at the time of the case, 48 out of 50 
states had such clauses. 
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The State Courts' Role 
After the Rodriguez decision, however, some feared that state courts would be 
unwilling to take on constitutional issues of such magnitude.22 Very few states outside 
of Calif omia and New Jersey23 had examined complex constitutional questions.24 
During the two decades prior to Rodriguez, plaintiffs challenging 
discrimination as unconstitutional had generally ignored state courts in favor 
of the federal court system, which they perceived to be more receptive. 
Therefore, most state courts lacked a tradition of creative constitutional 
adjudication. At the time of the Rodriguez decision, state courts were long 
shots for plaintiffs challenging discrimination in school finance systems.25 
Thus, not only were the issues untested; so were the state courts themselves. 
Potential plaintiffs' attorneys had to determine which types of cases were not 
"doomed by the majority's declaration that education [was] not a fundamental interest."26 
Although the Rodriguez case did not specifically prohibit challenges under the federal 
Constitution, the chances for success were severely diminished.27 Cases which alleged 
that education was a fundamental right under the United States Constitution could not 
anticipate a high degree of success, and neither could cases based on federal equal 
protection arguments would also be unsuccessful, but other potentially successful 
arguments did exist 
22 David C. Long, "Rodriguez: The State Courts Respond," Phi Delta Kappan 
(March 1983): 481. 
23 Ibid. at 482. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Linda Mathews, "Rodriguez and Friends," Race Relations Reporter, July 1973, 
20. 
27 Rodriguez did not automatically foreclose an examination of another state's school 
financing system under the federal Constitution. A state with a financing system that 
differed from the one in Texas could still be found to violate the United States Constitution. 
See, Fair School Finance Council v. State, 746 P.2d 1135 (Okla. 1987). 
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The first was through the individual state constitution's c1auses that were similar to 
the federal equal protection clause. While, the Supreme Court had established guidelines 
for reviewing the federal equal protection c1ause, it made no attempt to tell the states how to 
interpret their own individual constitutions. To take such an action would have been 
beyond the Court's power. Thus, when evaluating its own equal protection clause, a state 
court could look to either the rational relationship test (which had been employed by the 
majority) or the strict scrutiny test (which was preferred by Marshall and the District 
Court) for guidance. 
The second likely route to success was through the clauses in the state constitution 
that established the state's education. (For purposes of brevity, throughout this 
dissertation, these clauses will be referred to as state education clauses.) 
As a matteroflaw, education in nearly every state [was] a function of state 
not local government. In this regard, education is unlike sewer, police, or 
fire departments. In virtually every state, school districts [were] considered 
legal agencies of the state in carrying out its constitutional obligation to 
provide a free public education to all children. Yet in carrying out this 
obligation, the state compel[led] children to attend school districts having 
vastly different resources.28 
The plaintiffs' attorneys reasoned that if they could persuade the state courts to 
acknowledge the irrationality of these constitutionally state-supported systems then their 
arguments might be successful. 
Why the Plaintiffs' Arguments Failed in the Supreme Court 
Yet, it was also important to consider why the plaintiffs' arguments failed in the 
Supreme Court. Hopefully, new plaintiffs could learn from errors made in Rodriguez and 
by doing so, they could then form more effective arguments in the state courts. Some of 
the possible plaintiffs' errors in Rodriguez are examined below. 
Timing Considerations 
28 David C. Long, "Rodriguez: The State Courts Respond," Phi Delta Kappan 
(March 1983 ): 481. 
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According to Coons, the Rodriguez decision reached the Supreme Court both too 
late and too early. The decision reached the Court too late because it missed the period of 
judicial activism that characterized the Court under the leadership of Chief Justice Earl 
Warren.29 Coons was confident that had the Warren Court heard the exact same facts, it 
would have ruled the other way. He believed that "[t]here was not much doubt as to how 
[Supreme Court Justices] Earl Warren, Arthur Goldberg, and Abe Fortas would have 
voted. 1130 In Coons's opinion, the decision reached the Court too early because the court 
relied on an "ill-informed"3 l article in the Yale Law Journal, because the friends of the 
plaintiffs were divided in their goals and because "the court had so little time to digest the 
idea."32 
In retrospect, some questioned whether the Rodriguez case reached the Supreme 
Court, at a time when the school finance reform movement Jacked focus and was "really an 
amalgamation of groups and individuals with various--and often competing--views on the 
general subject of money and the schools. 1133 Indeed, those who argued for change did so 
from several perspectives. "Egalitarians, "34 who believed that education's value would 
vary from district to district, wanted money to be divided equally at the state level; they 
were opposed to the idea that local citizens could or should make different decisions about 
spending. Another group believed that the Constitution should "guarantee spending 
29 It was during the years of the Warren Court that the Brown decision was handed 
down. 
30 "A Decade After Rodriguez: An Interview with John Coons," Phi Delta Kappan, 






according to the child's needs. "35 Yet, this group's definition of educational needs was 
unclear, even to others in the education finance reform movement.36 
Was Rodriguez the Best Case to Appear Before the Court? 
There was also some thought among leaders of the school finance reform 
movement that the Rodriguez case was not the best case to come before the Supreme Court. 
Rodriguez was one of more than thirty cases that materialized after Serrano v. Priest37 
(Serrano I) "first questioned the constitutionality of inequalities in school spending which 
were caused by disparate taxable wealth. "38 Some other correlations between district 
income and individual family income in Texas were weak.39 These weaknesses did not 
escape the review of the Supreme Court and "[t]he introduction of demographic data 
backfired on [the plaintiffs.]"40 A better case for the plaintiffs might "have come from 
New Jersey, where personal poverty was very strongly associated with the poverty of the 
tax base. 114 I 
Conclusion 
Typically, a decision like Rodriguez would not spur a great deal of action. It could 
almost be considered a nondecision. Despite all the words, the close vote, and the strong 
views both for and against the Texas school financing system, after the Rodriguez decision 
35 Ibid. 
36 John Coons was among those education finance reformers who were not certain of 
the definition. 
37 Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P. 2d 1241 (1971). 
38 David C. Long, "Rodriguez: The State Courts Respond," Phi Delta Kappan 
(March 1983): 481. 
39 Linda Mathews, "Rodriguez and Friends," Race Relations Reporter, July 1973, 
20. 
40 "A Decade After Rodriguez: An Interview with John Coons," Phi Delta Kappan, 
(March 1983): 480. 
41 Ibid. 
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was handed down, the state of Texas was under no federal constitutional obligation to 
make any changes in its school financing system. It could still finance its schools through 
a combination of federal, state, and local funds. It could still use the local property tax as a 
major source of income. Neither Texas nor any other state with a similar financing system 
(and that included just about every state) had to take any action whatsoever. As the next 
chapter demonstrates, however, the next twenty years were full of activity in the world of 
school finance reform, and much of that activity took place in the courtroom. 
CHAPfERIV 
SIGNIFICANT STATE COURT HISTORY AND DATA 
AFfER THE RODRIGUFZ DECISION 
Introduction 
As noted in the previous chapters, the Rodriguez case initiated a flurry of activity in 
state courts. People came to realize that education finance needed to be reformed, and if 
those reforms would not take place in the Supreme Court, then they would have to occur 
elsewhere. This chapter begins with a brief overview of the activity that took place, on the 
state court level during this period. It then highlights individual state court decisions from 
the time of the Rodriguez decision through 1993. A series of tables follows. The tables 
present a nationRl pkture of ('O!!lpRrison Rnc:f ('.ontrnst T~hJP 4, highlights the plaintiffs' 
strategies in these cases by examining which state constitutional clauses were attacked in 
the plaintiffs' arguments. Next,Table 6 details the states' education clauses as they existed 
!n ! Q93 Rnd notes whether education was recognized as a fundamental right in the state. 
Finally, Table 5, examines the outcomes of the cases in relation to the purported strength of 
the state's education clause. 
Overview 1973 to 1993 
The Early History 
As noted in the previous chapter, few state courts had experience with complicated 
constitutional matters at the time of the Rodriguez decision. Federal courts had been the 
favored arena for resolving social issues such as the ones surrounding school finance. 
After Rodriguez, plaintiffs wondered how this major shift from federal court to state 
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courts would affect the outcome of their cases. Plaintiffs did not have to wait long for an 
answer.I 
Only one month after the Rodriguez decision, the New Jersey Supreme Court 
handed down its own ruling in a school finance case. In Robinson v. Cahill,2 the court 
struck down the New Jersey system of school financing because it failed to provide the 
"thorough and efficient" system of free public schools that was required by the education 
clause of the New Jersey Constitution. 
Robinson was no harbinger of easy plaintiff victories, however. Many long years 
oflitigation followed in other states. 
Although the first response by a state court to the retreat of the 
federal courts from school finance issues came quickly, school finance 
litigation unfolded slowly during the three years following Rodriguez. 
During this period plaintiffs did well in state trial courts. Between 1973 
and 1976, trial courts in Idaho, California , and Connecticut found school 
finance systems unconstitutional. However, supreme courts in four 
western states followed the lead of the U.S. Supreme Court in Rodriguez 
and found that inequalities in state school finance systems resulting from the 
disparate fiscal capacities of school districts did not violate state 
constitutions.3 [These states were Arizona, Idaho, Oregon and 
Washington]. 
Thus, the years immediately following Rodriguez brought mixed results, but school 
finance reformers pushed ahead with additional litigation aimed at achieving equal 
educational opportunity for all students. 
As time passed, plaintiffs became more court-savvy. They were able to produce 
more extensive court records because they had more witnesses and documents.4 
Plaintiffs meticulously documented how the school financing systems 
discriminate[d] against children as a result of the fiscal capacity of the 
school district--a factor that [had] nothing to do with education. They also 
1 David C. Long, "Rodriguez: The State Courts Respond," Phi Delta Kappan 
(March 1983 ): 482. 
2 Robinson v. Cahill, 62 NJ. 473, 303 A.2d 273 (1973). 
3 David C. Long, "Rodriguez: The State Courts Respond," Phi Delta Kappan 
(March 1983 ): 482. 
4 Ibid. 
documented the ways in which inequalities in financing resulted in unequal 
educational facilities, staff, course offerings, equipment and instruction 
materials. 5 
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Plaintiffs gathered evidence carefully and because there was more of it for the courts to 
examine, trials took longer.6 
"Beginning in late 1976, plaintiffs' fortunes in state courts changed dramatically 
for the better. In general, the cases that reached state supreme courts during this period 
were tried after Rodriguez and profited from lessons learned from earlier losses. "7 In late 
1976, the California Supreme Court reaffirmed its 1971 Serrano v. Priest,8 (Serrano I) 
holding. In Serrano II, 9 the California Supreme Court held that education was a 
fundamental right under the California Constitution regardless of its status under the federal 
Constitution. Soon afterward, state supreme courts in Connecticut, Washington and 
Wyoming also found that their school finance systems were unconstitutional. Io 
After 1976, however, plaintiffs began to suffer defeats in major state court cases. 
Plaintiffs lost in state supreme court in Ohio, Colorado, Georgia and New York. School 
finance reformers may have lost some of the momentum that they had gained from earlier 
court victories. 
The Early to Middle 1980s 
As the 1970s moved into the 1980s, new concerns developed outside of education 




8 Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241 (1971). 
9 Serrano v. Priest, 18 Cal. 3d 729, 557 P.2d 929 (1976). 
10 David C. Long, "Rodriguez: The State Courts Respond," Phi Delta Kappan 
(March 1983): 482. 
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and then recession, appeared to be far more immediate concerns. I I Furthermore, attentions 
shifted in the education world as well. With the publication of A Nation at Risk in 1983, 12 
education reform became the "consuming passion"l3 of the 1980s. Americans became 
concerned with how they compared to other nations academically. Consequently, by 1983 
the education reform movement "eclipsed the school finance reform movement of the 
1970s."14 
School finance litigation by no means disappeared during the 1980s. Courts 
continued to address many of the same factual scenarios that they had adjudicated in the 
1970s, but new trends began to develop in the some of the case arguments. For example, 
during the 1980s, several courts addressed the issue of municipal overburden. Municipal 
overburden was an alleged disadvantage suffered by urban areas which had "enormous 
demands for non-education-related services, such as welfare, health and immigration." 15 
Plaintiffs argued that municipal overburden should be acknowledged in school funding 
formulas. Municipal overburden was a controversial issue, not only in the courts where it 
was alleged, but also in the school finance community. Some even doubted its existence. 
Near the end of the 1980s, municipal overburden arguments in school finance cases were, 
for the most part over.16 
The Late 1980s and Early 1990s 
11 Allan R. Odden and Lawrence 0. Picus, School Finance: A Policy Perspective. 
(St. Louis, Missouri: McGraw-Hill, 1992), 35, 118. 
12 Allan R. Odden and Lawrence 0. Picus, School Finance: A Policy Perspective. 
(St. Louis, Missouri: McGraw-Hill, 1992), 263. 
13 Allan Odden and Lori Kim, "Changing School Finance: Imperative for the 90s." 
Education Digest 57 (April 1992): 3. 
14 Deborah A. Verstegen, "The New Wave of School Finance Litigation," Phi Delta 
Kappan 7 (November 1994) 243-250, LEXIS par. 7of104. 
15 Allan R. Odden and Lawrence 0. Picus, School Finance: A Policy Perspective. 
(St. Louis, Missouri: McGraw-Hill, 1992), 33. 
16 Ibid. 
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The late 1980s and early 1990s saw a resurgence in interest in school finance 
cases. The exact cause behind this regeneration remains unknown. Some experts alleged 
that it was a result of the growing disparity between rich and poor districts. Others alleged 
that earlier lawsuits failed to reach acceptable results. Still others believed that the courts 
had become more liberal and more protectionist, at least as far as education finance was 
concerned. Finally, according to some, educators began bringing the suits out of 
frustration with their state legislators inability to reform school finance.1 7 
The Failure of Equality and Equity 
Furthermore, in the 1990s, after more than twenty years of frustration with trying 
to bring about equal educational opportunity, some school finance reformers suggested 
abandoning the equality and equity arguments. To these reformers, attempts to bring 
about equality or equity no longer seemed viable. Equality of spending, dollar for dollar, 
would probably never occur; most school finance reformers came to this conclusion long 
before Rodriguez ever reached the Supreme Court. Essentially, as mentioned in Chapter 
1, different children often required different materials or equipment, which typically 
translated into different amounts of money. Seemingly, this would make equity a good 
solution to school finance problems. Consequently, for many years, school finance 
reformers struggled to obtain equal educational opportunity for children through calls for 
equity, but equity too had its problems. Even when state courts struck down the school 
financing system as unconstitutional and inequitable, the actual changes in dollar amounts 
for districts and educational opportunities for children were seldom seen. From 1983 to 
1993, "states all over the country ... endured the same cycle of litigation, court decision, 
attempted remedy and further litigation." 18 
17 Jo Anna Natale, "Just Deserts," The American School Board Journal (March 
1990): 20. 




One of the only possible roads to equity appeared to have come through something 
wealthy districts had feared since before Rodriguez: leveling.19 Some residents of 
wealthier districts apprehensively equated the concept of equity with leveling. 
The fear that comes across in many .. .letters [to the editor] and editorials ... 
is that democratizing opportunity will undermine diversity and even 
elegance in our society and that the best schools will be dragged down to a 
sullen norm, a mediocre middle ground of uniformity. References to 
Eastern European socialism keep appearing in these letters. Visions of 
Prague and Moscow come to mind: Equity means shortages of toilet tissue 
for all students, not just for black kids in New Jersey or in Mississippi. An 
impoverished vision of America seems to prevail in these scenarios.20 
Thus, to many residents of property-wealthy districts, the process of leveling meant 
distributing their money in other people's districts. In their eyes, equity would take their 
money away from their own children. 
Adequacy - A New Solution or a New Problem? 
In the 1990s, a solution to educational finance problems appeared to develop. 
School finance reformers began to speak in terms of adequacy rather than equity. 
Adequacy mov[ed] away from an emphasis on dollar inputs--or how much 
it [would] cost to bring poorer districts to fiscal parity with their wealthier 
counterparts---towards a closer scrutiny of the things education dollars 
[were] supposed to buy---teachers, curricula, test scores.21 
Most of the education finance cases after 1989 spoke of adequacy as well as equity in their 
arguments.22 Indeed, some argued that adequacy will virtually replace equity in school 
finance cases, if it has not done so already. According to Michael Kirst, an educator 
19 Ibid. 
20 Jonathan Kozol, Savage Inequalities: Children in America's Schools (New York: 
Crown, 1991): 173. 
21 Charles Mahtesian, "The Quagmire of Education Finance," Governing (September 
1993): 44-45. 
22 Allan Odden and Lori Kim. "Changing School Finance: Imperative for the 90s." 
Education Digest 57 (April 1992): 3-6. 
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professor at Stanford and the former president of the California Board of education, 
"There is a general view in the school finance field that adequacy suits are not as 
sophisticated or up-to-date as adequacy. "23 
Thus, the post Rodriguez years were years of ever developing strategies for school 
finance reformers and of active litigation for the state courts. For the most part, both the 
reformers and the courts attempted, in their own ways, to improve the school finance 
situation in the United States, although at times, because of their respective duties and 
obligations, they appeared to work at cross purposes. Unfortunately, in spite of such 
efforts, as the next sections demonstrate, by 1993 conditions in property poor districts 
were much the same as they were in 1973. 
Case Highlights from State Courts 1973-1993 
The Purpose of this Synopsis 
By examining individual state court cases, this dissertation explores how the United 
States, as a nation, responded to the decision of its highest court. The Rodriguez case 
impacted education and education financing not only in Texas, but throughout the country. 
Many states had factual scenarios as compelling as those found in Texas. Not surprisingly. 
then, the history of education finance in many individual states, is worth additional study. 
(See Chapter V's Recommendations.) This dissertation does not attempt to examine the 
particular histories of every state's response to Rodriguez. Rather, it presents an overview 
of the significant state court cases that followed Rodriguez. 
1973 
Miliken v. Green, 390 Mich. 389, 212 N.W. 2d 711 (1973) 
The governor of the state brought a suit for declaratory judgment, hoping to 
determine the constitutionality of the state's school financing system. In December of 
23 Charles Mahtesian, "The Quagmire of Education Finance," Governing (September 
1993): 45. 
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1972, the Supreme Court of Michigan had found the school financing system to be 
"constitutionally infirm"24 based on the equal protection clause of the Michigan 
Constitution. On January 30, 1973, the court granted a rehearing. After the rehearing 
and the results of the Rodriguez case, the court vacated its earlier pronouncements and gave 
new answers to the certified questions. Based upon the Rodriguez authority, it found no 
violation of the federal equal protection clause. Furthermore, it found no violation against 
Michigan's equal protection clause. Finally, the Michigan Supreme Court indicated that 
the Michigan Constitution did not prohibit districts from using local property taxes as a 
source of revenue, nor did it require the state to supplement other districts or take any other 
measure to even out the distribution of school funds. 
Robinson v. Cahill, 62 NJ. 473, 303 A.2d 273 (1973) 
This case, handed down only one month after the Rodriguez Supreme Court 
decision,25 "was the first case in which a state supreme court relied on the education 
provisions of a state constitution, rather than on equal protection requirements, to find the 
funding of schools unconstitutional. 1126 The case, which came to be known as Robinson 
!,27 was important for several other reasons as well. For example, in Robinson "[t]he 
New Jersey court condemned not only the inequalities resulting from inadequate tax bases, 
but also those resulting form inadequate tax efforts. In addition, the court held that the 
state had never spelled out the content of the educational opportunity mandated by the state 
constitution. 1128 
24 Miliken v. Green, 390 Mich. 389, 212 N.W. 2d 711 
25 David C. Long, "Rodriguez: The State Courts Respond," Phi Delta Kappan 
(March 1983): 482. 
26 David C. Long, "Rodriguez: The State Courts Respond," Phi Delta Kappan 
(March 1983): 482. 
27 Peter Enrich, "Leaving Equality Behind: New Directions in School Finance 
Reform," 48 VanderbiltLawReview (1995): 189. 
28 Ibid. 
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Shofstall v. Hollins, 110 Ariz. 88, 515 P.2d 590 (1973) 
The plaintiffs alleged that the disparities in Arizona's school finance system violated 
the equal protection clauses of the United States and of the State of Arizona. After the 
appeal to the Arizona Supreme Court was filed in this case, the United States Supreme 
Court handed down its decision in Rodriguez and the Arizona court found that the federal 
equal protection question had been answered. The court also found that there was no state 
equal protection violation because the school financing system was rationally related to a 
legitimate state goal. Interestingly, though, the court also declared that under the language 
of the Arizona Constitution's education clause, education was a fundamental right in 
Arizona.29 
1974 
Northshore School District No, 417 v. Kinear, 84 Wash.2d 685, 530 P.2d 178 (1974) 
In this case the plaintiffs alleged that the Washington school financing system 
violated both the federal and state equal protection clauses, as well as the state 
constitution's education clause.30 The Washington Supreme Court found that "the record 
[did] not bear out these claims of unconstitutional inequality of educational opportunity. "31 
Consequently, the court deferred to the legislative determination of the scope of education 
to be provided in the state.32 
29 In a 1994 case, Roosevelt Elementary School Dist. v. Bishop, 877 P.2d 806, 811 
(Ariz. 1994), the Arizona Supreme Court questioned the court's reasoning in Shofshall 
when it declared: [w]e do not understand how the rational basis test can be used when a 
fundamental right has been implicated." 
30 Peter Enrich, "Leaving Equality Behind: New Directions in School Finance 
Reform," 48 Vanderbilt Law Review ( 1995): 193. 
31 Northshore School District No, 417 v. Kinear, 84 Wash.2d 685, 530 P.2d 178, 
185 (1974) 
32 Peter Enrich, "Leaving Equality Behind: New Directions in School Finance 
Reform," 48 VanderbiltLawReview (1995): 193. 
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1975 
Thompson v. Engelking, 96 Idaho 793, 537 P.2d 635 (1975) 
In this case, the Idaho Supreme Court reviewed the decision of the District Court. 
The District Court had found that Idaho's school financing system, which relied heavily on 
ad valorum taxes, violated the Idaho Constitution because it failed to provide a uniform 
system of public schools. The District Court had found no violation of the state's equal 
protection clause. On appeal the Idaho Supreme Court found that neither the education 
clause nor the equal protection clause was violated. 
1976 
Olsen v. State, 276 Or.9, 554 P.2d 139 (1976) 
In this case that came before the Oregon Supreme Court, the plaintiffs contended 
that the Oregon system of public school financing violated both the equal protection and 
education clauses of the Oregon Constitution.33 The essence of the plaintiffs' argument 
[was] that under the Oregon system the amount of money available for education 
depend[ed] upon the value of the property in the individual school districts and this varie[d] 
greatly. They further contend[ed] that this variation in wealth result[ed] in unequal 
educational opportunities for the children of the state.34 
In its analysis, the court noted that there were three types of districts in Oregon: 
unified, elementary ,and secondary and that substantial spending disparities existed 
between like districts.35 The court then referred to the recent Rodriguez case, but 
acknowledged that it could decide that the equal protection clause of the Oregon 
Constitution was broader than that of the federal Constitution.36 The court used the 
33 Olsen v. State, 276 Or.9, 554 P.2d 139 (1976) 
34 Ibid. at 140. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Ibid. at 143. 
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balancing test employed by the New Jersey Supreme Court in Robinson v. Cahill37 to 
evaluate the plaintiffs' equal protection arguments. The Oregon Supreme Court found no 
violation of state equal protection.38 Furthermore, the court found that the education 
clause of the Oregon Constitution (which called for a "uniform" system of public schools) 
did not require spending equality among like districts. Thus, the education clause 
argument was likewise rejected.39 As in the Rodriguez case, however, the court stated 
that its rulings in this case were not an endorsement of the status quo in school financing. 
The court declared: "Our decision should not be interpreted to mean that we are of the 
opinion that the Oregon system of school financing is politically or educationally desirable. 
Our only role is to pass upon its constitutionality. "40 
People ex. rel. Jones v. Adams, 40 Ill. App.3d 189, 350 N.E.2d 767 (1976) 
Citizens of a rural district in Illinois paid their 1971 and 1972 property taxes under 
protest, and alleged, in part, that the 111inois method of financing public education violated 
the equal protection clauses of the United States Constitution, and the Illinois Constitution. 
The citizens, who were the defendants in this case, were taxed locally at an above-average 
rate, but per student spending still fell $165 below the state average.41 The court found 
that "Illinois' method of financing public schools before 1973 was expressly held to be 
constitutional in Mcinnis v. Shapiro. "42 Even under the standards adopted in Rodriguez, 
37 Robinson v. Cahill, 62 N.J. 473, 303 A.2d 273 (1973). 
38 Olsen v. State, 276 Or.9, 554 P.2d 139, 148 (1976). 
39 Ibid. 
40 Ibid. at 149. 
41 People ex. rel. Jones v. Adams, 40 Ill. App.3d 189, 350 N.E.2d 767, 774-775 
(1976). 
42Mcinnis v. Shapiro (N .. Ill. 1968) 293 F. Supp. 327, affd sub nom. Mcinnis v. 
Ogilvie, 394 U.S., 322, 22 L.Ed. 2d 308, 89 S. Ct. 1197. 
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Rodriguez, which "displaced"43 those in Mclnnis, the taxpayer defendants failed to prove 
discrimination. 
At trial the defendants did not elicit any testimony concerning the 
discriminatory aspects of Illinois' method of financing public schools 
during 1971 and 1972. Although the defendants introduced in evidence 
several exhibits which contained information relevant to this subject, they 
made little effort to separate the information from the large volume of other 
material in the exhibits. The defendants have not offered an analysis of 
what the statistics included in their exhibits prove. They have not 
introduced evidence concerning the adequacy of education provided by 
school districts in Franklin County, and they have not introduced evidence 
concerning the size of the disparity in expenditures per pupil between school 
districts in Franklin County and wealthy school districts in the state.44 
The defendants arguments were t})us rejected by the court. 
Robinson v. Cahill, 69 NJ. 449, 355 A. 2d 129 (1976) 
In this case, which came to be known as Robinson V, the New Jersy Supreme 
Court upheld the constitutionality of the legislative reforms that had been instigated in 
response to Robinson I. 45 The primary focus of the case was on the statutory provisions 
used to implement "the state's responsibility to define and monitor the adequacy of 
education delivered by the school districts. Secondary attenetion [was] given to 
sufficeincy of provisions for financial support and to steps toward elimination of gross 
disparities in funding.46 
Serrano v. Priest, 18 Cal. 3d 729, 557 P.2d 929 (1976) 
This case became known as Serrano II because it followed the original 1971 
Serrano v. Priest case, 5 Cal 3d 584, 96 Cal Rptr. 601, 487 P.2d 1241 (which afterwards 
became known as Serrano I.) Prior to the Rodriguez decision, in Serrano I, the California 
Supreme Court had found that the California school financing system violated both the state 
43 People ex. rel. Jones v. Adams, 40 Ill. App.3d 189, 350 N.E.2d 767, 775 (1976) 
44 Ibid. at 776. 
45 Peter Enrich, "Leaving Equality Behind: New Directions in School Finance 
Reform," 48 Vanderbilt Law Review (1995): 189. 
46 Ibid. 
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and federal equal protection clauses. In Serrano II, the court acknowledged that the 
Rodriguez decision "undercut1147 its federal equal protection ruling in Serrano I, but 
nonetheless, the court found that a state equal protection violation still existed.48 
Although the state legislature had attempted to changed the system (which relied on local 
property taxes for much of its funding) the California Supreme Court found that the 
changes were inadequate because the basic structure of the system was unchanged; i.e. it 
was still a "foundation level" system.49 
1977 
Horton v. Meskill, 376 A. 2d 359 (1977) 
The Connecticut Supreme Court in this case (Horton I) found that the state's 
system of school financing, which relied heavily on local property taxes, violated the state 
equal protection clause. 50 At the time of the initial trial, 
Connecticut ranked fiftieth among states in its efforts to distribute aid in 
such a way as to equalize the abilities of various towns to finance education, 
ranked forty-seventh in the percent of educational funding coming from the 
state and second in the percent of education funding coming form local 
govemments.51 
The court used Rodriguez in its equal protection analysis,54 but found that education was a 
fundamental right under the Connecticut Constitution and that the "[b ]asic and fundamental 
nature of [the] right to education necessitat[ed strict scrutiny of wealth-based variations, 
with [the] result that substantial equality of educational opportunity [was] required."53 
47 Serrano v. Priest, 18 Cal. 3d 729, 557 P.2d 929, 948 (1976) 
48 Ibid. at 951. 
49 Serrano v. Priest, 18 Cal. 3d 729, 557 P.2d 929, 935 (1976) 
50 Peter Enrich, "Leaving Equality Behind: New Directions in School Finance 
Reform," 48 VanderbiltLawReview (1995): 186. 
51 Horton v. Meskill, 376 A. 2d 359, 368 (1976) 
52 Ibid. at 371-372. 
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1978 
Seattle School Dist. No. 1 v. State, 90 Wash. 2d 476, 585 P.2d 71 (1978) 
"Faced with a deteriorating plant, a reduction in budget for books, supplies, staff 
and programs and a double levy failure petitioners (respondents and cross-appellants 
brought this action"54 on appeal to the Supreme Court of Washington. The petitioners 
alleged that "the State had failed to discharge its 'paramount duty' to make 'ample 
provision' for the education of its resident children pursuant to Const., art 9, § 1 and 'to 
provide for a general and uniform system of public schools' pursuant to Const., art 9., § 
2. 1155 
Based upon these claims, the Washington Supreme Court upheld the decision of the 
lower court56 which had invalidated the school financing system's reliance on local 
property taxes.57 The court rejected the appellants call for judicial restraint and asserted 
that it was not acting beyond the scope of its constitutionally granted powers.58 Finally, 
the court determined that the state legislature had the responsibility to define the scope of a 
basic education and to make the adequate provision for funding education statewide. 59 
1979 
Board of Education v. Walter, 58 Oh.St. 2d 368, 390 N.E.2d 813 (1979) 
53 Peter Enrich, "Leaving Equality Behind: New Directions in School Finance 
Reform," 48 Vanderbilt Law Review ( 1995): 186. 
54 Seattle School Dist. No. 1 v. State, 90 Wash. 2d 476, 585 P.2d 71 (1978). 
55 Ibid. 
56 Ibid. at 75. 
57 Peter Enrich, "Leaving Equality Behind: New Directions in School Finance 
Reform," 48 Vanderbilt Law Review (1995): 193. 
58 Seattle School Dist. No. 1 v. State, 90 Wash. 2d 476, 585 P.2d 71, 87-90 (1978). 
59 Peter Enrich, "Leaving Equality Behind: New Directions in School Finance· 
Reform," 48 Vanderbilt Law Review (1995): 193. 
Jn this case, the Supreme Court of Ohio addressed two common issues in state 
school finance litigation. First, did the state's school financing system violate the equal 
protection clause of the Ohio Constitution? Secondly, did the system violate the state's 
education clause?60 
The court looked to the Rodriguez decision for guidance, but noted that it was "not 
helpful in determining whether a right was fundamental under the Ohio Constitution."61 
Thus, even though education was mentioned explicitly in the Ohio Constitution, the court 
did not find education to be a fundamental right in Ohio. The court also found this case 
inappropriate for evaluation under the strict scrutiny test. Consequently, using the rational 
relationship test, the court found no violation of the state's equal protection clause. 62 
The court also failed to find a violation of the state's education clause. The court 
acknowledged its responsibility to review legislation, and "that the wide General Assembly 
discretion granted to the General Assembly [--here with respect to school finance litigation-
-was] not without limits."63 In this case, however, the Ohio Supreme Court found that the 
General Assembly acted within its constitutionally granted powers when it established the 
school financing system. 64 
Danson v. Casey, 484 Pa. 415, 399 A 2d 360 (1979) 
In this case the plaintiff sf appellants alleged that, due to inadequate revenues, 
students in the Philadelphia School District received "only a 'truncated and uniquely limited 
program of educational services. "'65 The appellants did 
60 Board of Education v. Walter, .58 Oh.St. 2d 368, 390 N.E.2d 813 (1979). 
61 Ibid. at 818. 
62 Ibid. at 821. 
63 Ibid. at 825. 
64 Ibid. 
65 Danson v. Casey, 484 Pa. 415, 399 A 2d 360 (1979). 
not purport to challenge any particuJar portion of either the state subsidy or 
local taxation aspects of the scheme. Instead, appellants basic constitutional 
claim [was] that, viewed as a whole, the Pennsylvania system of school 
financing fail[ed] to provide Philadelphia's public school children with a 
thorough and efficient education and deni[ed] them equaJ educational 
opportunity solely because of their residence in the School District of 
Philadelphia. 66 
94 
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania found that the plaintiffs' "broad and general"67 
cha11enge (brought in part under the state's education clause) to the state's school 
financing system "failed to state a justicable cause of action. 1168 
Pauly v. Ke11y, 162 W.Va. 672, 255 S.E.2d 859 (1979) 
In 1975, the plaintiffs filed a class action lawsuit alleging violations of the state's 
equal protection and education clauses. The circuit court granted the defendants motion to 
dismiss the case, but the plaintiffs appealed. The West Virginia Supreme Court found that 
"[t]he mandatory requirements of a 'thorough and efficient system of free schools found in 
Article XII, Section 1 of the West Virginia Constitution, made education a fundamental 
right in this State."69 The court also found that the state's equal protection clause was 
violated because there was no compelling state interest which justified the unequal 
classifications brought about by the system.70 The court then called upon the legislature 
to develop a new "high quality" system and subsequently remanded the case to the circuit 
court.71 
1980 
Washakie County School Dist. No. 1 v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310 (Wyo. 1980) 
()6 Ibid. at 363. 
67 Ibid. 
68 Ibid. 
69 Pauly v. Kelly, 162 W.Va. 672, 255 S.E.2d 859 (1979). 
70 Pauley v. Bailey, 174 W.Va. 167, 324 S.E. 2d 128, 131 (1984). 
71 Ibid. 
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Three school districts, together with their school board members and several 
students had alleged, in District Court, that the Wyoming school financing system violated 
the equal protection clause of the state constitution. When the District Court granted the 
state's motion to dismiss the plaintiffs' challenge, the plaintiffs appealed. Unlike the 
Rodriguez court, the Wyoming Supreme Court found that education~ a fundamental 
right under the Wyoming Constitution. Furthermore, the Wyoming court accepted the 
argument that wealth was a suspect class and ruled that the compelling state interest test 
should be applied to evaluate the state's equal protection clause. Finally, the court 
concluded that "until equality of financing is achieved, there is no practicable method of 
achieving equality of quality." The court then reversed the decision and remanded the 
case to the trial court. 
1981 
McDaniel v. Thomas, 248 Ga. 632, 285 S.E. 2d 156 (1981) 
Georgia parents, children, and school officials who resided in school districts with 
low property tax bases alleged that the school financing system violated the Georgia equal 
protection clause and also failed to provide the "adequate education" that was required by 
the Georgia Constitution. The trial court found that the school financing system did violate 
the state's equal protection clause, but it rejected the plaintiffs' claims that the state failed to 
provide an adequate education. On appeal, the Georgia Supreme Court found that 
"adequate education" did not "require the state to equalize educational opportunities 
between districts"72 and that the more than l billion dollars the state allocated to education 
was proof of its adequacy.73 Beyond this evaluation of "adequacy," the court did not 
want to act as a "super-legislature" The court applied the rational relationship test to its 
evaluation of the state's equal protection clause and found that the educational finance 
72 McDaniel v. Thomas, 248 Ga. 632, 285 S.E. 2d 156, 164 (1981). 
73 Ibid. at 165. 
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system did not violate the Georgia Constitution. The court declared, however, that its 
holding "should not be construed as this court's endorsement of the status quo ... [but that] 
solutions must come from our lawmakers. "74 
1982 
Levittown Union Free School Dist. v. Nyquist, 57 N.Y.S. 2d 27, 453 N.Y.S.2d 643, 439 
N.E. 2d 359 
The New York Court of Appeals (the highest court in the state) overturned the 
decisions of two lower courts that had previously found in favor of plaintiffs who 
challenged the school financing system. The court used the rational basis test from 
Rodriguez to find that there was no violation of either federal or state equal protection. 
Furthermore, the court held that the state abided by the state constitutional mandate to 
provide for the maintenance and support of free common elementary and secondary 
schools. In addition, the court rejected the plaintiffs claim that "metropolitan overburden" 
(which alleged that inequalities were a result of "demographic, economic and political 
factors intrinsic to cities"75 was a result of legislative action or inaction.76 
Lujan v. Colorado State Board of Educ., 649 P.2d 1005 (Colo. 1982) 
The trial court had determined that the Colorado school financing system, which 
relied heavily on local taxes, was unconstitutional on both state and federal equal protection 
grounds, as well as the "thorough and uniform" requirement of the education clause of the 
state's constitution. The Colorado Supreme Court reversed. It found no equal protection 
violations because the financing system was "rationally related to a legitimate state 
purpose. "77 
74 Ibid. at 167. 
75 Mary Jane Connelly and Jack McGee, "School Finance Litigation of the 1980s." 
Journal of Education Finance 12 (Spring 1987): 580. 
76 Ibid. 
77 Lujan v. Colorado State Bd. of Educ., 649 P.2d 1005 at 1011 (Colo. 1992) 
Yet, the court did not specifically endorse the status quo, as far as the school 
financing system was concerned. 
Whether a better financing system could be devised is not material to this 
decision, as our sole function is to rule on the constitutionality of our state's 
system. This decision should not be read to indicate that we find 
Colorado's school financing system to be without fault or not requiring 
further legislative improvements. Our decision today declares only that it is 
constitutionally permissible.78 
Thus, the Colorado Supreme Court exercised judicial restraint in its evaluation of the issues 
in Lujan. 
1983 
Dupree v. Alama School Dist. No. 30, 279 Ark. 340, 651S.W.2d90 (1983) 
In Dupree, the plaintiffs contended that 
[T]he great disparity in funds available for education to school districts 
throughout the state [was] due primarily to the fact that the major 
determinative of revenue throughout the state [was] the local tax base, a 
basis unrelated to the educational needs of any given district and that the 
... state financing system [was] inadequate to rectify the inequalities inherent 
in a system based on widely varying local tax bases, and actually widens the 
gap between the property-poor and property-wealthy districts in providing 
educational opportunities.79 
The trial court found that the Arkansas school financing system violated the education and 
equal protection clauses of the Arkansas Constitution, and the Supreme Court upheld the 
trial courts' ruling. The Supreme Court of Arkansas upheld the trial court's finding that 
the Arkansas school financing system violated the education and equal protection clauses of 
the Arkansas Constitution. 
Hornbeck v. Somerset County Board of Education, 295 Md. 597, 458 S.2d 758 (1983) 
In this case, the Supreme Court of Maryland overturned an earlier circuit court 
decision which had found that the state's school financing system violated both the state 
and federal equal protection clauses and the state constitutional clause requiring a "thorough 
78 Ibid. 
79 Dupree v. Alama School Dist. No. 30, 279 Ark. 340, 651S.W.2d90 (1983). 
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and efficient" system of free pubJic schools. The Maryland Supreme Court applied the 
rational relationship test to its evaluation of the equaJ protection clauses and found no equal 
protection violations. Even though students from property-poor districts could not 
produce funds to the same extent as students in property-rich districts, nonetheless, the 
court deemed their education was stilJ adequate. Furthermore, the court held that a 
"thorough and efficient" system of free public schools "did not mandate exact equality of 
per pupil funding and expenditures among districts. "80 
1984 
East Jackson PubJic Schools v. State, 133 Mich. App. 132, 348 N.W. 2D 303 (1984) 
In this case, the plaintiffs appealed a circuit court's ruling which had found the 
state schooJ system to be vaJid under the Michigan Constitution. 
The plaintiffs' thesis, as interpreted by the [appellate] court, was that a state 
school financing system which did not produce equal funding per pupiJ in 
each school district throughout the state was not permissible under the 
Michigan state constitution. The [appellate] court's determination was that 
the legislative mandate to establish a system of free public education was not 
synonymous with providing equal per pupil funding between aJl school 
districts. 81 
Thus, the appellate court upheld the circuit court's decision. 
PauJey v. Bailey, 174 W.Va. 167, 324 S.E. 2d 128 (1984) 
This case followed the implementation of the Master Plan for Education that was 
devised by the legislature after Pauly v. Kelly. 82 Plaintiffs alleged that the "circuit court 
erred, perhaps inadvertently, when it failed to specifically order the implementation and 
enforcement of the Master Plan. 1183 The plaintiffs were particularly interested in imposing 
8o80 Hornbeck v. Somerset County Board of Education, 295 Md. 597, 458 S.2d 758, 
776, (1983). 
81 Mary Jane Connelly and Jack McGee, "School Finance Litigation of the 1980s." Journal 
of Education Finance 12 (Spring 1987): 580 
82 Pauly v. Kelly, 162 W.Va. 672, 255 S.E.2d 859 (1979). 
83 Pauley v. Bailey, 174 W.Va. 167, 324 S.E. 2d 128, 133 (1984). 
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"a specific timetable for full implementation of the Master Plan."84 The court did not 
consider it appropriate to recommend a timetable and thus, remanded the case to the circuit 
court for further monitoring. 85 
1985 
Abbott v. Burke, 100 NJ. 269 (1985) 
The school finance system that had been enacted by the legislature after the 
Robinson v. Cahill decision was challenged in court, but the court referred the case to an 
administrative hearing.86 The case would reappear before the New Jersy Supreme Court 
in 1990.87 
Horton v. Meskill, 187 Conn. 187, 486 A.2d 1099 (1985) 
This case, part of a long line of school finance litigation in Connecticut, became 
known as Horton II. At the trial level in Horton II, the court examined the 1979 legislative 
response to the Horton I's call for a new school finance scheme and found that it was 
inadequate. On appeal, the court found that the Horton II trial court had erred in reaching 
its decision. First, the trial court used the compelling state interest standard to evaluate the 
funding formulas when the appropriate test called for only a rational relationship between 
the formula and a legitimate state purpose. Secondly, the trial court "had failed to afford 
all interested parties an opportunity to be heard regarding remediation of constitutional 
infirmities. "88 Consequently, the Connecticut Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality 
of the power-equalization financing system that had been adopted after Horton I, on the 
84 Ibid. at 137. 
85 Ibid. 
86 Stephen I. Brown, "Educational Finance Equity: Recent Developments in State 
Courts," NASSPBulletin, (January 1991): 83. 
87 As well as in 1994. 
88 Mary Jane Connelly and Jack McGee, "School Finance Litigation of the 1980s." 
Journal of Education Finance 12 (Spring 1987): 582. 
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grounds that it significantly narrowed the disparities between rich and poor districts.89 
The court the remanded the claims that amendments passed subsequently to the new system 
unconstitutionally delayed the implementation of the system.90 
1986 
Serrano v. Priest, 226 Cal. Rptr. 584 (Cal. App. 1986) 
This case, part of the ongoing struggle for school finance reform in California, 
became known as Serrano III. The plaintiffs cJaimed that in spite of the attempts at reform 
that followed Serrano I and Serrano II, unacceptable funding disparities still existed.91 By 
the time the Serrano III decision was handed down, the school finance system in California 
had again changed due to a taxpayers' revolt92 and the implementation of Proposition 13.93 
In this case, however, the court ruled "as did the trial court that remaining differences in 
spending [were] not significant, either mathematically or educationally."94 Furthermore, 
even had the differences been significant, they would have been justified by many state 
interests relating to the necessity of a uniform and adaptable budget.95 
1987 
Fair School Finance Council v. State, 746 P.2d 1135 (Okla. 1987) 
On appeal in this class action suit, the plaintiffs argued that the school financing 
system in Oklahoma violated the equal protection laws of both the United States and 
89 Peter Enrich, "Leaving Equality Behind: New Directions in School Finance 
Reform," 48 Vanderbilt Law Review (1995): 189. 
90 Peter Enrich, "Leaving Equality Behind: New Directions in School Finance 
Reform," 48 Vanderbilt Law Review (1995): 189. 
91 Serrano v. Priest, 226 Cal. Rptr. 584, 589(Cal. App. 1986). 
92 Peter Enrich, "Leaving Equality Behind: New Directions in School Finance 
Reform," 48 Vanderbilt Law Review (1995): 114. 
93 Serrano v. Priest, 226 Cal. Rptr. 584, 591 (Cal. App. 1986). 
94 Ibid. at 619. 
95 Ibid. 
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Oklahoma constitutions.96 In addition, to these fairly standard arguments, the plaintiffs 
made two unique arguments. First, they 11contend[ed] that it [was] a violation of both due 
process and equal protection to require children to attend schools under penalty for them 
and their parents without requiring some standard of equality in the public support of those 
schools. "97 Secondly, they argued that the school financing system violated Article 5 §§ 
59 and 46 of the Oklahoma Constitution. "Section 59 requir[ed] that general laws have a 
uniform operation throughout the state and that no special Jaw be enacted where a general 
law [could] be made and Section 46 prohibit[ed] any special or local law 'regulating the 
affairs' of school districts. 1198 
The court rejected all of these arguments. As to the federal Constitutional claims, 
the court found Rodriguez to be controlling. There was "no requirement under the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution that a 
state's school financing system guarantee equal expenditures per child. 1199 In addition, 
because the court did not accept the plaintiffs argument for the application of strict judicial 
scrutiny to the state equal protection cJause, the plaintiffs arguments under the state equal 
protection clause also failed. Finally, the court rebuffed the plaintiffs two unusual 
arguments. The Oklahoma Supreme Court declared that "[w]hatever merit [the 
compulsory attendance argument had] it [was] of no avail where a charge [could] not be 
fairly made that a child[ was] not receiving at least a basic adequate education, 11 100 
(emphasis in the original). Lastly, the court rejected the arguments brought under Article 5 
§§ 59 and 46 of the Oklahoma Constitution. The state had a rational basis for its school 
96 Fair School Finance Council v. State, 746 P.2d 1135, 1144,1148 (Okla. 1987) 
97 Ibid. at 1150. 
98 Ibid. 
99 Ibid. at 1147. 
100 Ibid. at 1150. 
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financing system and the laws that regulated the affairs of the school district were not 
impermissible simply because some districts could act with greater freedom under those 
laws, due to a superior financial situation within the district 1o1 
Britt v. North Carolina State Board of Education. 86 N.C. App. 282, 357 S.E.2d 432, 
app. dismissed 361 S.E.2d 71 (1987) 
After the Superior Court of North Carolina dismissed their complaint alleging a 
violation of the state's education clause, the plaintiffs (the present and future students of 
public schools in Robeson County, North Carolina) brought their case to the Court of 
Appeals of North Carolina.102 On appeal, the plaintiffs alleged that the state's school 
financing system was unconstitutional because it depended in large part on local tax bases 
and it resulted in the denial of the plaintiffs' fundamental right to equal educatfonal 
opportunity .103 
According to the court, "the outcome of this appeal depended entirely on the 
interpretation to be given the constitutional provisions relied upon by the plaintiffs." 104 If 
the court interpreted the constitution in the same manner as the plaintiffs (who believed that 
equal educational opportunity was a fundamental right) then the court would be able to 
redress the plaintiffs claim. If the court did not agree with the plaintiffs' interpretation of 
the North Carolina Constitution, however, it would be therefore compelled to affirm the 
lower court's dismissal. The court looked to the legislative history surrounding the 
development of the education clause and to the text of the education clause itself in order to 
reach its conclusion. It found that neither the constitutional history nor the text of the 
101 Ibid. 
102 Britt v. North Carolina State Board of Education. 86 N.C. App. 282, 357 S.E.2d 
432, 433 app. dismissed 361 S.E.2d 71 (1987). 
103 Ibid. at 434. 
104 Ibid. 
103 
document supported the plaintiffs' claims. Therefore, the appeJJate court upheld the lower 
court's dismissal. I 05 
1988 
Richland County v. Campbell, 294 S.C. 346, 364 S.E. 2d 470 (1988) 
In this brief opinion, the Supreme Court rejected the plaintiffs' claims that the 
school financing system in South Carolina violated both the education and equal protection 
clauses of the South Carolina Constitution.106 The appellants asserted that the South 
Carolina public school financing system produced "disparate revenue and unequal 
educational opportunities because it [was] based upon formulas that [took] into account the 
individual wealth of the various school districts."107 The court found that "[a]pparently 
plaintiffs interpreted [the education] provision as requiring the legislature to 'pay' for the 
cost of the public school system rather than to 'provide' for its maintenance and 
support." 108 The court found the legislative acts that devised the state's school finance 
plan to be a valid means of providing for education. 
The court also refuted the appellants equal protection claim. According to the 
court, the school financing plan in South Carolina differed from plans which relied heavily 
upon property local taxes. Though the court did not describe in detail the differences 
between South Carolina's method and the method which relied on property local taxes, it 
nonetheless declared that South Carolina "school districts which lack a sufficient tax base 
receive proportionally more state funds and are required to pay proportionally less local 
revenue for public school operation,"109 (emphasis in the original). Based on these 
conclusions, the supreme court affirmed the decision of the trial court. 
105 Ibid. at 434-435. 
106 Richland County v. Campbell, 294 S.C. 346, 364 S.E. 2d 470 (1988). 




Edgewood Independent School District v. Kirby, 777 S.W. 2d 391 (Tex. 1989) 
Sixteen years after the Supreme Court's Rodriguez decision, the undisputed facts of 
another Texas case, Edgewood v. Kirby, 
showed that the disparity between the richest and poorest districts in Texas 
was more than 700 to 1. The 300,000 students in the poorest districts had 
Jess than 3 percent of the state's wealth to support their education, while the 
300,000 students in the richest districts had more than 25 percent of the 
state's wealth.110 
The Court wrote, "More money allocated under the present system would reduce some of 
the existing disparities between districts but would at best only postpone the reform that is 
necessary to make the system efficient. A Band-aid will not suffice; the system itself must 
be changed." 111 
Helena Elementary School District No. 1 v. State, 236 Mont. 44, 769 P.2d 684 (1989) 
In this action for declaratory judgment, the Montana Supreme Court affirmed the 
District Court's holding that the system of educational financing in Montana violated the 
Montana Constitution, but the Supreme Court drew its conclusions based upon narrower 
grounds that those used by the District Court. At the District Court level, the plaintiffs had 
"presented voluminous evidence to support their theory that the system of funding public 
education in Montana [was] unconstitutional."112 For example, the plaintiffs had 
provided data which demonstrated that per pupil spending disparities were as high as 8 to 
1.113 The District Court had concluded that education was a fundamental right under the 
109 Ibid. at 472. 
110 Stephen I. Brown, "Educational Finance Equity: Recent Developments in State 
Courts," NASSP Bulletin (January 1991): 82. 
111 Edgewood Independent School District v. Kirby, 777 S.W. 2d 391, 397 (Tex. 
1989). 




Montana Constitution and that the state's equal protection clause, as well as the state's 
education clause had been violated On appeal, the Montana Supreme Court found that the 
state "failed to provide a system of quality education granting to each student the equality 
of educational opportunity guaranteed under Art. X, Sec. 1, Mont. Const."114 Because 
the court found the financing system to be invalid under the education clause of the 
Montana Constitution, it found no reason to consider the equal protection issue.115 
Furthermore, the court refused to consider whether education was a fundamental right 
under the Montana Constitution.116 
Kukor v. Grover, 148 Wis. 2d 469, 436 N.W.2d 568 (1989) 
The plaintiffs in this case alleged that the state aid formula violated the education 
and equal protection clauses of the Wisconsin Constitution. After the circuit court 
dismissed the plaintiffs claim, the case came before the Wisconsin Supreme Court on 
certification from the court of appeals. The Wisconsin Supreme Court affirmed the 
judgment of the circuit court. First, the court found that "while greater uniformity in 
educational opportunities is ... desirable and necessary, it is not something which is 
constitutionally mandated under the uniformity provision [of the education clause.]"117 
Secondly, citing Rodriguez and advocating local control as a legitimate state interest, the 
court found no violation of state equal protection.118 finally, the court suggested while 
education finance matters were extremely important and changes in the system might be 
beneficial, the duty to make such changes fell upon the legislature and the community .119 
114 Ibid. at 690. 
115 Ibid. at 691. 
116 Peter Enrich, "Leaving Equality Behind: New Directions in School finance 
Reform," 48 VanderbiltLawReview (1995): 189. 
117 Kukor v. Grover, 148 Wis. 2d 469, 436 N.W.2d 568, 577 (1989). 
118 Ibid. at 581, 582. 
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Rose v. Council for Better Education, 790 S.W. 2d 186 (Ky. 1989) 
Called "the mother of all adequacy suits," 120 the court in this Kentucky case ruled 
that the school financing system was both inadequate and inequitable. The Kentucky 
Supreme Court "threw out virtually everything--the mechanism for funding education and 
aIJ the Jaws creating districts, school boards and the state education department. AIJ 
regulations regarding teacher certification and school construction were declared 
unconstitutional as well." 121 
1990 
Abbott v. Burke, 119 N.J. 449, 355 A.2d 359 (1990). 
Although New Jersey led the nation in funding its schools,122 disparities had 
increased since the New Jersey Supreme Court's ruling in Robinson v. Cahill. In this 
case the New Jersey Supreme Court wrote: "[f]he extent of failure is so deep, its causes 
so embedded in the present system, as to persuade us that there is no likelihood of 
achieving a decent education tomorrow, in the recent future or ever. 11 123 In spite of its 
pessimistic view for hope of reform, the court nonetheless invalidated the school fiancne 
system that had been approved after Robinson V, "on the gorunds of stark failures of poor 
urban school districts to enable students to compete with those from wealthier suburban 
districts."124 The court ordered the elimination of differences between rich and poor 
119 Ibid. at 585. 
120 Charles Mahtesian, "The Quagmire of Education Finance," Governing (September 
1993): 45, quoting Michael Kirst, professor of education at Stanford University and former 
president of the California Board of E.ducation. 
121 Charles Mahtesian, "The Quagmire of E.ducation Finance," Governing (September 
1993): 45. 
122 Stephen I. Brown, "Educational Finance Equity: Recent Developments in State 
Courts," NASSPBulletin (January 1991): 83. 
123 Ibid. at 84. 
124 Peter Enrich, "Leaving Equality Behind: New Directions in School Finance 
Reform," 48 VanderbiltLawReview (1995): 190. 
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districts and also increased funding of poor urban school districtsl25 (essentially 
acknowledging the fact that they had special needsdue to municipal overburden.) 
1991 
Coalition for Equitable School Funding v. State. 311 Or. 300, 811 P.2d 116 (1991) 
The plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment holding that the Oregon system of 
public school finance violated the state constitution, but the Oregon Supreme Court found 
that the plaintiffs failed to plead a valid claim for relief.126 The plaintiffs had hoped the 
court would overturn the earlier Olsen127 case which upheld the system of school financing 
in the state, but according to the court, the Oregon Constitution had changed in a relevant 
way since 1976 when Olsen was decided.128 The people [had] added a new provision that 
address[ed] specifically how public schools were to be funded ... 11 129 According to the 
court, "When a party argues that a general constitutional provision forbids the state from 
doing something, the argument may be answered by a later adopted constitutional provision 
that allows he state to do that very thing." 130 
The court found that in this case the voters had added a provision to their 
constitution known as the "Safety Net."131 The Safety Net specifically addressed the 
funding of public schools and permitted both the use of local tax dollars to support 
education and district-to-district disparities.132 In essence, the plaintiffs claim had already 
125 Ibid. 
126 Coalition for Equitable School Funding v. State. 311 Or. 300, 811 P.2d 116 
(1991). 
127 Olsen v. State, 276 Or.9, 554 P.2d 139 (1976). 
128 CoalitionforEquitableSchoolFunding v. State. 311Or.300, 811P.2d116, 119 
(1991). 
129 Ibid. 
130 Ibid. at 120. 
131 Ibid. at 119. 
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In this case, which came to be known as Edgewood III, the court examined the 
legislative response to Edgewood II. After Edgewood II, the Texas State Legislature 
pooled property tax wealth and equalized taxing capacity through the creation of 
consolidated county-wide taxing districts. In Edgewood III, the court found that this 
system violated the Texas Constitution because it was a form of state-level property 
taxation, which was prohibited by the constitution.137 
Tennessee SmaJI School Systems v. McWberter, Appeal No.01-A-01-9111-CH-00433, 
1992 Tenn. App. LEXIS 486 
See Tennessee Small School Systems v. McWherter, 851 S.W. 2d 139 (Ten. 
1993) in the 1993 Section for more on this case. 
1993 
Alabama Coalition for Equity v. Hunt, 624 So. 2d 107 (Ala. 1993) 
Circuit Court Judge Eugene Reese declared the Alabama school finance system 
unconstitutional under Alabama's equal protection clause and its education clause. In 
considering whether or not education should be a fundamental right in Alabama, the court 
found that Rodriguez did not control.138 The court wrote that "[p]ublic education is the 
state's chief instrument for stimulating economic growth, fostering civic responsibility, 
exposing the citizenry to social values, preparing students for professional training, and 
protection our democratic form of govemment."139 Based on these assertions, the court 
also found that education was a fundamental right in Alabama.140 
137 Peter Enrich, "Leaving Equality Behind: New Directions in School Finance 
Reform," 48 Vanderbilt Law Review (1995): 192. 
138 Alabama Coalition for Equity v. Hunt, 624 So. 2d 107, 159 (Ala. 1993). 
139 Ibid. at 158. 
140 Ibid. at 159. 
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The court found that it was the state's responsibility to "establish, organize, and 
maintain"l41 a system of free public schools where students would have the opportunity to 
obtain: (1) "sufficient oral and written communications skills"; (2) "sufficient mathematics 
and scientific skills"; (3) "sufficient knowledge of economic, social, and political systems 
generally, and of the history, politics and social structure of Alabama and the United States, 
specifically to enabled the student to make informed choices"; (4) sufficient understanding 
of government and civics; (5) sufficient "self-knowledge," including health and mental 
hygiene; ( 6) "sufficient understanding of the arts to enable each student to appreciate his or 
her cultural heritage and the cultural heritages of others"; (7) sufficient academic, 
vocational and guidance training "to choose and pursue life work intelligently"; (8) 
sufficient ski1Js to enable student to compete with others in the state, country and world, in 
the job market and academics; and (9) "sufficient support and guidance so that every 
student feels a sense of self-worth and ability to achieve, and so that every student is 
encouraged to live up to his or her full human potential."142 The court did not define 
"sufficient" in this context. 
Gould v. Orr, 244 Neb. 163, 506 N.W.2d 349 (1993) 
The court dismissed claims that the wide spending disparities violated Nebraska's 
education and equal protection clauses (and uniform taxation.) The court found that the 
plaintiffs failed to state facts sufficient to support a cause of action because they did not 
allege that the disparities caused the educational inadequacies.143 
Claremont School District v. Governor, 138 N.H. 183, 635 A.2d 1375 (1993) 
141 Ibid. at 166. 
142 Ibid. 
143 Peter Enrich, "Leaving Equality Behind: New Directions in School Finance 
Reform," 48 Vanderbilt Law Review (1995): 189. 
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In this case,144 the court found that the education clause of the New Hampshire 
Constitution required the state to provide adequate funding for broad educational 
opportunities for all children. The court remanded the case to the lower court for a 
determination as to whether or not the existing system fulfilled the state's obligation. 
Idaho Schools for Equal Educational Opportunity v. Evans, 123 Idaho 573, 850 P.2d 724 
(1993) 
The plaintiffs in a group of consolidated cases alleged, on appeal, that the method 
of funding public schools in Idaho (1) provide neither a uniform nor an efficient system 
and also (2) violated the state equal protection clause. The court found Thompson v. 
Engelking, 96 Idaho 793, 537 P.Ed. 635 (1975) to be controlling. The court's language 
in Thompson was not dicta, 145 and the court in that case reached the correct result In this 
case, like the Thompson case, the rational basis test was the appropriate standard of 
review. 
McDuffy v. Secretary of Executive Office of Education, 415 Mass. 545, 615 N.E.2d 516 
(1993) 
In this Massachusetts case the plaintiffs claimed that the state's school financing 
system denied them an adequate education in violation of the state's education clause. The 
plaintiffs alleged crowded classes, inadequate teaching, lack of curriculum development, 
inadequate guidance counseling and unpredictable funding made the school financing 
system unconstitutionaI.146 The court extensively examined the history of the 
Massachusetts education clause147 and upon doing so, agreed with the plaintiffs. The case 
144 Ibid. 
145 Dicta constitute "expressions in a court opinion which go beyond the facts before 
the court and therefore are the individual views of the author of the opinion and therefore, 
not binding in subsequent cases." (See Black's Law Dictionary, p.408.) 
146 McDuffy v. Secretary of Executive Office of Education, 415 Mass. 545, 615 
N.E.2d 516, 520-21 (1993). 
147 Ibid. at 523-47. 
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was then remanded to a lower court to determine whether, within a reasonable time, 
appropriate legislative action [had] been taken. "148 
Reform Educational Financing Inequities Today (R.E.F.I.T.) v. Cuomo, 199 A.D.2d. 
488, 606 n.Y. S. 2d 44 (1993) 
In this case, the property-poor plaintiffs asserted that they did not have the funds to 
compete with their wealthier neighbors who were able to provide better educational services 
as a result of their higher tax base. The plaintiffs insisted that the school finance situation 
had grown worse since the New York public school financing system was upheld almost 
ten years earlier in Board of Educ. Levittown Union Free School Dist. v. Nyquist. The 
plaintiffs cited the folJowing as evidence of the worsening situation: ( 1) a widening tax-
base gap between the rich and poor; (2) growing disparities in per pupil expenditures in 
spite of poor districts' attempts to increase their own taxes; (3) unnamed severe real life 
consequences resulted from these increasing disparities; (4) a disproportionate increase in 
high risk students; (5) the "burdensome imposition" of state mandates upon JocaJ districts 
which were unable to raise the finances necessary to meet these mandates; (6) the failure of 
the legislature to act upon the appeIJate court's "invitation" to reform the school financing 
system; and (7) the fact that the state budget crisis had a disproportionate effect on poor 
districts because of reductions in state aid.149 
The court found that in spite of all these claims, the plaintiffs never alleged that 
"their students were not being provided with a sound, basic education." 150 The plaintiffs 
aJlegations--that disparities existed between districts--had already been addressed in 
Levittown. The New York Court of Appealsl51 had already found that disparities were 
constitutionaIJy permissible. 
148 Ibid. at 556. 
149 Ibid. at 46. 
150 Ibid. 
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Skeen v. State, 505 N.W. 2d 299 (Minn. 1993) 
The plaintiffs in this case were rapidly growing suburban school districts with 
relatively low property values.152 They did not challenge the adequacy of education in 
Minnesota. "In fact, the parties conceded that all plaintiff districts met or exceeded the 
educational requirements of the state."153 Rather, they alleged that the current system 
violated the state's educationl54 and equal protection clausesl55ciause because it failed to 
provide all students with equal educational opportunity .156 
On appeal, the Minnesota Supreme Court found that neither clause was violated. 
First, after examining the wording in the education clause and comparing Minnesota's 
clause to those of other states, the court found that the plaintiffs had failed to show that the 
system was inadequate. Furthermore, according to the court the language of the education 
clause (which called for a "general and uniform" system of schools) did not require total 
funding equalization.157 Secondly, the court found no violation of state equal protection. 
although the court agreed with the lower court's holding that education was a fundamental 
right in Minnesota, the supreme court found the fundamental right to education did not 
mean that there was a fundamental right to a particular funding scheme.158 In this case, 
the court found that the rational relationship test, not the strict scrutiny test should be used 
151 The highest state court in New York. 
152 Peter Enrich, "Leaving Equality Behind: New Directions in School Finance 
Reform," 48 Vanderbilt Law Review (1995): 101. 
153 Skeen v. State, 505 N.W. 2d 299, 302 (Minn. 1993). 
154 Ibid. at 302. 
155 Ibid. at 312. 
156 Ibid. at 302. 
157 Ibid. at 312. 
158 Ibid. at 315. 
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to evaluate the funding scheme. Using this Jess stringent test, the court found that the 
school finance scheme was rationally related to a legitimate state purpose. 159 Like many 
other courts that have upheld school financing systems, the Skeen court was nonetheless 
careful not to endorse the status quo and encouraged attempts to improve the system.1 60 
Tennessee Small School Systems v. McWherter, 851 S.W. 2d 139 (Ten. 1993) 
This case reached the Tennessee Supreme Court after years of court battles. The 
original complaint in this case was filed on July 7, 1988.161 The complaint alleged that 
education was a fundamental right in the State of Tennessee, but that the state had deprived 
children of that fundamental right because its school financing system was unjust. The 
complaint also alleged violations of the state equal protection and education clauses.162 
The trial court had ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, but the appellate court reversed.163 
The Tennessee Supreme Court determined that the essential issue in the case was 
"quality and equality of education," not "equality of funding."164 The court found that the 
Tennessee system for funding public schools was invalid according to all three types of 
equal protection analysis equal protection test, including the rational relationship test.165 
The plaintiffs in this case had argued that school financing was related to the legitimate 
interest of local control. The court found that argument unacceptable and concluded that 
"the better reasoned opinions are those which have rejected the argument that local control 
159 Ibid. 
160 Ibid. at 318. 
161 Tennessee Small School Systems v. McWherter. 851S.W.2d 139 (Ten. 1993). 
162 Ibid. 
163 Ibid. at 142. 
164 Ibid. at 156. 
165 Ibid. at 153. 
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is justification for disparity in opportunity."166 Because the court found that the state 
school financing system was unconstitutional under the equal protection clause, the court 
felt that it did not need to detennine "the precise level of education mandated" under the 
education clause.167 Based on these conclusions, the Tennessee Supreme Court reversed 
the holding of the court of appeals and remanded the case for trial. 168 
166 Ibid. at 154. 
167 Ibid. at 152. 
168 Ibid. at 156. 
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Comparison and Contrast Through the Use of Tables 
Evaluating school finance cases through comparison and contrast is especially 
useful because in school finance cases there are many points of similarity as well as 
numerous individual nuances that make each case unique. Because of the length of the 
some decisions, the complexity of the issues involved and the great number of cases, a side 
by side evaluation of cases is a difficult challenge. The following tables (Table 4, Table 5 
and Table 6) attempt to meet that challenge by focusing on brief, but specific points of 
comparison. 
Table 4 attempts to get to the heart of the plaintiffs' arguments by examining the 
particular clauses that were challenged by the plaintiffs. The table indicates whether the 
plaintiffs challenged a state's equal protection clause, a state's education clause, or both 
clauses. It follows the continuation of challenges to both types of clauses from 1973 to 
1993. 
Table 5 highlights the "education clause" language from each state's constitution, as 
it read in 1993. Not only is direct comparison of constitutional language made possible by 
this table, the table also evaluates the strength of the individual state education clauses and 
indicates whether education has been declared a fundamental right in the particular state. 
(While courts have been major source for declaring education a fundamental state right, 
some states have addressed this issue by voting or through other means. Such instances 
are noted in the table.) 
Table 6, like Table 5, also touches upon the purported strength of the state's 
education clause, but Table 6 also evaluates the cases' outcomes. It demonstrates which 
state system were upheld and which were invalidated during the 1973 to 1993 period. It 
also serves as proof of the continuation of efforts to resolve school finance problems in the 
state court system, more than twenty years after the Rodriguez decision. 
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Table 4- State Constitutinal Clauses Challenged After the Rodriguez Decision 
1973 
Miliken v. Green, 390 Mich. 389, 212 
N.W. 2d 711 (1973) 
Robinson v. Cahill, 62 NJ. 473, 303 A.2d 
273 (1973) 
Shofstall v. Hollins, 110 Ariz. 88, 515 
P.2d 590 (1973) 
1974 
Northshore School District No, 417 v. 
Kinear, 84 Wash.2d 685, 530 p.2d 178 
(1974) 
1975 
Thompson v. Engelking, 96 Idaho 793, 
537 P.2d 635 (1975) 
1976 
Olsen v. State, 276 Or.9, 554 P.2d 139 
(1976) 
People ex. rel. Jones v. Adams, 40 Ill. 
App.3d 189, 350 N.E.2d 767 (1976) 
Robinson v. Cahill, 69 N.J. 449, 355 A. 
2d 129 ( 1976) 
Serrano v. Priest, 18 Cal. 3d 729, 557 
p .2d 929 (1976) 
1977 
Horton v. Meskill, 376 A. 2d 359 (1977) 
1978 
Seattle School Dist. No. 1 v. State, 90 























Table 4- State Constitutina] Clauses Challenged After the Rodriguez Decision (Cont.) 
1979 
Board of Education v. Walter, 58 Oh.St. 2d 
368, 390 N.E.2d 813 (1979) 
Danson v. Casey, 484 Pa. 415, 399 A 2d 
360 (1979) 
Pauly v. Kelly 162 W.Va. 672, 255S.E. 2d 
859 (1979) 
1980 
Washakie County School Dist. No. 1 v. 
Herschler, 606 P.2d 310 (Wyo. 1980) 
1981 
Levittown Union Free School Dist. v. 
Nyquist, 57 N.Y.S. 2d 27, 453 N.Y.S.2d 
643, 439 N.E. 2d 359 
McDaniel v. Thomas, 248 Ga. 632, 285 
S.E. 2d 156 (1981) 
1982 
Board of Education v. Nyquist, 57 N.Y.2d 
27, 439 N.E. 2d 369 (1982) 
Lujan v. Colorado State Board of Educ., 
649 P.2d 1005 (Colo. 1992) 
1983 
Dupree v. Alama School Dist. No. 30, 279 
Ark. 340, 651 S.W.2d 90 (1983) 
Hornbeck v. Somerset County Board of 
Education, 295 Md. 597, 458 S.2d 758 
(1983) 
1984 
East Jackson Public Schools v. State, 133 
Mich. APP. 132, 348 N.W. 2D 303 (1984) 
Pauley v. Bailey,174 W.Va. 167, 324 S.E. 






























Table 4- State Constitutinal Clauses Challenged After the Rodriguez Decision (Cont.) 
1985 
Horton v. Meskill, 187 Conn. 187, 486 
A.2d 1099 (1985) 
1986 
Serrano v. Priest, 226 Cal. Rptr. 584 (Cal. 
App. 1986) 
1987 
Britt v. North Caolina State Board of 
Education. 86 N.C. App. 282, 357 S.E.2d 
432, app. dismissed 361 S.E.2d 71 (1987) 
Fair School Finance Council v. State, 746 
P.2d 1135 (Okla. 1987) 
1988 
Richland County v. Campbell, 294 s.c. 
346, 364 S.E. 2d 470 (1988) 
1989 
Edgewood Independent School District v. 
Kirby, 777 S.W. 2d 391 (Tex. 1989) 
Helena Elementary School District No. 1 
v. State, 236 Mont. 44, 769 bP.2d 684 
(1989) 
Kukor v. Grover, 148 Wis.2d 469, 436 
N.W.2d 568 (1989) 
Rose v. Council for Better Education, 790 
S.W. 2d 186 (Ky. 1989) 
1990 
























Tab I e 4 - State Consti tutinal Clauses Challenged After the Rodriguez Decision (Cont.) 
1991 
Coalition for Equitable School Funding v. 
State. 311 Or. 300, 811 P.2d 116 (1991) 
Edgewood Independent School District v. 
Kirby, 804 S.W. 2d 491 (Tex. 1991) 
1992 
Butt v. State, 4 Cal. 4th 668, 842 P.2d 
1240 (1992) 
Carrollton-Farmers Branch Independent 
School District v. Edgewood Independent 
School District, 826 s.w. 2d 489 
(Tex.1992) 
1993 
Alabama Coalition for Equity v. Hunt, 624 
So. 2d 107 (Ala. 1993) 
Gould v. Om, 244 Neb. 163, ~ N.W.2d 
349 (1993) 
Claremont School District v. Governor, 
138 N.H. 183, 635 A.2d 1375 (1993) 
Idaho Schools for Equal Educational 
Opportunity v. Evans, 123 Idaho 573, 850 
P.2d 724 (1993) 
McDuffy v. Secretary of Executive Office 
of Education, 415 Mass. 545, 615 N.E.2d 
516 (1993) 
Reform Educational Financing Inequities 
Today (R.E.F.l.T.) v. Cuomo, 199 
A.D.2d. 488, 606 n.Y. S. 2d 44 (1993) 
Skeen v. State, 505 N.W. 2d 299 (Minn. 
1993) 
Tennessee Small Sch. Sys. v. McWherter, 






























Tab]e 5 - State Constitutional Clauses That 
Established Public Schools (As They Looked In 1993) 
121 
Category I exacts the minimum educational obligation upon a state; generally the mere 
creation or establishment of schools 
Category II is a higher standard than Category I; it requires that states meet some 
minimum standard of quality 
Categoryy III contains a preamble which may set forth the purpose of education in the 
state and a]so employs a "stronger and more specific education mandate" 
Category IV exacts the highest form of educational obligation upon a state; often 
describes education as "fundamenta1," "paramount," or "primary" 
{These categories were established in the following article: William E. Thro, "To Render 
Them Safe: The Ana1ysis of State Constitutional Provisions in Public Schoo] Finance 










F Fundamental -Educational is a fundamental right in the state. 
NF Not Fundamental - Education is not a fundamental right in the state. 
NR No Ruling - There is no state ruling as to the fundamentality of education. 
Courts have either ( 1) not had the opportunity to examine the issue; or (2) 
refused to rule on the fundamentality of education. 
Art. XIV, "The Legislature shall establish, organize and maintain a liberal 
* 
F 
system of public schools throughout the state for the benefit of the 
§ 256; children thereof between the ages of seven and twenty-ones years." 
Art. VII,§ 1 "The legislature shall by general law establish and maintain a system I NR 
of public schools open to all children of the State, and may provide 
for other public educational institutions ... " 
Art. XI,§ 1 "The Legislature shall enact such laws as shall provide for the I F 
establishment and maintenance of a general and uniform public school 
svstem ... II 
Art. XIV, "The state shall maintain a general, suitable and efficient system of II NR free schools whereby all persons in the State between the ages of six 
§ 1 and twenty-one years may receive gratuitous instruction." 
Art. IX,§ 1 "A general diffusion of knowledge and intelligence being essential to III F the preservation of the rights and liberties of the people, the 
Legislature shall encourage by all suitable means the promotion of 
intellectual, scientific, moral and agricultural improvement" 
Art.IX, § 2 "The genral assembly shall, as soon as practicable, provide for the II NF 
establishment and maintenance of a thorough and uniform system of 
free public schools, throughout the state, wherein all residents of the 
state, between the ages of six and twenty-one years, may be educated 
gratuitouslv." 
Art.VII,§ 1 "There shall be free public elementary and secondary schools in the I F 
state. The general assembly shall implement this principle by 
annropriate legislation.• 
Art. X, § 1 "The General Assembly shall provide for the establishment and III NR 
maintenance of a general and efficient system of free public schools, 
and may require that every child, not physically or mentally disabled, 
shall attend the pubic school, unless educated by other means." 











Art. X, § 1 
Art. IX,§ 1 
Art. X, § 1 
Art. VIII, § 1 




Art. VII,§ 1 
ME Art.VII, pt. 
1, § 1 
MD Art.VIII,§ 1 
MA Pt.2, Ch. 5, 
§2 
MI Art.VII, 
§§ 1, 2 
MN Art. XIII, 
§ 1 
MS Art. 8, § 201 
"The provision of an adequate public education for the citizens shall 
be a primary obligation of the State of Georgia." 
"The State shall provide for the establishment, support and control of 
a statewide svstem of public schools ... " 
"[I]t shall be the duty of the legislature of Idaho to establish and 
maintain a general, uniform and thorough system of public, free 
common schools." 
"A fundamental goal of the People of the State is the educational 
development of all persons to the limits of their capacities. The 
State shall provide for an efficient system of high quality public 
education institutions and services. Education in public schools 
through the secondary level shall be free. There may be such other 
free education a<> the General Assemblv provides bv law." 
"Knowledge and learning, generally diffused throughout a community, 
being essential to the preservation of a free government; it shall be 
the duty of the General Assembly to encourage, by all suitable 
means, moral, intellectual, scientific, and agricultural improvement; 
and to provide, by law, for a general and uniform system of Common 
Schools, wherin tuition shall be without charge, and equally open to 
all. It 
"The general assembly shall encourage, by all suitable means, the 
promotion of intellectual, scientific, moral, and agricultural 
improvement." 
"The legislature shall provide for intellectual, educational, vocational 
and scientific improvement by establishing and maintaining public 
schools." 
"The General Assembly shall, by appropriate legislation, provide for 
an efficient svstem of common schools throughout the State." 
"The legislature shall provide for the education of the people of the 
state and shall establish and maintain a public educational svstem." 
"A general diffusion of the advantages of education being essential to 
the preservation of the rights and liberties of the people; to promote 
this important object, the Legislature are authorized, and it shall be 
their duty to require, the several towns to make suitable provision, at 
their own expense, for the support and maintenance of public 
schools ... " 
"The General Assembly ... shall by law, establish throughout the state 
a thorough and efficient svstem of free public schools." 
"[l]t shall be the duty of the legislatures and magistrates, in all future 
periods of this commonwealth, to cherish the interests of literature 
and the sciences, and all the seminaries of them ... public schools and 
grammar schools in the towns." 
"the means of education shall forever be encouraged" and "[e]very 
school district shall provide for the education of its pupils without 
discrimination." 
"The stability of a republican form of government depending mainly 
upon the intelligence of the people, it is the duty of the legislature to 
establish a general and uniform system of public schools. The 
legislature shall make such provisions by taxation or otherwise as 
will secure a thorough and efficient system of public schools 
throughout the state." 
"The Legislature shall, by general law, provide for the establishment, 
maintenance and support of free public schools upon such conditions 
and limitations as the Legislature may prescribe." (Inserted into the 




















MO Art. IX, "A general diffusion of knowledge and intelligence being essential to IV NR the preservation of the rights and liberties of the people, the general 
§ l(a) assembly shall establish and maintain free public schools for the 
gratuitous instruction of all persons in this state within ages not in 
excess of twenty-one years as prescribed by law." 
Mf Art. X, § 1 "( 1 )It is the goal of the people to establish a system of education II F 
which will develop the full educational potential of each person. 
Equality of educational opportunity is guaranteed to each person of 
the state. (2) The state recognizes the distinct and unique cultural 
heritage of the American Indians and is committed in its educational 
goals ti the preservation of their cultural heritage. (3) The legislature 
shall provide a basic system of free quality public elementary and 
secondary schools. The legislature may provide such other 
educational institutions, public libraries, and educational programs as 
it deems desirable. It shall fund and distribute in an equitable manner 
to the school districts the state's share of the cost of the basic 
elementarv and secondary school system." 
NB Art. VII,§ I "The Legislature shall provide for the free instruction in the common I NR 
schools of this state of all persons between the ages of five and 
twenty-one years." 
NV Art. XI,§ 2 "The legislature shall provide for a uniform system of common III NR 
schools ... " 
NH Pt. 2, 83 "Knowledge and learning, generally diffused through a community, IV NR being essential to the preservation of a free government; and 
spreading the opportunities and advantages of education through the 
various parts of the country, being highly conducive to promote this 
end; it shall be the duty of the legislators and magistrates, in all 
future periods of government, to cherish the interest of literature and 
the sciences, and all seminaries and public schools, to encourage 
private and public institutions ... " 
NJ Art. VIII,§ 4 " The legislature shall provide for the maintenance and support of a II F thorough and efficient system of free public schools" 
NM Art. XII,§ I "A uniform system of free public schools sufficient for the education I NR 
of, and open to, all the children of school age in the state shall be 
established and maintained." 
NY Art. XI,§ 1 "The legislature shall provide for the maintenance and support of a I NR 
system of free common schools, wherein all the children of this state 
may be educated." 
NC Art. IX,§ 2 "The people have a right to the privilege of education, and it is the I NF duty of the State to guard and maintain that right." 
ND Art.VII,§ I "A high degree of intelligence, patriotism, integrity and morality on II NR the part of every voter in a government and the prosperity and 
happiness of the people, the legislative assembly shall make 
provision for the establishment and maintenance of a system of 
public schools which shall be open to all children of the state of 
North Dakota and free from sectarian control. This legislative 
requirement shall be irrevocable without the consent of the United 
States and the people of North Dakota." 
OH Art. VI,§ 3 "Provisions shall be made by law for the organization, administration II NR 
and control of the public school system of the state supported by 
public funds: provided, that each school district embraced wholly or 
in part within any city shall have the power by referendum vote to 
determine for itself the number of members and organization of the 
district board of education, and provision shall be made by law for the 
exercise of this nower by such school districts." 
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OK Art. XII,§ 1 "The legislature shall establish and maintain a system of free public I NR 
schools wherein all the children of the State mav be educated" 
OR Art. 8, § 3 "The Legislative Assembly shall provide by law for the establishment II NF 
of a uniform, and general svstem of Common schools." 
PA Art. III, § 14 "The General Assembly shall provide for the maintenance of a II NR thorough and efficient system of education to serve the needs of the 
Commonweal th" 
RI Art. XII,§ 1 "The diffusion of knowledge, as well as of virtue among the people, III NR being essential to the preservation of their rights and liberties, it shall 
be the duty of the general assembly to promote public schools and 
public libraries, and to adopt all means which it may deem necessary 
and proper to secure to the people the advantages and opportunities of 
education and public library services." 
SC Art. 11, § 3 "The General Assembly shall provide for the maintenance and support I NR of a system of free public schools open to all children in the State and 
shall establish, organize and support such other public institutions of 
learning, as mav be desirable." 
SD Art.VII,§ 1 "The stability of republican form of government depending on the III NR 
morality and intelligence of the people, it shall be the duty of the 
Legislature to establish and maintain a general and uniform system of 
public schools wherein tuition shall be without charge, and equally 
open to all; and to adopt all suitable means to secure to the people 
the advantages and oooortunities of education." 
TN Art. XI,§ 12 "The State of Tennessee recognizes the inherent value of education II NR 
and encourages its support. The General Assembly shall provide for 
the maintenance, support, and eligibility standards of a system of free 
schools." 
TX Art. VII,§ 1 "A general diffusion of knowledge being essential to the preservation II NR of the liberties and rights of the people, it shall be the duty of the 
Legislature of the State to establish and make suitable provision for 
the support and maintenance of an efficient system of public free 
schools." 
UT Art.X, § 1 "The Legislature shall provide for the establishment and maintenance I NR 
of the state's education systems including: (a) a public education 
system, which shall be open to all the children of the state and (b) a 
higher education system. Both systems shall be free from sectarian 
control." 
VT Ch.2, § 68 "Laws for the encouragement of virtue and prevention of vice and I NR immorality ought to be constantly kept in force, and duly executed; 
and a competent number of schools ought to be maintained in each 
town unless the general assembly permits other provisions for the 
convenient instruction of vouth." 
VA Art. XII, §1 "The General Assembly shall provide for a system of free public II F 
elementary and secondary schools for all children of school age 
throughout the Commonwealth, and shall seek to ensure that an 
educational program of high quality is established and continually 
maintained." 
WA Art. IX,§ 1 "It is the paramount duty of the state to make ample provision for the IV NR education of all children residing within its borders, without 
distinction or oreference on account of race, color, caste, or sex." 
WV Art. XII,§ 1 "The legislature shall provide, by general law, for a thorough and II F efficient svstem of free schools." 
WI Art. X, § 3 "The legislature shall provide by law for the establishment of district II NR schools, which shall be as nearly uniform as practicable; and such 
schools shall be free and without charge for tuition to all children 
between the ages of 4 and 20 vears." 
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WY Art.7, § 1 "The legislature shall provide for the establishment and maintenance II F 
of a complete and uniform system of public instruction, embracing 
free elementarv schools of everv needed kind and irrade ... " 
*Thro evaluated Alabama's education clause as a "I," but the language of the clause was 
subsequently changed and in 1993 education was declared a fundamental right in Alabama. 
**Illinois rejected the fundamentality of education in a 1993 vote to ammend the state 
constitution, not in a court decision. 
***At the time the evaluations of these clauses was set, Mississppi's relativley new clause 
had not yet been considered by the authors who established this system of evaluation. 
Based upon their qualifications,however, Mississippi's education clause appears to have 
been approximatley a II. 
Source: Lexis Computer Services, 1995. 
Year and Case 
1973 
Miliken v. Green 
Robinson v. Cahill 
Sh of stall v. Hollins 
1974 
Northshore Sch. Dist. 
No. 417 v. Kinear 
1976 
Thompson v. Engelking 
1976 
Olsen v. State 
People ex. rel. Jones v. 
Adams 
Robinson v. Cahill 
Serrano v. Priest 
1977 
1978 
Seattle School Dist. No. 
I v. State 
1979 
Board of Education V. 
Walter 
Danson v. Casey 
Table 6 - Results Of School Finance Challenges 
Citation 
390 Mich. 389 
212 N.W. 2d 711 
62 N.J. 473 
303 A.2d 273 
110 Ariz. 88 
515 P.2d 590 
84 Wash.2d 685 
530 P.2d 178 
96 Idaho 793 
537 P.2d 635 
276 Or.9 
554 P.2d 139 
40 Ill. App.3d 189 
350 N.E.2d 767 
69 N.J. 449 
355 A. 2d 129 
18 Cal. 3d 729 
557 P.2d 929 
90 Wash. 2d 476 
585 P.2d 71 
58 Oh.St. 2d 368 
390 N.E.2d 813 
484 Pa. 415 
399 A. 2d 360 
Strength 
of Education 
































Year and Case 
1980 
Washakie County 
School Dist. No. 1 v. 
Herschler 
1981 
McDaniel v. Thomas 
1982 
Bd. of Educ. v. Nyquist 
Lujan v. Colorado State 
Board of Educ. 
1983 
Dupree v. Alama School 
Dist. No. 30 
Hornbeck v. Somerset 
County Bd. of Educ. 
1984 
East Jackson Public 
Schools v. State 
Pauley v. Bailey 
1985 
Horton v. Meskill 
1986 
Serrano v. Priest 
1987 
Britt v. North Carolina 
State Bd. of Educ. 86 
N.C. Aon. 282 
Fair School Finance 
Council v. State 
Citation 
606 P.2d 310 (Wyo. 
1980) 
248 Ga. 632 
285 S.E. 2d 156 
57N.Y.2d27 
439 N.E. 2d 369 
649 P.2d 1005 
(Colo. 1992) 
279 Ark. 340 
651S.W.2d90 
295 Md. 597 
458 S.2d 758 
133 Mich. Ap. 132 
348 N. W. 2d 303 
174 W.Va. 167 
324 S.E. 2d 128 
187 Conn. 187 
486 A.2d 1099 
226 Cal. Rptr. 584 
(Cal. App. 1986) 
357 S.E.2d 432 
app. dismissed 361 
S.E.2d 71 (1987) 




































Year and Case 
1988 




School District v. Kirby 
Helena Elementary 
School District No. 1 v. 
State 
Kukor v. Grover 




Coalition for Equitable 
Sch. Funding v. State. 
311 Or. 300 
Edgewood Indep. Sch. 
Dist. v. Kirby 
1992 
Butt v. State 
Carrollton-Farmers 




294 s.c. 346 
364 S.E. 2d 470 
777 S.W. 2d 391 
(Tex. 1989) 
236 Mont. 44 
769 P.2d 684 
148 Wis.2d 469 
436 N. W.2d 568 
790 S. W. 2d 186 
(Ky. 1989) 
811 P.2d 116 
(1991) 
804 s.w. 2d 491 
(Tex. 1991) 
4 Cal. 4th 668 
842 P.2d 1240 
(1992) 


























Year and Case Citation 
1993 
Alabama Coalition for 624 So. 2d 107 
Equity v. Hunt (Ala. 1993) 
Claremont School 138 N.H. 183 
District v. Governor 635 A.2d 1375 
(1993) 
Gould v. Orrr 244 Neb. 163 
506 N. W.2d 349 
(1993) 
Idaho Schools for Equal 123 Idaho 573 
Educational Opportunity 850 P.2d 724 
Y. Evans (1993) 
McDuffy v. Secretary of 415 Mass. 545 
Executive Office of 615 N.E.2d 516 
Education (1993) 
Reform Educ. Financing 199 A.D.2d. 488 
Inequities Today 606 N.Y. S. 2d 44 
(R.E.F.I.T.) v. Cuomo ( 1993) 



























The strength of education c1auses used in this table (Table 6) correspond to the William E. 
Thro rankings in the previous table (Table 5.) The clauses have been determined as 




This last chapter begins by offering evidence of continuing inequities in urban, 
suburban and rural communities. It then notes that in 1993 courts continued to be aware 
of these inequities. Next, the chapter examines the roles of both the courts and the 
education community in working toward a solution to education finance problems. It also 
suggests possible routes to successful change in school finance litigation. Finally, the 
"Summary" outlines the basic structure of the entire work is briefly summarized and 
"Recommendations for Future Research" are offered. 
Inequities Continue to Exist 
Inequities in Urban and Suburban Schoo] Financing Systems 
Jonathan Kozol's Savage Inequalities: Children in America's Schools 
In 1992, Jonathan Kozol captured the attention of the nation with his book Savage 
Inequalities: Children in America's Schools. Perhaps surprisingly, the subject of this 
National Book Critics Circle Nominee and best seller was the same topic the United States 
Supreme Court found so difficult to digest--school finance. Kozol's work ambitiously 
attempted to take a very difficult topic and present it in a manner that would be accessible 
to a large audience. Kozol succeeded in doing so by emphasizing the effects of inequitable 
school finance policies, rather than the complicated formulas that comprised those policies. 
The events in KozoJ's book took place from 1988 to 1991 and were sadly 
reminiscent of the facts in 1968 in San Antonio that spurred the Rodriguez case. Kozol 
visited both property-wealthy and property-poor districts across the country in cities and 
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towns such as East St. Louis, Chicago, New York, and Camden. He sat in classrooms, 
examined buildings, observed neighborhood conditions, and spoke to children, parents, 
and teachers. 
In Savage Inequalities, Kozol made no attempt to deny his strong perspective or to 
make his own position subtle. 
Flags in these poor and segregated schools hang motionless and gather 
dust, often in airless rooms and they are frequently no cleaner than the 
schools themselves. Children in a dirty school are asked to pledge 
allegiance to a dirtier flag. What they learn of patriotism is not clear. I 
The crowding of children into insufficient, often squalid spaces [schools] 
seems an inexplicable anomaly in the United States. Images of 
spaciousness and majesty, of endless plains and soaring mountains, fill our 
folklore and our music and the anthems that our children sing. "This land 
is your land," they are told; and in one of the patriotic songs that children 
truly love because it summons up so well the goodness and the optimism of 
the nation at its best, they sing of "good" and "brotherhood" from "sea to 
shining sea." It is a betrayal of the best things that we value when poor 
children are obliged to sing these songs in storerooms and coat closets. 2 
Consequently, at times, Kozol's story of oppression as dramatic as the one found in Cecil 
B. DeMille's The Ten Commandments. 
Nevertheless, behind the drama was indeed a serious picture. Kozol wrote of 
Clark Junior High School in East Saint Louis, Illinois: 
[It] is regarded as the top school in the city ... Even here there is a disturbing 
sense that one has entered a backwater of America .. .In a mathematics class 
of30, children are packed into a space that might be adequate for 15 ... Four 
of the 14 ceiling lights are broken .. .In a seventh grade social studies class, 
the only book that bears some relevance to black concems---its title is "The 
American Negro"--bears a publication date of 1967 ... [Referring to Dr. 
Martin Luther King's "I Have A Dream Speech," a student says:] "Don't 
tell students in this school about 'the dream.' Go and look into a toilet here 
if you would like to know what life is like for students in this city." Before 
I leave, I do as [the boy] asked and enter a boy's bathroom. Four of the 
six toilets do not work. The toilet stalls, which are eaten away by red and 
brown corrosion, have no doors. The toilets have no seats. One has a 
rotted wooden stump. There are no paper towels and no soap. Near the 
door there is a loop of wire with an empty toilet -paper roll. 
1 Jonathan Kozol, Savage Inequalities: Children in America's Schools (New York: 
Harper Perennial, 1992): 173. 
2 Jonathan Kozol, Savage Inequalities: Children in America's Schools (New York: 
Harper Perennial, 1992): 159. 
132 
In Savage Inequalities, Kozo] insisted that even he was shocked by such conditions and at 
first thought that the situation in East St. Louis had to be atypical, but as the book 
progressed, Kozol went on to point out similar deplorable conditions in other parts of the 
United States. 
Kozol was not alone in documenting these inequities. A 1995 Chicago Tribune 
Magazine article compared conditions at two Chicago area high schools in the early 1990s.3 
Less than twenty-five miles apart, the inner city DuSable High School was a world away 
from the suburban New Trier High School in terms of educational opportunity. (See 
Table 7.) 
3 The article is not specific as to the exact period in which it visited the schools, 
however, it appears to have been during the 1993-94 school year. As a consequence of 
the timing of the visits, some of subjects interviewed in the article apparently discussed 
events and situations prior to the 1993-94 school year. 
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Table 7 - New Trier & Dusable High Schools: A Comparison 
Location 
Act mean score 1992-93 
Spending per pupil 
Graduation percentage 
Four-year college enrollment 
Average per capita income 
Local property value 






New Trier High School DuSable High School 
Winnetka, IL* Chicago, IL 
25.2 (Top 1 % ) 14.1 
$12,000 $6,000 
Most years, 100% 50% 
98% "only a handful" 
$62,000 + More than 80% of the 
student body classified as 
low income 
Public housing 
$21,000 more than DuSable $21,000 less than New Trier 
teacher's salary teacher's salary 
Numerous 
Abundant 
Parents extremely involved 
and interested 
"beautifully landscaped;" 
like "an Ivy League college" 
Few 
Limited 
Parents skeptical of school's 
value; involvement lacking 
In "the shadow of the 
Robert Taylor homes ... The 
worst urban misery in 
America" 
Source: The Chicago Tribune Magazine, February 12, 1995, pp. 14-24. (lnterestlingly, 
Kozol also visited schools in Chicago and Winnetka.) 
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Inequities in Rural School Financing Systems 
Rural communities also continued to be affected by unequal educational 
opportunities. Perhaps this was because property-poor districts were even more likely to 
be funded in rural regions than urban ones.4 
Rural areas face a greater challenge than urban places in adequately 
financing education. Equivalent educations are more expensive to provide 
in rural areas, but on the average, metro counties outpace non-metro 
counties in per-pupil expenditures. Rural areas have higher ratios of 
professionals to pupils. Sparsely populated nonmetro counties must spend 
a disproportionate percentage of their revenues transporting 
students ... [even] where non-metro counties have higher per-pupil 
expenditures than their metro counterparts, much of the difference goes to 
provide transportation rather than to expand school curricula or student 
services.5 
In addition to these uniquely rural problems, students in non-urban property poor 
communities suffered from some of the same problems that afflict their city and suburban 
counterparts--outdated materials, underpaid teachers and inadequate buildings. 
Local property taxes were used to fund education in rural areas, just as in urban or 
suburban area, but the value of the land and the ability of rural residents to tax themselves 
was subject to even greater fluctuation than other non-rural residents. For example, 
"Annual incomes of farmers averaged over $62,000 in 1978, but fell to an average of only 
$2,271 in 1981, $9,871 in 1984 and $5,487 in 1985 ... when figures are adjusted for 
inflation, [1990] farm values [were] 47 percent below those of 1980"6 By the early 
1990s, deflated land values made it increasingly difficult to maintain an adequate level of 
4 Lewis B. Kaden, "Courts and Legislatures in a Federal System: The Case of 
School Finance, "11 Hofstra L.Rev. 1205 ( 1983) 
5 Bernal L.Green and Mary Jo Schneider. "Threats to Funding for Rural Schools." 
Journal of Education Finance 15 (Winter 1990): 302-18. 
61bid. 
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educational spending. Without some sort of assistance, poverty was m danger of 
"becoming endemic in formerly prosperous areas of rural America. "7 
The Courts' Continued Recognition of School Finance Problems 
In Decisions 
Courts continued to recognize and to be affected by school finance problems. In 
1993, more school finance cases were heard than in any previous year.8 Furthermore, 
though similar factual scenarios had been repeated again and again even prior to Rodriguez, 
the despicable conditions in property poor districts continued to outrage and frustrate many 
judges. 
For example, in the 1993 case Tennessee Small School System, v. McWherter,9 
Judge Lyle Reid, writing for the majority reported: 
Trial testimony indicates that many schools in the poorer school districts 
have decaying physical plants, and that some school buildings are not 
adequately heated and have non-functioning showers, buckling floors, and 
leaking roofs. School superintendents and students also testified that the 
poorer school districts do not provide adequate science laboratories for the 
students, even though regulations require such facilities. In fact, evidence 
was adduced that some districts' laboratories are so inadequate that only 
teachers use the equipment in order to 'demonstrate' lab techniques. At 
other schools, the teachers buy supplies with their own money in order to 
stock the labs. Still other schools engage in almost constant fundraising by 
students to provide needed materials. 
Similarly, the textbooks and libraries of many of the poorer school 
districts are inadequate, outdated, and in disrepair. One compelling 
photograph in the record depicts a library in a Hancock county school. The 
library consists of only one bookcase nestled in a room containing empty 
boxes, surplus furniture, a desktop copier, kitchen supplies, a bottle of 
mouthwash, a popcorn machine. When asked why newer textbooks and 
more functional libraries were not provided in the schools, the responsible 
official stated that additional money needed for such improvements was not 
available. The lack of funds in some of the plaintiffs' districts also 
prevents schools in those areas from offering advanced placement courses, 
state-mandated art and music classes, drama instruction, extracurricular 
athletic teams, or more than one foreign language in high school. Io 
7 Ibid. 
8 Chris Pipho, "Fiscal Gridlock," Phi Delta Kappan 74 (February 1993): 430. 
9 Tennessee Small School System, v. McWherter, 851 S.W. 2d 139 (Tenn.1993). 
10 Ibid. at 145. 
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This description of conditions in property poor Tennessee school districts was remarkably 
similar to the descriptions of conditions in the plaintiffs briefs in the Rodriguez case.11 
Twenty years later, students in property poor districts sti11 suffered the same affects--
unequal educational opportunity. 
And Beyond Decisions 
By 1993,judges familiar with education finance cases recognized that identifying 
the problems associated with unequal educational opportunity and declaring a financing 
system invalid were only a tiny step towards reforming school finance. For example, in 
the 1979 case Pauly v. Kelly,12 the West Virginia Supreme Court found the plaintiffs' 
schools to be "woefulJy inadequate." A lower court then directed the state legislature to 
devise a new system. By 1983 the legislature had devised the "Master Plan for 
Education." It ca11ed for greater funding equity, more teachers, higher salaries, new 
buildings and equipment. "A decade later, though the unfortunate truth [was] that the 
court case and the Master Plan accomplished very little." 13 
Even the judges in school finance cases recognized that, despite the good 
intentions, the situation did not improve. Charles Mahtesian, in the September 1993 issue 
of Governing quoted West Virginia Supreme Court Justice Richard Neely on the Bailey 
case, "Our case had all sorts of wonderful language in it, but it didn't amount to a bowl of 
whiz."14 Unfortunately, Justice Neely's assessment was fairly accurate. Mahtesian 
reported that 18 of the 19 schools in the original Bailey suit had been recommended for 
11 See plaintiffs briefs in San Antonio v. Rodriguez. 
12 Pauly v. Kelly,162 W.Va. 672, 255 S.E.2d 859 (1979). 




probation status. The 19th school was labeled "seriously impaired."15 Not only had 
conditions remained unimproved since Bailey, they remained unimproved since Rodriguez. 
Is a Solution Impossible? 
The Courts' Role in Determining the Outcome of School Finance Cases 
In an interview conducted ten years after the Rodriguez decision, John Coons 
asserted that had the Rodriguez case been examined by the Warren Court, the result would 
have been different. He suggested that the Warren Court, with its more liberal 
philosophies and potential willingness to expand fundamental rights, would have had a 
different approach to the case than did the Burger Court, in 1973.16 By 1993, the 
Supreme Court was generally thought to be even more conservative than it was in 1973. 
Several members of the court were appointed by Ronald Reagan and George Bush, neither 
of whom advocated increased federal government involvement in education.1 7 Again, 
while members of the Supreme Court are not bound to follow the political philo~hies of 
the presidents who nominate them, Supreme Court candidates are generally nominated 
because their political philosophies coincide (or at the very least do not clash) with the 
president's. This idea would suggest that the Supreme Court is unlikely to reverse 
Rodriguez at any time in the near future. 
However, the school finance situation did not improve after the Rodriguez 
decision. In fact, most signs indicate that it has gotten worse.18 It is possible that, 
should the right case come along, the Court would once again examine school finance 
15 Ibid. at 43, 44. 
16 "A Decade After Rodriguez: An Interview with John Coons," Phi Delta Kappan, 
March 1983, 482. 
17 Percy E. Burrup, Vern Brimley Jr. and Rulon R. Garfield, Financing Education in 
a Climate of Change, (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1988), 211, 212. 
18 See Jonathan Kozol's Savage Inequalities. 
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matters. If the Court did so, however, one could be fairly certain that it would not do so 
because it was eager to once again address the complicated constitutional issues involved 
with school finance, but because the situation in American schools had indeed so drastically 
deteriorated. The Rodriguez case demonstrated the Supreme Court's hesitation to become 
involved in resolving school finance matters. Whether this hesitation was based in fear or 
genuine concern for upholding the concept of the separation of powers remains unclear. 
Perhaps the decision was influenced by both of these factors. One thing is fairly certain. 
The twenty years following Rodriguez demonstrate that the more removed a court became 
from the facts of the case, the more likely it was to uphold the constitutionality of the state's 
financing system--even in the face of great funding disparities. 
Unlike the appellate courts, or the state supreme courts, which dealt with the more 
abstract issues of constitutionality and school financing, the trial courts assessed the facts 
of the case.1 9 
What distinguish[ed] these trial judges [was] simply that they took the time 
to understand how school finance systems operate. Two conclusions were 
inescapable: that these systems allocated educational resources among 
districts on factors that [had] nothing to do with education and that 
educational opportunities [were] the result of the happenstance of where a 
child live[d].20 
Thus, confronted with these harsh inequalities, the trial courts often found for the plaintiffs 
who had challenged the financing systems. 
The Education Community's Role in Determining the Outcome of School Finance Cases 
Not all of the blame for the lack of improvement in the school financing situation 
should be placed on the courts. The courts can only judge the facts and determine the 
issues that are placed before it. The education finance community, indeed the entire 
education community, needs to put forth a united front, if it is to be successful in court. In 
19 David C. Long, "Rodriguez: The State Courts Respond," Phi Delta Kappan, 
March 1983, 482. 
20 Ibid. 
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Rodriguez, a1though all of the plaintiffs wanted to abolish the school financing system, 
many also had their own agendas that alienated them from their fellow plaintiffs.21 The 
lawyers for the state of Texas were perceptive enough to point out this division to the 
Supreme Court. Surely, this lack of unity did not help the plaintiffs' case. Education 
finance reformers need to formulate a plan that focuses on factors about which there is 
agreement, if they ever hope to succeed in court. 
Scholars must come to some form of consensus before they demand that the courts 
do the same. Even those holding opposing views in Rodriguez were able to reach a 
consensus about some aspects of education: 
1 . Education is important. 
2. Local control is important. 
3. Not all children receive equal educational opportunity. 
Education finance leaders need to examine these and other potential points of agreement in 
order to achieve their goals of equal educational opportunity for all. 
Finding an Answer 
The United States' Historic Interest in Education 
Enemies and Goals 
As this dissertation has pointed out repeatedly, there is no federal constitutional 
commitment to education. Education is a state matter and each state may determine its own 
education system; however, this does not mean that there is no national interest in 
education. The Justices in the Rodriguez majority, as well as in the dissent, noted, 
perhaps even with pride, the Supreme Court's historic interest in education. Likewise, at 
certain times in United States history, the federal government, as a whole, has shown an 
interest in national education policy. 
21 "A Decade After Rodriguez: An Interview with John Coons," Phi Delta Kappan, 
March 1983, 482. 
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In the United States, a national interest in education has typically coincided with 
periods of crisis or change. During the 1973-93 period, the classic example of the federal 
government's interest in education was the federal government's call for increased science 
and math courses after the Soviet Union launched Sputnik in 1957.22 At that time, the 
Soviets' capabilities and the United States' relative inadequacies in math and science were 
seen as a threat to United States security.23 Other examples exist as well. For example, 
the development of the American high school coincided with the changes that took place in 
the workforce due to the industrial revolution.24 In the 1940s, the national government 
took steps to guard against massive unemployment after World War II by financiaJly 
assisting veterans through the 1944 G.I. Bill of Rights.25 
At these times in United States history, the country had, if not an enemy, a at least a 
goal. If education finance reform is ever to take place in the United States (either through 
state-by-state reforms or in one centralized national movement) reformers need to uncover 
an enemy or to focus on a goal. An enemy need not be external. In fact, from 1973 to 
1993, the United States struggled with several internal enemies. These enemies included 
crime, violence, poverty and homelessness. Although many educators have been trained 
to see the relationship between these internal enemies and equal educational opportunity, 
other citizens, including judges, may not have been so trained and may need convincing. 
Finding a goal has been a source of greater difficulty. In the period from 1973 to 
1993, as multicultural awareness increased and political correctness expanded, more and 
more groups sought to influence education. Other more traditionally conservative groups 
22 Percy E. Burrup, Vern Brimley Jr. and Rulon R. Garfield, Financing Education in 
a Climate of Change, (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1988), 177. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Larry E. Decker, Foundations of Community Education, ( 1972). 
25 Percy E. Burrup, Vern Brimley Jr. and Rulon R. Garfield, Financing Education in 
a Climate of Change, (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1988), 177. 
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resented these changes.26 Unlike other countries that have a national identity based upon 
qualities or traits that are similar for all or most of the people of the country, the national 
identity of the United States is founded upon independence and diversity. 
This is not to say that Americans have no national consensus or identifiable 
characteristics. Certainly, capitalist, sports-enthusiastic Americans are competitive, if not 
by nature, then by tradition. Yet, the very quality in the American nature that makes people 
shout "We're number one!" at sporting events and contests should also compel Americans 
to see that there is no legitimate competition in United States schools. After all, where's 
the competition when one side has a distinct disadvantage? 
The Rodriguez case and the subsequent state court cases demonstrate that parents 
are interested in their own children's education. Rich parents, poor parents, and midd1e-
class parents want their children to have educational opportunities that will bring out their 
child's own individual talents and maximize their potential for growth and learning. 
Although, many parents would state, with the utmost conviction, that they want the best 
education for their children, would any parent stand on record and say that his children 
deserve a better education than those who live five miles away in public housing? The 
difference in the two statements may be subtle, but it is nonetheless important. 
Potential Strategies for the Future 
Perhaps, with the combination of the lack of improvement in school finance since 
Rodriguez and the potential national crisis in education, the Supreme Court would once 
again address issues surrounding school finance. Even if the current Court will not 
address these issues, perhaps a later Court would. School finance reformers need to be 
ready with successful arguments should the opportunity to appear before the Court occur 
once agam. One argument that might be successful relates to the exercise of political 
261n a recent New York Times article, one woman expressed her dismay with the potential 
attachments to federal government moneys by indicating that if her state accepted federal 
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Such an argument need not result in the conclusion that every child who enters 
public school is guaranteed a chance to become the President of the United States. In a 
College Board Review article entitled "Rich Schools, Poor Schools: The Persistence of 
Unequal Education," Arthur E. Wise and Tamar Gendler noted that as a result of 
continuing school finance inequities 
it is not only potential luminaries that are lost; it is part of an entire 
generation of citizens whose potential contributions are stunted by the 
inadequacy of the education they are provided. School finance reform 
cannot solve alJ of the problems of education, but it can equalize the 
opportunities that the state provides.28 
Thus, an argument for school finance reform it need not imply that every child who enters 
public school will attend college, let alone a prestigious college. The argument would 
simply center on the fact that educational opportunity is necessary to participate in the total 
political process, not only as an active member of the governed masses, but also for the 
realistic possibility to serve as an elected or appointed government official. Because 
educational opportunity is necessary, for participation in the complete political process, 
where the government has accepted the responsibility to provide it, the government should 
provide it to all on equal terms. 
Moving Beyond Adequacy 
This means forming school finance policies that go beyond adequacy. While 
children should strive to reach goals and educators might hope to produce outcomes, 
working towards adequacy is a somewhat disheartening concept. Furthermore, the 
concept of adequacy as a solution to school finance questions is not without its very 
practical problems. 
Even Justice Thurgood Marshall, who voiced the strongest agreement with the 
plaintiffs in Rodriguez, expressly denounced adequacy as a solution to educational finance 
28 Arthur E. Wise and Tamar Gendler, "Rich Schools, Poor Schools: The Persistence 
of Unequal Education," The College Board Review, 151 (Spring 1989): 37. 
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problems.29 In Rodriguez, Marshall questioned the Court's ability to define educational 
adequacy. More than twenty years later, not only had courts failed to arrive at a workable 
definition of the term, even proponents of adequacy struggled with the term. 
Mary Fulton, a policy analyst at the Education Commission of the States, 
join[ed] a chorus of other education experts when she [said] there is no 
consensus over how to define it. "You can produce a lot of data to show 
inequities exist. You can show that pretty easily. Adequacy is a little 
messier. "3 0 
Finally, adequacy has negative connotations. Parents, regardless of their socio-economic 
class, who are concerned for their children's educational well-being want the same thing 
for their children: a good education. A parent with a low socio-economic status does not 
want wealthy schools to spend less or "level down" so that their own schools no longer 
look so poor in comparison. They want their schools to be as good as those other 
schools. 
Just as Wise and Gendler wrote, a "future physician is as easily born in Jersey City 
as in Princeton, a future pianist in Edgewood as Alamo Heights," (emphasis added). The 
accidents of birth and geography should not determine whether a child learns to play the 
violin or whether class is held in a basement, but despite years of litigation and attempted 
efforts at finance reform, this continues to be the case. "America continues to provide 
unequal education to those who most need what school has to offer."3 1 
29 See Marshall's dissent in San Antonio v. Rodriguez, 411 US 1, 36 L.Ed. 2d 16. 
30 Charles Mahtesian, "The Quagmire of Education Finance," Governing (September 
1993): 45. 
31 Arthur E. Wise and Tamar Gendler, "Rich Schools, Poor Schools: The Persistence 
of Unequal Education," The College Board Review, 151(Spring1989): 12. 
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Closing Remarks 
From 1973 to 1993 many state courts addressed school finance issues. Most often, 
the courts addressed challenges to school financing that had been brought under two state 
constitutional clauses--the equal protection clause and the state education clause. 
Although Rodriguez virtually eliminated the chance for the success of a federal equal 
protection claim, after Rodriguez plaintiffs continued to challenge the clause in their state 
constitution that resembled the federal equal protection clause. In addition, plaintiffs began 
to challenge the clause in the state constitution that established education in the state. The 
language of this clause diff er~d from state to state and so did judicial interpretation of that 
language. 
The success of these challenges varied. Nonetheless, plaintiffs continued to look 
to the courts for guidance, if not solutions, to the problems associated with unequal 
educational opportunity. The state courts attempted to address the complex issues of 
school finance as best they could, given their limited background and experience in such 
matters. At the trial level, where the facts associated with the financial disparities played a 
more prominent role in the adjudication of cases, courts typically advocated a more active 
judicial role, but frequently, by the time the case reached the higher courts, the facts were 
secondary to issues of the law and its interpretation. 
In sum, because the Supreme Court in Rodriguez declined the opportunity to take a 
more active leadership role, the post-Rodriguez years were busy, but not highly productive 
years for state courts. In states like Texas, California and New Jersey, essentially the 
same factual scenarios were repeatedly adjudicated. As time passed, the names of the 
plaintiffs might have changed--after all, in twenty plus years many student/plaintiffs had 
graduated--but with slight variations the procedures for financing schools in the United 
States remained the same. 
During this period school finance litigation was the Jarndyce v. Jarndyce of 
American education. In the Charles Dicken's classic Bleak House, an inheritance case, 
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known as Jarndyce v. Jarndyce, continues on for years in the English courts. By the time 
the suit is resolved, at the end of the novel, all the inheritance money has been spent on 
attorneys fees. In the United States, surely billions of do11ars have been spent arguing, 
somewhat ironically, over inadequate school funding systems. This is not to imply that 
the attorneys in these cases did not earn their fees, but simply to point out that, in spite of 
all the costly litigation, the school finance problems that existed in 1973 still existed in 
1993. The Rodriguez majority, through their inaction, at best delayed the reforms that will 
be necessary to the survival of American education, and at worst exacerbated these 
problems. (See Table 10.) 
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Table9-Timeline 
1968 Rodriguez plaintiffs file claim alleging 
school district funding disparities violate 
the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. 
1969 A three-judge District Court is 
impanelled to hear the Rodriguez suit. 
1970 
19 71 The District Court finds in favor of the 
Rodriguez plaintiffs. The case is 
appealed to the United States Supreme 
Court. 
1972 
197 3 The United States Supreme Court 











1983 In response to Pauly v. Kelly, West 
Virginia produced the Master Plan for 
Education which called improving 
educatinal quality through more 
teachers, higher salaries, new buildings, 
etc. (Ten years later, WestVirginia 
Supreme Court Justice Richard Neely s 
aid, "our case had lots of wonderful 
alnguage in it, but it didn't amount to a 
bowl of whiz.} 
1984 
1985 "Princeton, New Jersey spends $4,954 
to educate a child in its public schools. 
Down the road--and down the social 
ladder--Patterson spends $2,674 per 
child." 
1986 
1987 The man who wrote the Rodriguez 
majority, Supreme Court Justice Lewis 
F. Powell, Jr., retires from the Court as 
its wealthiest member. 
1988 The city of Detroit spends $3,600 yearly 
on each child's education. Nearby 
suburbs spend the following: Grosse 
Pointe $5,700; Bloomfield Hills 
$6,250; Birmingham $6,400. 
1989 United States govenors have a summit 
meeting to discuss national educational 
standards. 
The wealthiest Texas school districts 
outspend the poorest by a ratio of 700 
to 1. 
1990 Demetrio Rodriguez's grandchildren---a 
girl in third grade and a boy in pre-
kindergarten attend public schools in 
Edgewood. Rodrigue predicts, "My 
grandson and granddaughter will graduate 
from high school and [school finance 
reform] still won't be implmented." 
1991 
1992 Jonothan Kozol's Savage Inequalities, 
which describes and humanizes the 
continuing effects of inequitable school 
funding is published and becomes a best 
seller. 
19 9 3 More states than ever have pending 
school finance litigation. 
The information in this timetine can be found in the main body of the dissertation. 
149 
Summary 
This study has analyzed the San Antonio v. Rodriguez in detail and examined 
subsequent state court decisions. By doing do, it has pointed to the effects that the 
Rodriguez decision had, not merely on the education finance policy of a single state or a 
handful of states, but on the education finance scene in the nation as a whole. The 
dissertation began by noting the importance of effective communication in legal educational 
finance matters. Matters of school finance affect a huge range of people--from children to 
teachers to taxpayers to the society at large. The effective resolution of these matters 
depends on the ability to communicate effectively using terminology from law, education 
and school finance. 
Chapters II and III focused on the Rodriguez case. Chapter II began by 
presenting the facts that gave rise to the need for change in Texas school finance policy. It 
then followed the legal trail from the District Court to the United States Supreme Court. 
The Supreme Court decision was examined in its entirety, from the majority opinion 
through the concurring opinions and dissents. Chapter III touched upon questions and 
considerations that were not part of the formal case record, but might nonetheless have 
impacted its outcome. It looked to the Justices' formal constitutional duties as well as their 
life experiences. Fina11y, it pointed out some of the legitimate concerns with making 
education a fundamental right. 
Chapter IV traced the state court case history that followed the Rodriguez decision. 
It presented a chronological listing on state court cases and pointed out interesting or unique 
aspects of certain decisions. It highlighted certain aspects of the plaintiffs' strategies in the 
cases. For example, it noted how many cases stressed violations of state equal protection 
and how many emphasized the state's obligation on its own clause establishing schools. 
In addition the chapter presented other data relevant to school finance, such as the wording 
of state education clauses or whether education was a fundamental right in the state. 
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The final chapter examined where the years since the Rodriguez case have brought 
the school finance movement. It referred to Jonathan Kozol's Savage Inequalities: 
Children in America's Schools and noted some of the unequal educational opportunities 
that still existed in the 1990s. Finally, it offered some suggestions as to the possible future 
of the school finance reform movement. 
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Recommendations for Future Research 
1. Explore individual state finance histories in detail. 
2. Gather evidence as to the adult lives (careers, family situations, extent of education) 
of former residents of school districts with low property value and compare them with 
those of former residents of school districts with high property value. 
3. Rank states as to federal, state, and local sources of education funding. How have 
the federal, state and local contributions changed over the years? 
4. Can national goals be achieved in a multicultural environment? If so, how? What 
can the United States learn from other countries with stronger national education policies? 
5. What are the positions of the current Justices on educational opportunity? Do these 
opinions reflect their own educational backgrounds or are they more closely related to the 
political philosophies they have adopted as adults? 
6. Explore the expanding role of the school business manager as it relates to equal 
educational opportunity. Can the nation as a whole learn from the school business 
manager? Can an individual school with an effective school business manager serve as an 
example for the entire nation? 
7. Does municipal overburden really exist or was it just a failed theory aimed at 
bringing more money into urban schools? 
8. Explore equal educational opportunity as it affects rural communities. 
9. Who are the attorneys who argue these school law cases? Do the same attorneys 
travel from state to state wherever school finance cases are filed. Is school finance 
litigation a lucrative business for attorneys? 
l 0. Is formal education related to political leadership? What percentage of Congress 
(the Supreme Court, Senate, state governors) attended college? Is any correlation merely 
coincidental? 
11. Examine the dissenting opinions in detail. Do dissenters usually advocate change? 
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